UNITED STATES v. ROBERT J. STEVENS
Supreme Court Cases
559 U.S. 460 (2010)
Opinions
Majority Opinion Author
John Roberts
Majority Participants
Dissenting Participants
559 U.S. 460
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2009 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08鈥769. Argued October 6, 2009鈥擠ecided April 20, 2010
Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. 搂48 to criminalize the commercial crea
tion, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty. The
statute addresses only portrayals of harmful acts, not the underlying
conduct. It applies to any visual or auditory depiction 鈥渋n which a liv
ing animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or
killed,鈥 if that conduct violates federal or state law where 鈥渢he crea
tion, sale, or possession takes place,鈥 搂48(c)(1). Another clause ex
empts depictions with 鈥渟erious religious, political, scientific, educa
tional, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.鈥 搂48(b). The
legislative background of 搂48 focused primarily on 鈥渃rush videos,鈥
which feature the torture and killing of helpless animals and are said
to appeal to persons with a specific sexual fetish. Respondent Ste
vens was indicted under 搂48 for selling videos depicting dogfighting.
He moved to dismiss, arguing that 搂48 is facially invalid under the
First Amendment. The District Court denied his motion, and Ste
vens was convicted. The Third Circuit vacated the conviction and de
clared 搂48 facially unconstitutional as a content-based regulation of
protected speech.
Held: Section 搂48 is substantially overbroad, and therefore invalid un
der the First Amendment. Pp. 5鈥20.
(a) Depictions of animal cruelty are not, as a class, categorically
unprotected by the First Amendment. Because 搂48 explicitly regu
lates expression based on content, it is 鈥 鈥榩resumptively invalid,鈥 . . .
and the Government bears the burden to rebut that presumption.鈥
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803,
817. Since its enactment, the First Amendment has permitted re
strictions on a few historic categories of speech鈥攊ncluding obscenity,
defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal con
2 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
Syllabus
duct鈥攖hat 鈥渉ave never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem,鈥 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572. Depic
tions of animal cruelty should not be added to that list. While the
prohibition of animal cruelty has a long history in American law,
there is no evidence of a similar tradition prohibiting depictions of
such cruelty. The Government鈥檚 proposed test would broadly balance
the value of the speech against its societal costs to determine
whether the First Amendment even applies. But the First Amend
ment鈥檚 free speech guarantee does not extend only to categories of
speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and
benefits. The Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American
people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government out
weigh the costs. New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, distinguished.
Pp. 5鈥9.
(b) Stevens鈥檚 facial challenge succeeds under existing doctrine.
Pp. 9鈥20.
(1) In the First Amendment context, a law may be invalidated as
overbroad if 鈥渁 鈥榮ubstantial number鈥 of its applications are unconsti
tutional, 鈥 鈥渏udged in relation to the statute鈥檚 plainly legitimate
sweep.鈥 鈥 鈥 Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican
Party, 552 U. S. 442, 449, n. 6. Stevens claims that common depic
tions of ordinary and lawful activities constitute the vast majority of
materials subject to 搂48. The Government does not defend such ap
plications, but contends that the statute is narrowly limited to spe
cific types of extreme material. Section 48鈥檚 constitutionality thus
turns on how broadly it is construed. Pp. 9鈥10.
(2) Section 48 creates a criminal prohibition of alarming breadth.
The statute鈥檚 definition of a 鈥渄epiction of animal cruelty鈥 does not
even require that the depicted conduct be cruel. While the words
鈥渕aimed, mutilated, [and] tortured鈥 convey cruelty, 鈥渨ounded鈥 and
鈥渒illed鈥 do not. Those words have little ambiguity and should be read
according to their ordinary meaning. Section 48 does require that the
depicted conduct be 鈥渋llegal,鈥 but many federal and state laws con
cerning the proper treatment of animals are not designed to guard
against animal cruelty. For example, endangered species protections
restrict even the humane wounding or killing of animals. The statute
draws no distinction based on the reason the conduct is made illegal.
Moreover, 搂48 applies to any depiction of conduct that is illegal
in the State in which the depiction is created, sold, or possessed, 鈥渞e
gardless of whether the . . . wounding . . . or killing took place鈥 there,
搂48(c)(1). Depictions of entirely lawful conduct may run afoul of the
ban if those depictions later find their way into States where the
same conduct is unlawful. This greatly expands 搂48鈥檚 scope, because
views about animal cruelty and regulations having no connection to
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 3
Syllabus
cruelty vary widely from place to place. Hunting is unlawful in the
District of Columbia, for example, but there is an enormous national
market for hunting-related depictions, greatly exceeding the demand
for crush videos or animal fighting depictions. Because the statute
allows each jurisdiction to export its laws to the rest of the country,
搂48(a) applies to any magazine or video depicting lawful hunting that
is sold in the Nation鈥檚 Capital. Those seeking to comply with the law
face a bewildering maze of regulations from at least 56 separate ju
risdictions. Pp. 11鈥15.
(3) Limiting 搂48鈥檚 reach to crush videos and depictions of animal
fighting or other extreme cruelty, as the Government suggests, re
quires an unrealistically broad reading of the statute鈥檚 exceptions
clause. The statute only exempts material with 鈥渟erious鈥 value, and
鈥渟erious鈥 must be taken seriously. The excepted speech must also fall
within one of 搂48(b)鈥檚 enumerated categories. Much speech does not.
For example, most hunting depictions are not obviously instructional
in nature. The exceptions clause simply has no adequate reading
that results in the statute鈥檚 banning only the depictions the Govern
ment would like to ban.
Although the language of 搂48(b) is drawn from the Court鈥檚 deci
sion in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, the exceptions clause does
not answer every First Amendment objection. Under Miller, 鈥渟eri
ous鈥 value shields depictions of sex from regulation as obscenity. But
Miller did not determine that serious value could be used as a gen
eral precondition to protecting other types of speech in the first place.
Even 鈥 鈥榳holly neutral futilities . . . come under the protection of free
speech.鈥 鈥 Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 25. The First Amend
ment presumptively extends to many forms of speech that do not
qualify for 搂48(b)鈥檚 serious-value exception, but nonetheless fall
within 搂48(c)鈥檚 broad reach. Pp. 15鈥17.
(4) Despite the Government鈥檚 assurance that it will apply 搂48 to
reach only 鈥渆xtreme鈥 cruelty, this Court will not uphold an unconsti
tutional statute merely because the Government promises to use it
responsibly. Nor can the Court construe this statutory language to
avoid constitutional doubt. A limiting construction can be imposed
only if the statute 鈥渋s 鈥榬eadily susceptible鈥 to such a construction,鈥
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 884. To read
搂48 as the Government desires requires rewriting, not just reinter
pretation. Pp. 18鈥19.
(5) This construction of 搂48 decides the constitutional question.
The Government makes no effort to defend 搂48 as applied beyond
crush videos and depictions of animal fighting. It argues that those
particular depictions are intrinsically related to criminal conduct or
are analogous to obscenity (if not themselves obscene), and that the
4 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
Syllabus
ban on such speech would satisfy the proper level of scrutiny. But
the Government nowhere extends these arguments to other depic
tions, such as hunting magazines and videos, that are presumptively
protected by the First Amendment but that remain subject to 搂48.
Nor does the Government seriously contest that these presumptively
impermissible applications of 搂48 far outnumber any permissible
ones. The Court therefore does not decide whether a statute limited
to crush videos or other depictions of extreme animal cruelty would
be constitutional. Section 48 is not so limited but is instead substan
tially overbroad, and therefore invalid under the First Amendment.
Pp. 19鈥20.
533 F. 3d 218, affirmed.
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS,
SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ.,
joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 08鈥769
_________________
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ROBERT J.
STEVENS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[April 20, 2010]
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. 搂48 to criminalize the
commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depic
tions of animal cruelty. The statute does not address
underlying acts harmful to animals, but only portrayals of
such conduct. The question presented is whether the
prohibition in the statute is consistent with the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.
I
Section 48 establishes a criminal penalty of up to five
years in prison for anyone who knowingly 鈥渃reates, sells,
or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty,鈥 if done 鈥渇or
commercial gain鈥 in interstate or foreign commerce.
搂48(a).1 A depiction of 鈥渁nimal cruelty鈥 is defined as one
鈥斺斺斺斺斺
1 The statute reads in full:
鈥溌48. Depiction of animal cruelty
鈥(a) CREATION, SALE, OR POSSESSION.鈥擶hoever knowingly creates,
sells, or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of
placing that depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial
gain, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5
2 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court
鈥渋n which a living animal is intentionally maimed, muti
lated, tortured, wounded, or killed,鈥 if that conduct vio
lates federal or state law where 鈥渢he creation, sale, or
possession takes place.鈥 搂48(c)(1). In what is referred to
as the 鈥渆xceptions clause,鈥 the law exempts from prohibi
tion any depiction 鈥渢hat has serious religious, political,
scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic
value.鈥 搂48(b).
The legislative background of 搂48 focused primarily on
the interstate market for 鈥渃rush videos.鈥 According to the
House Committee Report on the bill, such videos feature
the intentional torture and killing of helpless animals,
including cats, dogs, monkeys, mice, and hamsters. H. R.
Rep. No. 106鈥397, p. 2 (1999) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.).
Crush videos often depict women slowly crushing animals
to death 鈥渨ith their bare feet or while wearing high heeled
shoes,鈥 sometimes while 鈥渢alking to the animals in a kind
of dominatrix patter鈥 over 鈥淸t]he cries and squeals of the
animals, obviously in great pain.鈥 Ibid. Apparently these
depictions 鈥渁ppeal to persons with a very specific sexual
鈥斺斺斺斺斺
years, or both.
鈥(b) EXCEPTION.鈥擲ubsection (a) does not apply to any depiction
that has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic,
historical, or artistic value.
鈥(c) DEFINITIONS.鈥擨n this section鈥
鈥(1) the term 鈥榙epiction of animal cruelty鈥 means any visual or
auditory depiction, including any photograph, motion-picture film,
video recording, electronic image, or sound recording of conduct in
which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured,
wounded, or killed, if such conduct is illegal under Federal law or the
law of the State in which the creation, sale, or possession takes place,
regardless of whether the maiming, mutilation, torture, wounding, or
killing took place in the State; and
鈥(2) the term 鈥楽tate鈥 means each of the several States, the Dis
trict of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Is
lands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession
of the United States.鈥
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 3
Opinion of the Court
fetish who find them sexually arousing or otherwise excit
ing.鈥 Id., at 2鈥3. The acts depicted in crush videos are
typically prohibited by the animal cruelty laws enacted by
all 50 States and the District of Columbia. See Brief for
United States 25, n. 7 (listing statutes). But crush videos
rarely disclose the participants鈥 identities, inhibiting
prosecution of the underlying conduct. See H. R. Rep., at
3; accord, Brief for State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae
11.
This case, however, involves an application of 搂48 to
depictions of animal fighting. Dogfighting, for example, is
unlawful in all 50 States and the District of Columbia, see
Brief for United States 26, n. 8 (listing statutes), and has
been restricted by federal law since 1976. Animal Welfare
Act Amendments of 1976, 搂17, 90 Stat. 421, 7 U. S. C.
搂2156. Respondent Robert J. Stevens ran a business,
鈥淒ogs of Velvet and Steel,鈥 and an associated Web site,
through which he sold videos of pit bulls engaging in
dogfights and attacking other animals. Among these
videos were Japan Pit Fights and Pick-A-Winna: A Pit
Bull Documentary, which include contemporary footage of
dogfights in Japan (where such conduct is allegedly legal)
as well as footage of American dogfights from the 1960鈥檚
and 1970鈥檚.2 A third video, Catch Dogs and Country Liv
ing, depicts the use of pit bulls to hunt wild boar, as well
as a 鈥済ruesome鈥 scene of a pit bull attacking a domestic
farm pig. 533 F. 3d 218, 221 (CA3 2008) (en banc). On the
basis of these videos, Stevens was indicted on three counts
of violating 搂48.
Stevens moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that
搂48 is facially invalid under the First Amendment. The
鈥斺斺斺斺斺
2 TheGovernment contends that these dogfights were unlawful at the
time they occurred, while Stevens disputes the assertion. Reply Brief
for United States 25, n. 14 (hereinafter Reply Brief); Brief for Respon
dent 44, n. 18.
4 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court
District Court denied the motion. It held that the depic
tions subject to 搂48, like obscenity or child pornography,
are categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.
2:04鈥揷r鈥00051鈥揂NB (WD Pa., Nov. 10, 2004), App. to Pet.
for Cert. 65a鈥71a. It went on to hold that 搂48 is not sub
stantially overbroad, because the exceptions clause suffi
ciently narrows the statute to constitutional applications.
Id., at 71a鈥75a. The jury convicted Stevens on all counts,
and the District Court sentenced him to three concurrent
sentences of 37 months鈥 imprisonment, followed by three
years of supervised release. App. 37.
The en banc Third Circuit, over a three-judge dissent,
declared 搂48 facially unconstitutional and vacated Ste
vens鈥檚 conviction. 533 F. 3d 218. The Court of Appeals
first held that 搂48 regulates speech that is protected by
the First Amendment. The Court declined to recognize a
new category of unprotected speech for depictions of ani
mal cruelty, id., at 224, and n. 6, and rejected the Gov
ernment鈥檚 analogy between animal cruelty depictions and
child pornography, id., at 224鈥232.
The Court of Appeals then held that 搂48 could not sur
vive strict scrutiny as a content-based regulation of pro
tected speech. Id., at 232. It found that the statute lacked
a compelling government interest and was neither nar
rowly tailored to preventing animal cruelty nor the least
restrictive means of doing so. Id., at 232鈥235. It therefore
held 搂48 facially invalid.
In an extended footnote, the Third Circuit noted that
搂48 鈥渕ight also be unconstitutionally overbroad,鈥 because
it 鈥減otentially covers a great deal of constitutionally pro
tected speech鈥 and 鈥渟weeps [too] widely鈥 to be limited only
by prosecutorial discretion. Id., at 235, n. 16. But the
Court of Appeals declined to rest its analysis on this
ground.
We granted certiorari. 556 U. S. ___ (2009).
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010)
5
Opinion of the Court
II
The Government鈥檚 primary submission is that 搂48 nec
essarily complies with the Constitution because the
banned depictions of animal cruelty, as a class, are
categorically unprotected by the First Amendment. We
disagree.
The First Amendment provides that 鈥淐ongress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.鈥 鈥淸A]s a
general matter, the First Amendment means that gov
ernment has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.鈥
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U. S. 564,
573 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 48
explicitly regulates expression based on content: The
statute restricts 鈥渧isual [and] auditory depiction[s],鈥 such
as photographs, videos, or sound recordings, depending on
whether they depict conduct in which a living animal is
intentionally harmed. As such, 搂48 is 鈥 鈥榩resumptively
invalid,鈥 and the Government bears the burden to rebut
that presumption.鈥 United States v. Playboy Entertain
ment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 817 (2000) (quoting
R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 382 (1992); citation
omitted).
鈥淔rom 1791 to the present,鈥 however, the First Amend
ment has 鈥減ermitted restrictions upon the content of
speech in a few limited areas,鈥 and has never 鈥渋nclude[d] a
freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.鈥 Id., at
382鈥383. These 鈥渉istoric and traditional categories long
familiar to the bar,鈥 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 127 (1991)
(KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment)鈥攊ncluding obscen
ity, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 483 (1957), defa
mation, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 254鈥255
(1952), fraud, Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi
zens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976),
incitement, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447鈥449
6 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court
(1969) (per curiam), and speech integral to criminal con
duct, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490,
498 (1949)鈥攁re 鈥渨ell-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.鈥
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571鈥572
(1942).
The Government argues that 鈥渄epictions of animal
cruelty鈥 should be added to the list. It contends that
depictions of 鈥渋llegal acts of animal cruelty鈥 that are
鈥渕ade, sold, or possessed for commercial gain鈥 necessarily
鈥渓ack expressive value,鈥 and may accordingly 鈥渂e regulated
as unprotected speech.鈥 Brief for United States 10 (em
phasis added). The claim is not just that Congress may
regulate depictions of animal cruelty subject to the First
Amendment, but that these depictions are outside the
reach of that Amendment altogether鈥攖hat they fall into a
鈥 鈥楩irst Amendment Free Zone.鈥 鈥 Board of Airport
Comm鈥檙s of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U. S.
569, 574 (1987).
As the Government notes, the prohibition of animal
cruelty itself has a long history in American law, starting
with the early settlement of the Colonies. Reply Brief 12,
n. 8; see, e.g., The Body of Liberties 搂92 (Mass. Bay Colony
1641), reprinted in American Historical Documents 1000鈥
1904, 43 Harvard Classics 66, 79 (C. Eliot ed. 1910) (鈥淣o
man shall exercise any Tirranny or Crueltie towards any
bruite Creature which are usuallie kept for man鈥檚 use鈥).
But we are unaware of any similar tradition excluding
depictions of animal cruelty from 鈥渢he freedom of speech鈥
codified in the First Amendment, and the Government
points us to none.
The Government contends that 鈥渉istorical evidence鈥
about the reach of the First Amendment is not 鈥渁 neces
sary prerequisite for regulation today,鈥 Reply Brief 12,
n. 8, and that categories of speech may be exempted from
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 7
Opinion of the Court
the First Amendment鈥檚 protection without any long-settled
tradition of subjecting that speech to regulation. Instead,
the Government points to Congress鈥檚 鈥 鈥榣egislative judg
ment that . . . depictions of animals being intentionally
tortured and killed [are] of such minimal redeeming value
as to render [them] unworthy of First Amendment protec
tion,鈥 鈥 Brief for United States 23 (quoting 533 F. 3d, at 243
(Cowen, J., dissenting)), and asks the Court to uphold the
ban on the same basis. The Government thus proposes
that a claim of categorical exclusion should be considered
under a simple balancing test: 鈥淲hether a given category
of speech enjoys First Amendment protection depends
upon a categorical balancing of the value of the speech
against its societal costs.鈥 Brief for United States 8; see
also id., at 12.
As a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage,
that sentence is startling and dangerous. The First
Amendment鈥檚 guarantee of free speech does not extend
only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balanc
ing of relative social costs and benefits. The First
Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American
people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Govern
ment outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any
attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that
some speech is not worth it. The Constitution is not a
document 鈥減rescribing limits, and declaring that those
limits may be passed at pleasure.鈥 Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 178 (1803).
To be fair to the Government, its view did not emerge
from a vacuum. As the Government correctly notes, this
Court has often described historically unprotected catego
ries of speech as being 鈥 鈥榦f such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.鈥 鈥 R. A. V., supra, at 383 (quoting Chap
linsky, supra, at 572). In New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S.
8 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court
747 (1982), we noted that within these categories of unpro
tected speech, 鈥渢he evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly
outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that
no process of case-by-case adjudication is required,鈥 be
cause 鈥渢he balance of competing interests is clearly
struck,鈥 id., at 763鈥764. The Government derives its
proposed test from these descriptions in our precedents.
See Brief for United States 12鈥13.
But such descriptions are just that鈥攄escriptive. They
do not set forth a test that may be applied as a general
matter to permit the Government to imprison any speaker
so long as his speech is deemed valueless or unnecessary,
or so long as an ad hoc calculus of costs and benefits tilts
in a statute鈥檚 favor.
When we have identified categories of speech as fully
outside the protection of the First Amendment, it has not
been on the basis of a simple cost-benefit analysis. In
Ferber, for example, we classified child pornography as
such a category, 458 U. S., at 763. We noted that the
State of New York had a compelling interest in protecting
children from abuse, and that the value of using children
in these works (as opposed to simulated conduct or adult
actors) was de minimis. Id., at 756鈥757, 762. But our
decision did not rest on this 鈥渂alance of competing inter
ests鈥 alone. Id., at 764. We made clear that Ferber pre
sented a special case: The market for child pornography
was 鈥渋ntrinsically related鈥 to the underlying abuse, and
was therefore 鈥渁n integral part of the production of such
materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation.鈥 Id.,
at 759, 761. As we noted, 鈥 鈥榌i]t rarely has been suggested
that the constitutional freedom for speech and press ex
tends its immunity to speech or writing used as an inte
gral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal stat
ute.鈥 鈥 Id., at 761鈥762 (quoting Giboney, supra, at 498).
Ferber thus grounded its analysis in a previously recog
nized, long-established category of unprotected speech,
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 9
Opinion of the Court
and our subsequent decisions have shared this under
standing. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U. S. 103, 110 (1990)
(describing Ferber as finding 鈥減ersuasive鈥 the argument
that the advertising and sale of child pornography was 鈥渁n
integral part鈥 of its unlawful production (internal quota
tion marks omitted)); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
535 U. S. 234, 249鈥250 (2002) (noting that distribution
and sale 鈥渨ere intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of
children,鈥 giving the speech at issue 鈥渁 proximate link to
the crime from which it came鈥 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Our decisions in Ferber and other cases cannot be taken
as establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new
categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amend
ment. Maybe there are some categories of speech that
have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been
specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law.
But if so, there is no evidence that 鈥渄epictions of animal
cruelty鈥 is among them. We need not foreclose the future
recognition of such additional categories to reject the
Government鈥檚 highly manipulable balancing test as a
means of identifying them.
III
Because we decline to carve out from the First Amend
ment any novel exception for 搂48, we review Stevens鈥檚
First Amendment challenge under our existing doctrine.
A
Stevens challenged 搂48 on its face, arguing that any
conviction secured under the statute would be unconstitu
tional. The court below decided the case on that basis, 533
F. 3d, at 231, n. 13, and we granted the Solicitor General鈥檚
petition for certiorari to determine 鈥渨hether 18 U. S. C. 48
is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment,鈥 Pet. for Cert. i.
10 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court
To succeed in a typical facial attack, Stevens would have
to establish 鈥渢hat no set of circumstances exists under
which [搂48] would be valid,鈥 United States v. Salerno, 481
U. S. 739, 745 (1987), or that the statute lacks any 鈥減lainly
legitimate sweep,鈥 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S.
702, 740, n. 7 (1997) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judg
ments) (internal quotation marks omitted). Which stan
dard applies in a typical case is a matter of dispute that
we need not and do not address, and neither Salerno nor
Glucksberg is a speech case. Here the Government asserts
that Stevens cannot prevail because 搂48 is plainly legiti
mate as applied to crush videos and animal fighting depic
tions. Deciding this case through a traditional facial
analysis would require us to resolve whether these appli
cations of 搂48 are in fact consistent with the Constitution.
In the First Amendment context, however, this Court
recognizes 鈥渁 second type of facial challenge,鈥 whereby a
law may be invalidated as overbroad if 鈥渁 substantial
number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in
relation to the statute鈥檚 plainly legitimate sweep.鈥 Wash
ington State Grange v. Washington State Republican
Party, 552 U. S. 442, 449, n. 6 (2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Stevens argues that 搂48 applies to com
mon depictions of ordinary and lawful activities, and that
these depictions constitute the vast majority of materials
subject to the statute. Brief for Respondent 22鈥25. The
Government makes no effort to defend such a broad ban as
constitutional. Instead, the Government鈥檚 entire defense
of 搂48 rests on interpreting the statute as narrowly lim
ited to specific types of 鈥渆xtreme鈥 material. Brief for
United States 8. As the parties have presented the issue,
therefore, the constitutionality of 搂48 hinges on how
broadly it is construed. It is to that question that we now
turn.3
鈥斺斺斺斺斺
3 The dissent contends that because there has not been a ruling on
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010)
11
Opinion of the Court
B
As we explained two Terms ago, 鈥淸t]he first step in
overbreadth analysis is to construe the challenged statute;
it is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too
far without first knowing what the statute covers.鈥 United
States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 293 (2008). Because 搂48
is a federal statute, there is no need to defer to a state
court鈥檚 authority to interpret its own law.
We read 搂48 to create a criminal prohibition of alarming
breadth. To begin with, the text of the statute鈥檚 ban on a
鈥渄epiction of animal cruelty鈥 nowhere requires that the
depicted conduct be cruel. That text applies to 鈥渁ny . . .
depiction鈥 in which 鈥渁 living animal is intentionally
maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed.鈥
搂48(c)(1). 鈥淸M]aimed, mutilated, [and] tortured鈥 convey
cruelty, but 鈥渨ounded鈥 or 鈥渒illed鈥 do not suggest any such
limitation.
The Government contends that the terms in the defini
tion should be read to require the additional element of
鈥渁ccompanying acts of cruelty.鈥 Reply Brief 6; see also Tr.
of Oral Arg. 17鈥19. (The dissent hinges on the same
鈥斺斺斺斺斺
the validity of the statute as applied to Stevens, our consideration of his
facial overbreadth claim is premature. Post, at 1, and n. 1, 2鈥3 (opinion
of ALITO, J.). Whether or not that conclusion follows, here no as-applied
claim has been preserved. Neither court below construed Stevens鈥檚
briefs as adequately developing a separate attack on a defined subset of
the statute鈥檚 applications (say, dogfighting videos). See 533 F. 3d 218,
231, n. 13 (CA3 2008) (en banc) (鈥淪tevens brings a facial challenge to
the statute鈥); App. to Pet. for Cert. 65a, 74a. Neither did the Govern
ment, see Brief for United States in No. 05鈥2497 (CA3), p. 28 (opposing
鈥渢he appellant鈥檚 facial challenge鈥); accord, Brief for United States 4.
The sentence in Stevens鈥檚 appellate brief mentioning his unrelated
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge hardly developed a First Amend
ment as-applied claim. See post, at 1, n. 1. Stevens鈥檚 constitutional
argument is a general one. And unlike the challengers in Washington
State Grange, Stevens does not 鈥渞est on factual assumptions . . . that
can be evaluated only in the context of an as-applied challenge.鈥 552
U. S., at 444.
12 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court
assumption. See post, at 6, 9.) The Government bases
this argument on the definiendum, 鈥渄epiction of animal
cruelty,鈥 cf. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 11 (2004), and
on 鈥 鈥榯he commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis.鈥 鈥 Reply
Brief 7 (quoting Williams, 553 U. S., at 294). As that
canon recognizes, an ambiguous term may be 鈥済iven more
precise content by the neighboring words with which it is
associated.鈥 Ibid. Likewise, an unclear definitional
phrase may take meaning from the term to be defined, see
Leocal, supra, at 11 (interpreting a 鈥 鈥榮ubstantial risk鈥 鈥 of
the 鈥渦s[e]鈥 of 鈥減hysical force鈥 as part of the definition of
鈥 鈥榗rime of violence鈥 鈥).
But the phrase 鈥渨ounded . . . or killed鈥 at issue here
contains little ambiguity. The Government鈥檚 opening brief
properly applies the ordinary meaning of these words,
stating for example that to 鈥 鈥榢ill鈥 is 鈥榯o deprive of life.鈥 鈥
Brief for United States 14 (quoting Webster鈥檚 Third New
International Dictionary 1242 (1993)). We agree that
鈥渨ounded鈥 and 鈥渒illed鈥 should be read according to their
ordinary meaning. Cf. Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast
Air Quality Management Dist., 541 U. S. 246, 252 (2004).
Nothing about that meaning requires cruelty.
While not requiring cruelty, 搂48 does require that the
depicted conduct be 鈥渋llegal.鈥 But this requirement does
not limit 搂48 along the lines the Government suggests.
There are myriad federal and state laws concerning the
proper treatment of animals, but many of them are not
designed to guard against animal cruelty. Protections of
endangered species, for example, restrict even the humane
鈥渨ound[ing] or kill[ing]鈥 of 鈥渓iving animal[s].鈥 搂48(c)(1).
Livestock regulations are often designed to protect the
health of human beings, and hunting and fishing rules
(seasons, licensure, bag limits, weight requirements) can
be designed to raise revenue, preserve animal populations,
or prevent accidents. The text of 搂48(c) draws no distinc
tion based on the reason the intentional killing of an
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 13
Opinion of the Court
animal is made illegal, and includes, for example, the
humane slaughter of a stolen cow.4
What is more, the application of 搂48 to depictions of
illegal conduct extends to conduct that is illegal in only a
single jurisdiction. Under subsection (c)(1), the depicted
conduct need only be illegal in 鈥渢he State in which the
creation, sale, or possession takes place, regardless of
whether the . . . wounding . . . or killing took place in
[that] State.鈥 A depiction of entirely lawful conduct runs
afoul of the ban if that depiction later finds its way into
another State where the same conduct is unlawful. This
provision greatly expands the scope of 搂48, because al
though there may be 鈥渁 broad societal consensus鈥 against
cruelty to animals, Brief for United States 2, there is
substantial disagreement on what types of conduct are
properly regarded as cruel. Both views about cruelty to
animals and regulations having no connection to cruelty
vary widely from place to place.
In the District of Columbia, for example, all hunting is
unlawful. D. C. Munic. Regs., tit. 19, 搂1560 (2009). Other
jurisdictions permit or encourage hunting, and there is an
enormous national market for hunting-related depictions
in which a living animal is intentionally killed. Hunting
periodicals have circulations in the hundreds of thousands
or millions, see Mediaweek, Sept. 29, 2008, p. 28, and
hunting television programs, videos, and Web sites are
equally popular, see Brief for Professional Outdoor Media
鈥斺斺斺斺斺
4 The citations in the dissent鈥檚 appendix are beside the point. The
cited statutes stand for the proposition that hunting is not covered by
animal cruelty laws. But the reach of 搂48 is, as we have explained, not
restricted to depictions of conduct that violates a law specifically
directed at animal cruelty. It simply requires that the depicted conduct
be 鈥渋llegal.鈥 搂48(c)(1). The Government implicitly admits as much,
arguing that 鈥渋nstructional videos for hunting鈥 are saved by the stat
ute鈥檚 exceptions clause, not that they fall outside the prohibition in the
first place. Reply Brief 6.
14 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court
Association et al. as Amici Curiae 9鈥10. The demand for
hunting depictions exceeds the estimated demand for
crush videos or animal fighting depictions by several
orders of magnitude. Compare ibid. and Brief for National
Rifle Association of America, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 12
(hereinafter NRA Brief) (estimating that hunting maga
zines alone account for $135 million in annual retail sales)
with Brief for United States 43鈥44, 46 (suggesting $1
million in crush video sales per year, and noting that
Stevens earned $57,000 from his videos). Nonetheless,
because the statute allows each jurisdiction to export its
laws to the rest of the country, 搂48(a) extends to any
magazine or video depicting lawful hunting, so long as
that depiction is sold within the Nation鈥檚 Capital.
Those seeking to comply with the law thus face a bewil
dering maze of regulations from at least 56 separate juris
dictions. Some States permit hunting with crossbows, Ga.
Code Ann. 搂27鈥3鈥4(1) (2007); Va. Code Ann. 搂29.1鈥
519(A)(6) (Lexis 2008 Cum. Supp.), while others forbid it,
Ore. Admin. Reg. 635鈥065鈥0725 (2009), or restrict it only
to the disabled, N. Y. Envir. Conserv. Law Ann. 搂11鈥
0901(16) (West 2005). Missouri allows the 鈥渃anned鈥 hunt
ing of ungulates held in captivity, Mo. Code Regs. Ann.,
tit. 3, 10鈥9.560(1), but Montana restricts such hunting to
certain bird species, Mont. Admin. Rule 12.6.1202(1)
(2007). The sharp-tailed grouse may be hunted in Idaho,
but not in Washington. Compare Idaho Admin. Code
搂13.01.09.606 (2009) with Wash. Admin. Code 搂232鈥28鈥
342 (2009).
The disagreements among the States鈥攁nd the 鈥渃om
monwealth[s], territor[ies], or possession[s] of the United
States,鈥 18 U. S. C. 搂48(c)(2)鈥攅xtend well beyond hunting.
State agricultural regulations permit different methods of
livestock slaughter in different places or as applied to differ
ent animals. Compare, e.g., Fla. Stat. 搂828.23(5) (2007)
(excluding poultry from humane slaughter requirements)
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 15
Opinion of the Court
with Cal. Food & Agric. Code Ann. 搂19501(b) (West 2001)
(including some poultry). California has recently banned
cutting or 鈥渄ocking鈥 the tails of dairy cattle, which other
States permit. 2009 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 344 (S. B. 135)
(West). Even cockfighting, long considered immoral in
much of America, see Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U. S. 560, 575 (1991) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment),
is legal in Puerto Rico, see 15 Laws P. R. Ann. 搂301 (Supp.
2008); Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of
P. R., 478 U. S. 328, 342 (1986), and was legal in Louisi
ana until 2008, see La. Stat. Ann. 搂14:102.23 (West) (effec
tive Aug. 15, 2008). An otherwise-lawful image of any of
these practices, if sold or possessed for commercial gain
within a State that happens to forbid the practice, falls
within the prohibition of 搂48(a).
C
The only thing standing between defendants who sell
such depictions and five years in federal prison鈥攐ther
than the mercy of a prosecutor鈥攊s the statute鈥檚 exceptions
clause. Subsection (b) exempts from prohibition 鈥渁ny
depiction that has serious religious, political, scientific,
educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.鈥 The
Government argues that this clause substantially narrows
the statute鈥檚 reach: News reports about animal cruelty
have 鈥渏ournalistic鈥 value; pictures of bullfights in Spain
have 鈥渉istorical鈥 value; and instructional hunting videos
have 鈥渆ducational鈥 value. Reply Brief 6. Thus, the Gov
ernment argues, 搂48 reaches only crush videos, depictions
of animal fighting (other than Spanish bullfighting, see
Brief for United States 47鈥48), and perhaps other depic
tions of 鈥渆xtreme acts of animal cruelty.鈥 Id., at 41.
The Government鈥檚 attempt to narrow the statutory ban,
however, requires an unrealistically broad reading of the
exceptions clause. As the Government reads the clause,
any material with 鈥渞edeeming societal value,鈥 id., at 9, 16,
16 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court
23, 鈥 鈥榓t least some minimal value,鈥 鈥 Reply Brief 6 (quoting
H. R. Rep., at 4), or anything more than 鈥渟cant social
value,鈥 Reply Brief 11, is excluded under 搂48(b). But the
text says 鈥渟erious鈥 value, and 鈥渟erious鈥 should be taken
seriously. We decline the Government鈥檚 invitation鈥
advanced for the first time in this Court鈥攖o regard as
鈥渟erious鈥 anything that is not 鈥渟cant.鈥 (Or, as the dissent
puts it, 鈥 鈥榯rifling.鈥 鈥 Post, at 6.) As the Government recog
nized below, 鈥渟erious鈥 ordinarily means a good bit more.
The District Court鈥檚 jury instructions required value that
is 鈥渟ignificant and of great import,鈥 App. 132, and the
Government defended these instructions as properly
relying on 鈥渁 commonly accepted meaning of the word
鈥榮erious,鈥 鈥 Brief for United States in No. 05鈥2497 (CA3), p.
50.
Quite apart from the requirement of 鈥渟erious鈥 value in
搂48(b), the excepted speech must also fall within one of the
enumerated categories. Much speech does not. Most
hunting videos, for example, are not obviously instruc
tional in nature, except in the sense that all life is a les
son. According to Safari Club International and the Con
gressional Sportsmen鈥檚 Foundation, many popular videos
鈥渉ave primarily entertainment value鈥 and are designed to
鈥渆ntertai[n] the viewer, marke[t] hunting equipment, or
increas[e] the hunting community.鈥 Brief for Safari Club
International et al. as Amici Curiae 12. The National
Rifle Association agrees that 鈥渕uch of the content of hunt
ing media . . . is merely recreational in nature.鈥 NRA Brief
28. The Government offers no principled explanation why
these depictions of hunting or depictions of Spanish bull
fights would be inherently valuable while those of Japa
nese dogfights are not. The dissent contends that hunting
depictions must have serious value because hunting has
serious value, in a way that dogfights presumably do not.
Post, at 6鈥8. But 搂48(b) addresses the value of the depic
tions, not of the underlying activity. There is simply no
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 17
Opinion of the Court
adequate reading of the exceptions clause that results in
the statute鈥檚 banning only the depictions the Government
would like to ban.
The Government explains that the language of 搂48(b)
was largely drawn from our opinion in Miller v. California,
413 U. S. 15 (1973), which excepted from its definition of
obscenity any material with 鈥渟erious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value,鈥 id., at 24. See Reply Brief 8,
9, and n. 5. According to the Government, this incorpora
tion of the Miller standard into 搂48 is therefore surely
enough to answer any First Amendment objection. Reply
Brief 8鈥9.
In Miller we held that 鈥渟erious鈥 value shields depictions
of sex from regulation as obscenity. 413 U. S., at 24鈥25.
Limiting Miller鈥檚 exception to 鈥渟erious鈥 value ensured that
鈥 鈥榌a] quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book
[would] not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene
publication.鈥 鈥 Id., at 25, n. 7 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin,
408 U. S. 229, 231 (1972) (per curiam)). We did not, how
ever, determine that serious value could be used as a
general precondition to protecting other types of speech in
the first place. Most of what we say to one another lacks
鈥渞eligious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic,
historical, or artistic value鈥 (let alone serious value), but it
is still sheltered from government regulation. Even
鈥 鈥榌w]holly neutral futilities . . . come under the protection
of free speech as fully as do Keats鈥 poems or Donne鈥檚 ser
mons.鈥 鈥 Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 25 (1971) (quot
ing Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 528 (1948) (Frank
furter, J., dissenting); alteration in original).
Thus, the protection of the First Amendment presump
tively extends to many forms of speech that do not qualify
for the serious-value exception of 搂48(b), but nonetheless
fall within the broad reach of 搂48(c).
18 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court
D
Not to worry, the Government says: The Executive
Branch construes 搂48 to reach only 鈥渆xtreme鈥 cruelty,
Brief for United States 8, and it 鈥渘either has brought nor
will bring a prosecution for anything less,鈥 Reply Brief 6鈥
7. The Government hits this theme hard, invoking its
prosecutorial discretion several times. See id., at 6鈥7, 10,
and n. 6, 19, 22. But the First Amendment protects
against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy
of noblesse oblige. We would not uphold an unconstitu
tional statute merely because the Government promised to
use it responsibly. Cf. Whitman v. American Trucking
Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 473 (2001).
This prosecution is itself evidence of the danger in put
ting faith in government representations of prosecutorial
restraint. When this legislation was enacted, the Execu
tive Branch announced that it would interpret 搂48 as
covering only depictions 鈥渙f wanton cruelty to animals
designed to appeal to a prurient interest in sex.鈥 See
Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing
H. R. 1887, 34 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2557 (Dec. 9,
1999). No one suggests that the videos in this case fit that
description. The Government鈥檚 assurance that it will
apply 搂48 far more restrictively than its language provides
is pertinent only as an implicit acknowledgment of the
potential constitutional problems with a more natural
reading.
Nor can we rely upon the canon of construction that
鈥渁mbiguous statutory language [should] be construed to
avoid serious constitutional doubts.鈥 FCC v. Fox Televi
sion Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at
12). 鈥淸T]his Court may impose a limiting construction on a
statute only if it is 鈥榬eadily susceptible鈥 to such a construc
tion.鈥 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S.
844, 884 (1997). We 鈥 鈥榳ill not rewrite a . . . law to conform
it to constitutional requirements,鈥 鈥 id., at 884鈥885 (quot
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 19
Opinion of the Court
ing Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U. S.
383, 397 (1988); omission in original), for doing so would
constitute a 鈥渟erious invasion of the legislative domain,鈥
United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U. S. 454, 479,
n. 26 (1995), and sharply diminish Congress鈥檚 鈥渋ncentive to
draft a narrowly tailored law in the first place,鈥 Osborne,
495 U. S., at 121. To read 搂48 as the Government desires
requires rewriting, not just reinterpretation.
* * *
Our construction of 搂48 decides the constitutional ques
tion; the Government makes no effort to defend the consti
tutionality of 搂48 as applied beyond crush videos and
depictions of animal fighting. It argues that those particu
lar depictions are intrinsically related to criminal conduct
or are analogous to obscenity (if not themselves obscene),
and that the ban on such speech is narrowly tailored to
reinforce restrictions on the underlying conduct, prevent
additional crime arising from the depictions, or safeguard
public mores. But the Government nowhere attempts to
extend these arguments to depictions of any other activi
ties鈥攄epictions that are presumptively protected by the
First Amendment but that remain subject to the criminal
sanctions of 搂48.
Nor does the Government seriously contest that the
presumptively impermissible applications of 搂48 (properly
construed) far outnumber any permissible ones. However
鈥済rowing鈥 and 鈥渓ucrative鈥 the markets for crush videos and
dogfighting depictions might be, see Brief for United
States 43, 46 (internal quotation marks omitted), they are
dwarfed by the market for other depictions, such as hunt
ing magazines and videos, that we have determined to be
within the scope of 搂48. See supra, at 13鈥14. We there
fore need not and do not decide whether a statute limited
to crush videos or other depictions of extreme animal
cruelty would be constitutional. We hold only that 搂48 is
20 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court
not so limited but is instead substantially overbroad, and
therefore invalid under the First Amendment.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 1
ALITO, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 08鈥769
_________________
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ROBERT J.
STEVENS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[April 20, 2010]
JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting.
The Court strikes down in its entirety a valuable stat
ute, 18 U. S. C. 搂48, that was enacted not to suppress
speech, but to prevent horrific acts of animal cruelty鈥攊n
particular, the creation and commercial exploitation of
鈥渃rush videos,鈥 a form of depraved entertainment that has
no social value. The Court鈥檚 approach, which has the
practical effect of legalizing the sale of such videos and is
thus likely to spur a resumption of their production, is
unwarranted. Respondent was convicted under 搂48 for
selling videos depicting dogfights. On appeal, he argued,
among other things, that 搂48 is unconstitutional as ap
plied to the facts of this case, and he highlighted features
of those videos that might distinguish them from other
dogfight videos brought to our attention.1 The Court of
鈥斺斺斺斺斺
1 Respondent argued at length that the evidence was insufficient to
prove that the particular videos he sold lacked any serious scientific,
educational, or historical value and thus fell outside the exception in
搂48(b). See Brief for Appellant in No. 05鈥2497 (CA3), pp. 72鈥79. He
added that, if the evidence in this case was held to be sufficient to take
his videos outside the scope of the exception, then 鈥渢his case presents
. . . a situation鈥 in which 鈥渁 constitutional violation occurs.鈥 Id., at 71.
See also id., at 47 (鈥淭he applicability of 18 U. S. C. 搂48 to speech which
is not a crush video or an appeal to some prurient sexual interest
constitutes a restriction of protected speech, and an unwarranted
violation of the First Amendment鈥檚 free speech guarantee鈥); Brief for
2 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
ALITO, J., dissenting
Appeals鈥攊ncorrectly, in my view鈥攄eclined to decide
whether 搂48 is unconstitutional as applied to respondent鈥檚
videos and instead reached out to hold that the statute is
facially invalid. Today鈥檚 decision does not endorse the
Court of Appeals鈥 reasoning, but it nevertheless strikes
down 搂48 using what has been aptly termed the 鈥渟trong
medicine鈥 of the overbreadth doctrine, United States v.
Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 293 (2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted), a potion that generally should be admin
istered only as 鈥渁 last resort.鈥 Los Angeles Police Dept. v.
United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U. S. 32, 39 (1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Instead of applying the doctrine of overbreadth, I would
vacate the decision below and instruct the Court of Ap
peals on remand to decide whether the videos that respon
dent sold are constitutionally protected. If the question of
overbreadth is to be decided, however, I do not think the
present record supports the Court鈥檚 conclusion that 搂48
bans a substantial quantity of protected speech.
I
A party seeking to challenge the constitutionality of a
statute generally must show that the statute violates the
party鈥檚 own rights. New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 767
(1982). The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine carves
out a narrow exception to that general rule. See id., at
768; Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 611鈥612
(1973). Because an overly broad law may deter constitu
tionally protected speech, the overbreadth doctrine allows
鈥斺斺斺斺斺
Respondent 55 (鈥淪tevens鈥 speech does not fit within any existing
category of unprotected, prosecutable speech鈥); id., at 57 (鈥淸T]he record
as a whole demonstrates that Stevens鈥 speech cannot constitutionally
be punished鈥). Contrary to the Court, ante, at 10鈥11, n. 3 (citing 533
F. 3d 218, 231, n. 13 (CA3 2008) (en banc)), I see no suggestion in the
opinion of the Court of Appeals that respondent did not preserve an as
applied challenge.
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 3
ALITO, J., dissenting
a party to whom the law may constitutionally be applied
to challenge the statute on the ground that it violates the
First Amendment rights of others. See, e.g., Board of
Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 483
(1989) (鈥淥rdinarily, the principal advantage of the over
breadth doctrine for a litigant is that it enables him to
benefit from the statute鈥檚 unlawful application to someone
else鈥); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S.
447, 462, n. 20 (1978) (describing the doctrine as one
鈥渦nder which a person may challenge a statute that in
fringes protected speech even if the statute constitution
ally might be applied to him鈥).
The 鈥渟trong medicine鈥 of overbreadth invalidation need
not and generally should not be administered when the
statute under attack is unconstitutional as applied to the
challenger before the court. As we said in Fox, supra, at
484鈥485, 鈥淸i]t is not the usual judicial practice, . . . nor do
we consider it generally desirable, to proceed to an over
breadth issue unnecessarily鈥攖hat is, before it is deter
mined that the statute would be valid as applied.鈥 Accord,
New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, 487
U. S. 1, 11 (1988); see also Broadrick, supra, at 613;
United Reporting Publishing Corp., supra, at 45 (STEVENS,
J., dissenting).
I see no reason to depart here from the generally pre
ferred procedure of considering the question of over
breadth only as a last resort.2 Because the Court has
addressed the overbreadth question, however, I will ex
plain why I do not think that the record supports the
conclusion that 搂48, when properly interpreted, is overly
broad.
鈥斺斺斺斺斺
2 For the reasons set forth below, this is not a case in which the chal
lenged statute is unconstitutional in all or almost all of its applications.
4 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
ALITO, J., dissenting
II
The overbreadth doctrine 鈥渟trike[s] a balance between
competing social costs.鈥 Williams, 553 U. S., at 292.
Specifically, the doctrine seeks to balance the 鈥渉armful
effects鈥 of 鈥渋nvalidating a law that in some of its applica
tions is perfectly constitutional鈥 against the possibility
that 鈥渢he threat of enforcement of an overbroad law [will]
dete[r] people from engaging in constitutionally protected
speech.鈥 Ibid. 鈥淚n order to maintain an appropriate bal
ance, we have vigorously enforced the requirement that a
statute鈥檚 overbreadth be substantial, not only in an abso
lute sense, but also relative to the statute鈥檚 plainly legiti
mate sweep.鈥 Ibid.
In determining whether a statute鈥檚 overbreadth is sub
stantial, we consider a statute鈥檚 application to real-world
conduct, not fanciful hypotheticals. See, e.g., id., at 301鈥
302; see also Ferber, supra, at 773; Houston v. Hill, 482
U. S. 451, 466鈥467 (1987). Accordingly, we have repeat
edly emphasized that an overbreadth claimant bears the
burden of demonstrating, 鈥渇rom the text of [the law] and
from actual fact,鈥 that substantial overbreadth exists.
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U. S. 113, 122 (2003) (quoting New
York State Club Assn., supra, at 14; emphasis added;
internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original).
Similarly, 鈥渢here must be a realistic danger that the stat
ute itself will significantly compromise recognized First
Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for
it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.鈥
Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 801 (1984) (emphasis added).
III
In holding that 搂48 violates the overbreadth rule, the
Court declines to decide whether, as the Government
maintains, 搂48 is constitutional as applied to two broad
categories of depictions that exist in the real world: crush
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 5
ALITO, J., dissenting
videos and depictions of deadly animal fights. See ante, at
10, 19. Instead, the Court tacitly assumes for the sake of
argument that 搂48 is valid as applied to these depictions,
but the Court concludes that 搂48 reaches too much pro
tected speech to survive. The Court relies primarily on
depictions of hunters killing or wounding game and depic
tions of animals being slaughtered for food. I address the
Court鈥檚 examples below.
A
I turn first to depictions of hunting. As the Court notes,
photographs and videos of hunters shooting game are
common. See ante, at 13鈥14. But hunting is legal in all
50 States, and 搂48 applies only to a depiction of conduct
that is illegal in the jurisdiction in which the depiction is
created, sold, or possessed. 搂搂48(a), (c). Therefore, in all
50 States, the creation, sale, or possession for sale of the
vast majority of hunting depictions indisputably falls
outside 搂48鈥檚 reach.
Straining to find overbreadth, the Court suggests that
搂48 prohibits the sale or possession in the District of Co
lumbia of any depiction of hunting because the District鈥
undoubtedly because of its urban character鈥攄oes not
permit hunting within its boundaries. Ante, at 13. The
Court also suggests that, because some States prohibit a
particular type of hunting (e.g., hunting with a crossbow
or 鈥渃anned鈥 hunting) or the hunting of a particular animal
(e.g., the 鈥渟harp-tailed grouse鈥), 搂48 makes it illegal for
persons in such States to sell or possess for sale a depic
tion of hunting that was perfectly legal in the State in
which the hunting took place. See ante, at 12鈥14.
The Court鈥檚 interpretation is seriously flawed. 鈥淲hen a
federal court is dealing with a federal statute challenged
as overbroad, it should, of course, construe the statute to
avoid constitutional problems, if the statute is subject to
such a limiting construction.鈥 Ferber, 458 U. S., at 769,
6 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
ALITO, J., dissenting
n. 24. See also Williams, supra, at 307 (STEVENS, J.,
concurring) (鈥淸T]o the extent the statutory text alone is
unclear, our duty to avoid constitutional objections makes
it especially appropriate to look beyond the text in order to
ascertain the intent of its drafters鈥).
Applying this canon, I would hold that 搂48 does not
apply to depictions of hunting. First, because 搂48 targets
depictions of 鈥渁nimal cruelty,鈥 I would interpret that
term to apply only to depictions involving acts of animal
cruelty as defined by applicable state or federal law, not
to depictions of acts that happen to be illegal for reasons
having nothing to do with the prevention of animal cru
elty. See ante, at 12鈥13 (interpreting 鈥淸t]he text of 搂48(c)鈥
to ban a depiction of 鈥渢he humane slaughter of a stolen
cow鈥). Virtually all state laws prohibiting animal cruelty
either expressly define the term 鈥渁nimal鈥 to exclude
wildlife or else specifically exempt lawful hunting activi
ties,3 so the statutory prohibition set forth in 搂48(a) may
reasonably be interpreted not to reach most if not all
hunting depictions.
Second, even if the hunting of wild animals were other
wise covered by 搂48(a), I would hold that hunting depic
tions fall within the exception in 搂48(b) for depictions that
have 鈥渟erious鈥 (i.e., not 鈥渢rifling鈥4) 鈥渟cientific,鈥 鈥渆duca
鈥斺斺斺斺斺
3 See Appendix, infra (citing statutes); B. Wagman, S. Waisman, & P.
Frasch, Animal Law: Cases and Materials 92 (4th ed. 2010) (鈥淢ost anti
cruelty laws also include one or more exemptions,鈥 which often 鈥渆x
clud[e] from coverage (1) whole classes of animals, such as wildlife or
farm animals, or (2) specific activities, such as hunting鈥); Note, Eco
nomics and Ethics in the Genetic Engineering of Animals, 19 Harv.
J. L. & Tech. 413, 432 (2006) (鈥淣ot surprisingly, state laws relating to
the humane treatment of wildlife, including deer, elk, and waterfowl,
are virtually non-existent鈥).
4 Webster鈥檚 Third New International Dictionary 2073 (1976); Random
House Dictionary of the English Language 1303 (1966). While the term
鈥渟erious鈥 may also mean 鈥渨eighty鈥 or 鈥渋mportant,鈥 ibid., we should
adopt the former definition if necessary to avoid unconstitutionality.
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 7
ALITO, J., dissenting
tional,鈥 or 鈥渉istorical鈥 value. While there are certainly
those who find hunting objectionable, the predominant
view in this country has long been that hunting serves
many important values, and it is clear that Congress
shares that view. Since 1972, when Congress called upon
the President to designate a National Hunting and Fish
ing Day, see S. J. Res. 117, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), 86
Stat. 133, Presidents have regularly issued proclamations
extolling the values served by hunting. See Presidential
Proclamation No. 8421, 74 Fed. Reg. 49305 (Pres. Obama
2009) (hunting and fishing are 鈥渁geless pursuits鈥 that
promote 鈥渢he conservation and restoration of numerous
species and their natural habitats鈥); Presidential Procla
mation No. 8295, 73 Fed. Reg. 57233 (Pres. Bush 2008)
(hunters and anglers 鈥渁dd to our heritage and keep our
wildlife populations healthy and strong,鈥 and 鈥渁re among
our foremost conservationists鈥); Presidential Proclamation
No. 7822, 69 Fed. Reg. 59539 (Pres. Bush 2004) (hunting
and fishing are 鈥渁n important part of our Nation鈥檚 heri
tage,鈥 and 鈥淎merica鈥檚 hunters and anglers represent the
great spirit of our country鈥); Presidential Proclamation No.
4682, 44 Fed. Reg. 53149 (Pres. Carter 1979) (hunting
promotes conservation and an appreciation of 鈥渉ealthy
recreation, peaceful solitude and closeness to nature鈥);
Presidential Proclamation No. 4318, 39 Fed. Reg. 35315
(Pres. Ford 1974) (hunting furthers 鈥渁ppreciation and
respect for nature鈥 and preservation of the environment).
Thus, it is widely thought that hunting has 鈥渟cientific鈥
value in that it promotes conservation, 鈥渉istorical鈥 value
in that it provides a link to past times when hunting
played a critical role in daily life, and 鈥渆ducational鈥 value
in that it furthers the understanding and appreciation of
nature and our country鈥檚 past and instills valuable charac
ter traits. And if hunting itself is widely thought to serve
these values, then it takes but a small additional step to
conclude that depictions of hunting make a non-trivial
8 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
ALITO, J., dissenting
contribution to the exchange of ideas. Accordingly, I
would hold that hunting depictions fall comfortably within
the exception set out in 搂48(b).
I do not have the slightest doubt that Congress, in en
acting 搂48, had no intention of restricting the creation,
sale, or possession of depictions of hunting. Proponents of
the law made this point clearly. See H. R. Rep. No. 106鈥
397, p. 8 (1999) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.) (鈥淸D]epictions of
ordinary hunting and fishing activities do not fall within
the scope of the statute鈥); 145 Cong. Rec. 25894 (Oct. 19,
1999) (Rep. McCollum) (鈥淸T]he sale of depictions of legal
activities, such as hunting and fishing, would not be illegal
under this bill鈥); id., at 25895 (Rep. Smith) (鈥淸L]et us be
clear as to what this legislation will not do. It will in no
way prohibit hunting, fishing, or wildlife videos鈥). Indeed,
even opponents acknowledged that 搂48 was not intended
to reach ordinary hunting depictions. See ibid. (Rep.
Scott); id., at 25897 (Rep. Paul).
For these reasons, I am convinced that 搂48 has no appli
cation to depictions of hunting. But even if 搂48 did imper
missibly reach the sale or possession of depictions of hunt
ing in a few unusual situations (for example, the sale in
Oregon of a depiction of hunting with a crossbow in Vir
ginia or the sale in Washington State of the hunting of a
sharp-tailed grouse in Idaho, see ante, at 14), those iso
lated applications would hardly show that 搂48 bans a
substantial amount of protected speech.
B
Although the Court鈥檚 overbreadth analysis rests primar
ily on the proposition that 搂48 substantially restricts the
sale and possession of hunting depictions, the Court cites
a few additional examples, including depictions of methods
of slaughter and the docking of the tails of dairy cows. See
ante, at 14鈥15.
Such examples do not show that the statute is substan
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 9
ALITO, J., dissenting
tially overbroad, for two reasons. First, as explained
above, 搂48 can reasonably be construed to apply only to
depictions involving acts of animal cruelty as defined by
applicable state or federal law, and anti-cruelty laws do
not ban the sorts of acts depicted in the Court鈥檚 hypotheti
cals. See, e.g., Idaho Code 搂25鈥3514 (Lexis 2000) (鈥淣o
part of this chapter [prohibiting cruelty to animals] shall
be construed as interfering with or allowing interference
with . . . [t]he humane slaughter of any animal normally
and commonly raised as food or for production of fiber . . .
[or] [n]ormal or accepted practices of . . . animal hus
bandry鈥); Kan. Stat. Ann. 搂 21鈥4310(b) (2007) (鈥淭he provi
sions of this section shall not apply to . . . with respect to
farm animals, normal or accepted practices of animal
husbandry, including the normal and accepted practices
for the slaughter of such animals鈥); Md. Crim. Law Code
Ann. 搂10鈥603 (Lexis 2002) (sections prohibiting animal
cruelty 鈥渄o not apply to . . . customary and normal veteri
nary and agricultural husbandry practices, including
dehorning, castration, tail docking, and limit feeding鈥).
Second, nothing in the record suggests that any one has
ever created, sold, or possessed for sale a depiction of the
slaughter of food animals or of the docking of the tails of
dairy cows that would not easily qualify under the excep
tion set out in 搂48(b). Depictions created to show proper
methods of slaughter or tail-docking would presumably
have serious 鈥渆ducational鈥 value, and depictions created to
focus attention on methods thought to be inhumane or
otherwise objectionable would presumably have either
serious 鈥渆ducational鈥 or 鈥渏ournalistic鈥 value or both. In
short, the Court鈥檚 examples of depictions involving the
docking of tails and humane slaughter do not show that
搂48 suffers from any overbreadth, much less substantial
overbreadth.
The Court notes, finally, that cockfighting, which is
illegal in all States, is still legal in Puerto Rico, ante, at 15,
10 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
ALITO, J., dissenting
and I take the Court鈥檚 point to be that it would be imper
missible to ban the creation, sale, or possession in Puerto
Rico of a depiction of a cockfight that was legally staged in
Puerto Rico.5 But assuming for the sake of argument that
this is correct, this veritable sliver of unconstitutionality
would not be enough to justify striking down 搂48 in toto.
In sum, we have a duty to interpret 搂48 so as to avoid
serious constitutional concerns, and 搂48 may reasonably
be construed not to reach almost all, if not all, of the depic
tions that the Court finds constitutionally protected.
Thus, 搂48 does not appear to have a large number of un
constitutional applications. Invalidation for overbreadth
is appropriate only if the challenged statute suffers from
substantial overbreadth鈥攋udged not just in absolute
terms, but in relation to the statute鈥檚 鈥減lainly legitimate
sweep.鈥 Williams, 553 U. S., at 292. As I explain in the
following Part, 搂48 has a substantial core of constitution
ally permissible applications.
IV
A
1
As the Court of Appeals recognized, 鈥渢he primary con
duct that Congress sought to address through its passage
[of 搂48] was the creation, sale, or possession of 鈥榗rush
videos.鈥 鈥 533 F. 3d 218, 222 (CA3 2008) (en banc). A
sample crush video, which has been lodged with the Clerk,
records the following event:
鈥斺斺斺斺斺
5 Since the Court has taken pains not to decide whether 搂48 would be
unconstitutional as applied to graphic dogfight videos, including those
depicting fights occurring in countries where dogfighting is legal, I take
it that the Court does not intend for its passing reference to cockfights
to mean either that all depictions of cockfights, whether legal or illegal
under local law, are protected by the First Amendment or that it is
impermissible to ban the sale or possession in the States of a depiction
of a legal cockfight in Puerto Rico.
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 11
ALITO, J., dissenting
鈥淸A] kitten, secured to the ground, watches and
shrieks in pain as a woman thrusts her high-heeled
shoe into its body, slams her heel into the kitten鈥檚 eye
socket and mouth loudly fracturing its skull, and
stomps repeatedly on the animal鈥檚 head. The kitten
hemorrhages blood, screams blindly in pain, and is ul
timately left dead in a moist pile of blood-soaked hair
and bone.鈥 Brief for Humane Society of United States
as Amicus Curiae 2 (hereinafter Humane Society
Brief).
It is undisputed that the conduct depicted in crush
videos may constitutionally be prohibited. All 50 States
and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes prohib
iting animal cruelty. See 533 F. 3d, at 223, and n. 4 (citing
statutes); H. R. Rep., at 3. But before the enactment of
搂48, the underlying conduct depicted in crush videos was
nearly impossible to prosecute. These videos, which 鈥 often
appeal to persons with a very specific sexual fetish,鈥 id., at
2, were made in secret, generally without a live audience,
and 鈥渢he faces of the women inflicting the torture in the
material often were not shown, nor could the location of
the place where the cruelty was being inflicted or the date
of the activity be ascertained from the depiction.鈥 Id., at 3.
Thus, law enforcement authorities often were not able to
identify the parties responsible for the torture. See Pun
ishing Depictions of Animal Cruelty and the Federal
Prisoner Health Care Co-Payment Act of 1999: Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Commit
tee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1 (1999)
(hereinafter Hearing on Depictions of Animal Cruelty). In
the rare instances in which it was possible to identify and
find the perpetrators, they 鈥渙ften were able to successfully
assert as a defense that the State could not prove its
jurisdiction over the place where the act occurred or that
the actions depicted took place within the time specified in
12 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
ALITO, J., dissenting
the State statute of limitations.鈥 H. R. Rep., at 3; see also
145 Cong. Rec. 25896 (Rep. Gallegly) (鈥淸I]t is the prosecu
tors from around this country, Federal prosecutors as well
as State prosecutors, that have made an appeal to us for
this鈥); Hearing on Depictions of Animal Cruelty 21 (鈥淚f the
production of the video is not discovered during the actual
filming, then prosecution for the offense is virtually im
possible without a cooperative eyewitness to the filming or
an undercover police operation鈥); id., at 34鈥35 (discussing
example of case in which state prosecutor 鈥渉ad the defen
dant telling us he produced these videos,鈥 but where
prosecution was not possible because the State could not
prove where or when the tape was made).
In light of the practical problems thwarting the prosecu
tion of the creators of crush videos under state animal
cruelty laws, Congress concluded that the only effective
way of stopping the underlying criminal conduct was to
prohibit the commercial exploitation of the videos of that
conduct. And Congress鈥 strategy appears to have been
vindicated. We are told that 鈥淸b]y 2007, sponsors of 搂48
declared the crush video industry dead. Even overseas
Websites shut down in the wake of 搂48. Now, after the
Third Circuit鈥檚 decision [facially invalidating the statute],
crush videos are already back online.鈥 Humane Society
Brief 5 (citations omitted).
2
The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, but it
most certainly does not protect violent criminal conduct,
even if engaged in for expressive purposes. Crush videos
present a highly unusual free speech issue because they
are so closely linked with violent criminal conduct. The
videos record the commission of violent criminal acts, and
it appears that these crimes are committed for the sole
purpose of creating the videos. In addition, as noted
above, Congress was presented with compelling evidence
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 13
ALITO, J., dissenting
that the only way of preventing these crimes was to target
the sale of the videos. Under these circumstances, I can
not believe that the First Amendment commands Con
gress to step aside and allow the underlying crimes to
continue.
The most relevant of our prior decisions is Ferber, 458
U. S. 747, which concerned child pornography. The Court
there held that child pornography is not protected speech,
and I believe that Ferber鈥檚 reasoning dictates a similar
conclusion here.
In Ferber, an important factor鈥擨 would say the most
important factor鈥攚as that child pornography involves the
commission of a crime that inflicts severe personal injury
to the 鈥渃hildren who are made to engage in sexual conduct
for commercial purposes.鈥 鈥 Id., at 753 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Ferber Court repeatedly described
the production of child pornography as child 鈥渁buse,鈥
鈥渕olestation,鈥 or 鈥渆xploitation.鈥 See, e.g., id., at 749 (鈥淚n
recent years, the exploitive use of children in the produc
tion of pornography has become a serious national prob
lem鈥); id., at 758, n. 9 (鈥淪exual molestation by adults is
often involved in the production of child sexual perform
ances鈥). As later noted in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coali
tion, 535 U. S. 234, 249 (2002), in Ferber 鈥淸t]he production
of the work, not its content, was the target of the statute.鈥
See also 535 U.S., at 250 (Ferber involved 鈥渟peech that
itself is the record of sexual abuse鈥).
Second, Ferber emphasized the fact that these underly
ing crimes could not be effectively combated without tar
geting the distribution of child pornography. As the Court
put it, 鈥渢he distribution network for child pornography
must be closed if the production of material which requires
the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively
controlled.鈥 458 U. S., at 759. The Court added:
鈥淸T]here is no serious contention that the legislature
14 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
ALITO, J., dissenting
was unjustified in believing that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to halt the exploitation of children by pur
suing only those who produce the photographs and
movies. . . . The most expeditious if not the only prac
tical method of law enforcement may be to dry up the
market for this material by imposing severe criminal
penalties on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise
promoting the product.鈥 Id., at 759鈥760.
See also id., at 761 (鈥淭he advertising and selling of child
pornography provide an economic motive for and are thus
an integral part of the production of such materials鈥).
Third, the Ferber Court noted that the value of child
pornography 鈥渋s exceedingly modest, if not de minimis,鈥
and that any such value was 鈥渙verwhelmingly out
weigh[ed]鈥 by 鈥渢he evil to be restricted.鈥 Id., at 762鈥763.
All three of these characteristics are shared by 搂48, as
applied to crush videos. First, the conduct depicted in
crush videos is criminal in every State and the District of
Columbia. Thus, any crush video made in this country
records the actual commission of a criminal act that in
flicts severe physical injury and excruciating pain and
ultimately results in death. Those who record the under
lying criminal acts are likely to be criminally culpable,
either as aiders and abettors or conspirators. And in the
tight and secretive market for these videos, some who sell
the videos or possess them with the intent to make a profit
may be similarly culpable. (For example, in some cases,
crush videos were commissioned by purchasers who speci
fied the details of the acts that they wanted to see per
formed. See H. R. Rep., at 3; Hearing on Depictions of
Animal Cruelty 27). To the extent that 搂48 reaches such
persons, it surely does not violate the First Amendment.
Second, the criminal acts shown in crush videos cannot
be prevented without targeting the conduct prohibited by
搂48鈥攖he creation, sale, and possession for sale of depic
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 15
ALITO, J., dissenting
tions of animal torture with the intention of realizing a
commercial profit. The evidence presented to Congress
posed a stark choice: Either ban the commercial exploita
tion of crush videos or tolerate a continuation of the crimi
nal acts that they record. Faced with this evidence, Con
gress reasonably chose to target the lucrative crush video
market.
Finally, the harm caused by the underlying crimes
vastly outweighs any minimal value that the depictions
might conceivably be thought to possess. Section 48
reaches only the actual recording of acts of animal torture;
the statute does not apply to verbal descriptions or to
simulations. And, unlike the child pornography statute in
Ferber or its federal counterpart, 18 U. S. C. 搂2252, 搂48(b)
provides an exception for depictions having any 鈥渟erious
religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic,
historical, or artistic value.鈥
It must be acknowledged that 搂48 differs from a child
pornography law in an important respect: preventing the
abuse of children is certainly much more important than
preventing the torture of the animals used in crush videos.
It was largely for this reason that the Court of Appeals
concluded that Ferber did not support the constitutionality
of 搂48. 533 F. 3d, at 228 (鈥淧reventing cruelty to animals,
although an exceedingly worthy goal, simply does not
implicate interests of the same magnitude as protecting
children from physical and psychological harm鈥). But
while protecting children is unquestionably more impor
tant than protecting animals, the Government also has a
compelling interest in preventing the torture depicted in
crush videos.
The animals used in crush videos are living creatures
that experience excruciating pain. Our society has long
banned such cruelty, which is illegal throughout the coun
try. In Ferber, the Court noted that 鈥渧irtually all of the
States and the United States have passed legislation
16 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
ALITO, J., dissenting
proscribing the production of or otherwise combating 鈥榗hild
pornography,鈥 鈥 and the Court declined to 鈥渟econd-guess
[that] legislative judgment.鈥6 458 U. S., at 758. Here,
likewise, the Court of Appeals erred in second-guessing
the legislative judgment about the importance of prevent
ing cruelty to animals.
Section 48鈥檚 ban on trafficking in crush videos also helps
to enforce the criminal laws and to ensure that criminals
do not profit from their crimes. See 145 Cong. Rec. 25897
(Oct. 19, 1999) (Rep. Gallegly) (鈥淭he state has an interest
in enforcing its existing laws. Right now, the laws are not
only being violated, but people are making huge profits
from promoting the violations鈥); id., at 10685 (May 24,
1999) (Rep. Gallegly) (explaining that he introduced the
House version of the bill because 鈥渃riminals should not
profit from [their] illegal acts鈥). We have already judged
that taking the profit out of crime is a compelling interest.
See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 119 (1991).
In short, Ferber is the case that sheds the most light on
the constitutionality of Congress鈥 effort to halt the produc
tion of crush videos. Applying the principles set forth in
Ferber, I would hold that crush videos are not protected by
the First Amendment.
B
Application of the Ferber framework also supports the
鈥斺斺斺斺斺
6 In other cases, we have regarded evidence of a national consensus as
proof that a particular government interest is compelling. See Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S.
105, 118 (1991) (State鈥檚 compelling interest 鈥渋n ensuring that victims of
crime are compensated by those who harm them鈥 evidenced by fact that
鈥淸e]very State has a body of tort law serving exactly this interest鈥);
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 624鈥625 (1984) (citing
state laws prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations as
evidence of the compelling governmental interest in ensuring equal
access).
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 17
ALITO, J., dissenting
constitutionality of 搂48 as applied to depictions of brutal
animal fights. (For convenience, I will focus on videos of
dogfights, which appear to be the most common type of
animal fight videos.)
First, such depictions, like crush videos, record the
actual commission of a crime involving deadly violence.
Dogfights are illegal in every State and the District of
Columbia, Brief for United States 26鈥27, and n. 8 (citing
statutes), and under federal law constitute a felony pun
ishable by imprisonment for up to five years, 7 U. S. C.
搂2156 et seq. (2006 ed. and Supp. II), 18 U. S. C. 搂49 (2006
ed., Supp. II).
Second, Congress had an ample basis for concluding
that the crimes depicted in these videos cannot be effec
tively controlled without targeting the videos. Like crush
videos and child pornography, dogfight videos are very
often produced as part of a 鈥渓ow-profile, clandestine indus
try,鈥 and 鈥渢he need to market the resulting products re
quires a visible apparatus of distribution.鈥 Ferber, 458
U. S., at 760. In such circumstances, Congress had rea
sonable grounds for concluding that it would be 鈥渄ifficult,
if not impossible, to halt鈥 the underlying exploitation of
dogs by pursuing only those who stage the fights. Id., at
759鈥760; see 533 F. 3d, at 246 (Cowen, J., dissenting)
(citing evidence establishing 鈥渢he existence of a lucrative
market for depictions of animal cruelty,鈥 including videos
of dogfights, 鈥渨hich in turn provides a powerful incentive
to individuals to create [such] videos鈥).
The commercial trade in videos of dogfights is 鈥渁n inte
gral part of the production of such materials,鈥 Ferber,
supra, at 761. As the Humane Society explains,
鈥淸v]ideotapes memorializing dogfights are integral to the
success of this criminal industry鈥 for a variety of reasons.
Humane Society Brief 5. For one thing, some dogfighting
videos are made 鈥渟olely for the purpose of selling the video
(and not for a live audience).鈥 Id., at 9. In addition, those
18 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
ALITO, J., dissenting
who stage dogfights profit not just from the sale of the
videos themselves, but from the gambling revenue they
take in from the fights; the videos 鈥渆ncourage [such] gam
bling activity because they allow those reluctant to attend
actual fights for fear of prosecution to still bet on the
outcome.鈥 Ibid.; accord, Brief for Center on the Admini
stration of Criminal Law as Amicus Curiae 12 (鈥淪elling
videos of dogfights effectively abets the underlying crimes
by providing a market for dogfighting while allowing
actual dogfights to remain underground鈥); ibid. (鈥淭hese
videos are part of a 鈥榣ucrative market鈥 where videos are
produced by a 鈥榖are-boned, clandestine staff鈥 in order to
permit the actual location of dogfights and the perpetra
tors of these underlying criminal activities to go unde
tected鈥 (citations omitted)). Moreover, 鈥淸v]ideo documen
tation is vital to the criminal enterprise because it
provides proof of a dog鈥檚 fighting prowess鈥攑roof de
manded by potential buyers and critical to the under
ground market.鈥 Humane Society Brief 9. Such re
cordings may also serve as 鈥 鈥榯raining鈥 videos for other fight
organizers.鈥 Ibid. In short, because videos depicting live
dogfights are essential to the success of the criminal dog
fighting subculture, the commercial sale of such videos
helps to fuel the market for, and thus to perpetuate the
perpetration of, the criminal conduct depicted in them.
Third, depictions of dogfights that fall within 搂48鈥檚 reach
have by definition no appreciable social value. As noted,
搂48(b) exempts depictions having any appreciable social
value, and thus the mere inclusion of a depiction of a live
fight in a larger work that aims at communicating an idea
or a message with a modicum of social value would not run
afoul of the statute.
Finally, the harm caused by the underlying criminal
acts greatly outweighs any trifling value that the depic
tions might be thought to possess. As the Humane Society
explains:
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 19
ALITO, J., dissenting
鈥淭he abused dogs used in fights endure physical tor
ture and emotional manipulation throughout their
lives to predispose them to violence; common tactics
include feeding the animals hot peppers and gunpow
der, prodding them with sticks, and electrocution.
Dogs are conditioned never to give up a fight, even if
they will be gravely hurt or killed. As a result, dog
fights inflict horrific injuries on the participating
animals, including lacerations, ripped ears, puncture
wounds and broken bones. Losing dogs are routinely
refused treatment, beaten further as 鈥榩unishment鈥 for
the loss, and executed by drowning, hanging, or incin
eration.鈥 Id., at 5鈥6 (footnotes omitted).
For these dogs, unlike the animals killed in crush vid
eos, the suffering lasts for years rather than minutes. As
with crush videos, moreover, the statutory ban on com
merce in dogfighting videos is also supported by compel
ling governmental interests in effectively enforcing the
Nation鈥檚 criminal laws and preventing criminals from
profiting from their illegal activities. See Ferber, supra, at
757鈥758; Simon & Schuster, 502 U. S., at 119.
In sum, 搂48 may validly be applied to at least two broad
real-world categories of expression covered by the statute:
crush videos and dogfighting videos. Thus, the statute has
a substantial core of constitutionally permissible applica
tions. Moreover, for the reasons set forth above, the re
cord does not show that 搂48, properly interpreted, bans a
substantial amount of protected speech in absolute terms.
A fortiori, respondent has not met his burden of demon
strating that any impermissible applications of the statute
are 鈥渟ubstantial鈥 in relation to its 鈥減lainly legitimate
sweep.鈥 Williams, 553 U. S., at 292. Accordingly, I would
reject respondent鈥檚 claim that 搂48 is facially unconstitu
tional under the overbreadth doctrine.
20 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
ALITO, J., dissenting
* * *
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 21
Appendix to J., dissenting , J.
ALITO, opinion of ALITO
APPENDIX
As the following chart makes clear, virtually all state
laws prohibiting animal cruelty either expressly define
the term 鈥渁nimal鈥 to exclude wildlife or else specifically
exempt lawful hunting activities.
Alaska Alaska Stat. 搂11.61.140(c)(4) (2008) (鈥淚t is a
defense to a prosecution under this section that
the conduct of the defendant . . . was necessarily
incidental to lawful fishing, hunting or trapping
activities鈥)
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 搂搂13鈥2910(C)(1), (3) (West
Supp. 2009) (鈥淭his section does not prohibit or
restrict . . . [t]he taking of wildlife or other
activities permitted by or pursuant to title 17
. . . [or] [a]ctivities regulated by the Arizona
game and fish department or the Arizona de
partment of agriculture鈥)
Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. 搂5鈥62鈥105(a) (Supp. 2009)
(鈥淭his subchapter does not prohibit any of the
following activities: . . . (9) Engaging in the
taking of game or fish through hunting, trap
ping, or fishing, or engaging in any other activ
ity authorized by Arkansas Constitution,
Amendment 35, by 搂15鈥41鈥101 et seq., or by
any Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission
regulation promulgated under either Arkansas
Constitution, Amendment 35, or statute鈥)
California Cal. Penal Code Ann. 搂599c (West 1999) (鈥淣o
part of this title shall be construed as interfer
ing with any of the laws of this state known as
the 鈥榞ame laws,鈥 . . . or to interfere with the right
to kill all animals used for food鈥)
Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 搂18鈥9鈥201.5(2) (2009) (鈥淚n
case of any conflict between this part 2 [prohib
iting cruelty to animals] or section 35鈥43鈥126,
[Colo. Rev. Stat.], and the wildlife statutes of
22 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
Appendix to J., dissenting , J.
ALITO, opinion of ALITO
the state, said wildlife statutes shall control鈥),
搂18鈥9鈥202(3) (鈥淣othing in this part 2 shall be
construed to amend or in any manner change
the authority of the wildlife commission, as
established in title 33, [Colo. Rev. Stat.], or to
prohibit any conduct therein authorized or
permitted鈥)
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. 搂53鈥247(b) (2009) (鈥淎ny person
who maliciously and intentionally maims,
mutilates, tortures, wounds or kills an animal
shall be fined not more than five thousand
dollars or imprisoned not more than five years
or both. The provisions of this subsection shall
not apply to . . . any person . . . while lawfully
engaged in the taking of wildlife鈥)
Delaware Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, 搂1325(f) (2007) (鈥淭his
section shall not apply to the lawful hunting or
trapping of animals as provided by law鈥)
Florida Fla. Stat. 搂828.122(9)(b) (2007) (鈥淭his section
shall not apply to . . . [a]ny person using animals
to pursue or take wildlife or to participate in any
hunting regulated or subject to being regulated
by the rules and regulations of the Fish and
Wildlife Conservation Commission鈥)
Georgia Ga. Code Ann. 搂16鈥12鈥4(e) (2007) (鈥淭he provi
sions of this Code section shall not be construed
as prohibiting conduct which is otherwise per
mitted under the laws of this state or of the
United States, including, but not limited to . . .
hunting, trapping, fishing, [or] wildlife man
agement鈥)
Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. 搂711鈥1108.5(1) (2008 Cum.
Supp.) (鈥淎 person commits the offense of cruelty
to animals in the first degree if the person
intentionally or knowingly tortures, mutilates,
or poisons or causes the torture, mutilation, or
poisoning of any pet animal or equine animal
resulting in serious bodily injury or death of the
pet animal or equine animal鈥)
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 23
Appendix to J., dissenting , J.
ALITO, opinion of ALITO
Idaho Idaho Code 搂25鈥3515 (Lexis 2000) (鈥淣o part of
this chapter shall be construed as interfering
with, negating or preempting any of the laws or
rules of the department of fish and game of this
state . . . or to interfere with the right to kill,
slaughter, bag or take all animals used for food鈥)
Illinois Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 510, 搂70/13 (West 2006) (鈥淚n
case of any alleged conflict between this Act . . .
and the 鈥榃ildlife Code of Illinois鈥 or 鈥楢n Act to
define and require the use of humane methods
in the handling, preparation for slaughter, and
slaughter of livestock for meat or meat products
to be offered for sale鈥, . . . the provisions of those
Acts shall prevail鈥), 搂70/3.03(b)(1) (鈥淔or the
purposes of this Section, 鈥榓nimal torture鈥 does
not include any death, harm, or injury caused to
any animal by . . . any hunting, fishing, trap
ping, or other activity allowed under the Wild
life Code, the Wildlife Habitat Management
Areas Act, or the Fish and Aquatic Life Code鈥
(footnotes omitted))
Indiana Ind. Code 搂35鈥46鈥3鈥5(a) (West 2004) (subject to
certain exceptions not relevant here, 鈥渢his
chapter [prohibiting 鈥淥ffenses Relating to
Animals鈥漖 does not apply to . . . [f]ishing, hunt
ing, trapping, or other conduct authorized under
[Ind. Code 搂]14鈥22鈥)
Iowa Iowa Code 搂717B.2(5) (2009) (鈥淭his section
[banning 鈥渁nimal abuse鈥漖 shall not apply to . . .
[a] person taking, hunting, trapping, or fishing
for a wild animal as provided in chapter 481A鈥),
搂717B.3A(2)(e) (鈥淭his section [banning 鈥渁nimal
torture鈥漖 shall not apply to . . . [a] person taking,
hunting, trapping, or fishing for a wild animal
as provided in chapter 481A鈥)
Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. 搂21鈥4310(b)(3) (2007) (鈥淭he
provisions of this section shall not apply to . . .
killing, attempting to kill, trapping, catching or
taking of any animal in accordance with the
24 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
Appendix to J., dissenting , J.
ALITO, opinion of ALITO
provisions of chapter 32 [Wildlife, Parks and
Recreation] or chapter 47 [Livestock and Do
mestic Animals] of the Kansas Statutes Anno
tated鈥)
Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 搂搂525.130(2)(a), (e) (Lexis
2008) (鈥淣othing in this section shall apply to the
killing of animals . . . [p]ursuant to a license to
hunt, fish, or trap . . . [or] [f]or purposes relating
to sporting activities鈥), 搂525.130(3) (鈥淎ctivities
of animals engaged in hunting, field trials, dog
training other than training a dog to fight for
pleasure or profit, and other activities author
ized either by a hunting license or by the De
partment of Fish and Wildlife shall not consti
tute a violation of this section鈥)
Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 搂14:102.1(C)(1) (West Supp.
2010) (鈥淭his Section shall not apply to . . . [t]he
lawful hunting or trapping of wildlife as pro
vided by law鈥)
Maine Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, 搂1031(1)(G) (West
Supp. 2009) (providing that hunting and trap
ping an animal is not a form of prohibited
animal cruelty if 鈥減ermitted pursuant to鈥 parts
of state code regulating the shooting of large
game, inland fisheries, and wildlife)
Maryland Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. 搂10鈥603(3) (Lexis
2002) (鈥淪ections 10鈥601 through 10鈥608 of this
subtitle do not apply to . . . an activity that may
cause unavoidable physical pain to an animal,
including . . . hunting, if the person performing
the activity uses the most humane method
reasonably available鈥)
Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 搂搂750.50(11)(a), (b)
(West Supp. 2009) (鈥淭his section does not pro
hibit the lawful killing or other use of an ani
mal, including . . . [f]ishing . . . [h]unting, [or]
trapping [as regulated by state law]鈥),
搂750.50b(9)(a), (b) (鈥淭his section does not pro
hibit the lawful killing or other use of an ani
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 25
Appendix to J., dissenting , J.
ALITO, opinion of ALITO
mal, including . . . [f]ishing . . . [h]unting, [or]
trapping [as regulated by state law]鈥)
Missouri Mo. Rev. Stat. 搂578.007(3) (2000) (鈥淭he provi
sions of sections 578.005 to 578.023 shall not
apply to . . . [h]unting, fishing, or trapping as
allowed by鈥 state law)
Montana Mont. Code Ann. 搂45鈥8鈥211(4)(d) (2009) (鈥淭his
section does not prohibit . . . lawful fishing,
hunting, and trapping activities鈥)
Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. 搂28鈥1013(4) (2008) (exempting
鈥淸c]ommonly accepted practices of hunting,
fishing, or trapping鈥)
Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. 搂搂574.200(1), (3) (2007) (provi
sions of Nevada law banning animal cruelty 鈥渄o
not . . . [i]nterfere with any of the fish and game
laws . . . [or] the right to kill all animals and
fowl used for food鈥)
New N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 搂644:8(II) (West Supp.
Hampshire 2009) (鈥淚n this section, 鈥榓nimal鈥 means a domes
tic animal, a household pet or a wild animal in
captivity鈥)
New Jersey N. J. Stat. Ann. 搂4:22鈥16(c) (West 1998) (鈥淣oth
ing contained in this article shall be construed
to prohibit or interfere with . . . [t]he shooting or
taking of game or game fish in such manner and
at such times as is allowed or provided by the
laws of this State鈥)
New Mexico N. M. Stat. Ann. 搂30鈥18鈥1(I)(1) (Supp. 2009)
(鈥淭he provisions of this section do not apply to
. . . fishing, hunting, falconry, taking and trap
ping鈥)
New York N. Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law Ann. 搂353鈥揳(2) (West
2004) (鈥淣othing contained in this section shall
be construed to prohibit or interfere in any way
with anyone lawfully engaged in hunting, trap
ping, or fishing鈥)
North N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 搂14鈥360(c)(1) (Lexis 2009)
Carolina (鈥淸T]his section shall not apply to . . . [t]he
lawful taking of animals under the jurisdiction
26 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
Appendix to J., dissenting , J.
ALITO, opinion of ALITO
and regulation of the Wildlife Resources Com
mission . . .鈥)
North Dakota N. D. Cent. Code Ann. 搂36鈥21.1鈥01(5)(a) (Lexis
Supp. 2009) (鈥 鈥楥ruelty鈥 or 鈥榯orture鈥 . . . does not
include . . . [a]ny activity that requires a license
or permit under chapter 20.1鈥03 [which governs
gaming and other licenses]鈥)
Oregon Ore. Rev. Stat. 搂167.335 (2007) (鈥淯nless gross
negligence can be shown, the provisions of
[certain statutes prohibiting animal cruelty] do
not apply to . . . (7) [l]awful fishing, hunting and
trapping activities鈥)
Pennsylvania 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 搂5511(a)(3)(ii) (2008) (鈥淭his
subsection [banning killing, maiming, or poison
ing of domestic animals or zoo animals] shall not
apply to . . . the killing of any animal or fowl
pursuant to . . . The Game Law鈥), 搂5511(c)(1) (鈥淎
person commits an offense if he wantonly or
cruelly illtreats, overloads, beats, otherwise
abuses any animal, or neglects any animal as to
which he has a duty of care鈥)
Rhode Island R. I. Gen. Laws 搂4鈥1鈥3(a) (Lexis 1998) (prohibit
ing 鈥淸e]very owner, possessor, or person having
the charge or custody of any animal鈥 from
engaging in certain acts of unnecessary cruelty),
搂搂4鈥1鈥5(a), (b) (prohibiting only 鈥淸m]alicious鈥
injury to or killing of animals and further pro
viding that 鈥淸t]his section shall not apply to
licensed hunters during hunting season or a
licensed business killing animals for human
consumption鈥)
South S. C. Code Ann. 搂47鈥1鈥40(C) (Supp. 2009) (鈥淭his
Carolina section does not apply to . . . activity authorized
by Title 50 [consisting of laws on Fish, Game,
and Watercraft]鈥)
South Dakota S. D. Codified Laws 搂40鈥1鈥17 (2004) (鈥淭he acts
and conduct of persons who are lawfully en
gaged in any of the activities authorized by Title
41 [Game, Fish, Parks and Forestry] . . . and
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 27
Appendix to J., dissenting , J.
ALITO, opinion of ALITO
persons who properly kill any animal used for
food and sport hunting, trapping, and fishing as
authorized by the South Dakota Department of
Game, Fish and Parks, are exempt from the
provisions of this chapter鈥)
Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. 搂39鈥14鈥201(1) (2010 Supp.)
(鈥 鈥楢nimal鈥 means a domesticated living creature
or a wild creature previously captured鈥), 搂39鈥
14鈥201(4) (鈥淸N]othing in this part shall be
construed as prohibiting the shooting of birds or
game for the purpose of human food or the use
of animate targets by incorporated gun clubs鈥)
Texas Tex. Penal Code Ann. 搂42.092(a)(2) (West Supp.
2009) (鈥 鈥楢nimal鈥 means a domesticated living
creature, including any stray or feral cat or dog,
and a wild living creature previously captured.
The term does not include an uncaptured wild
living creature or a livestock animal鈥),
搂42.092(f)(1)(A) (鈥淚t is an exception to the appli
cation of this section that the conduct engaged
in by the actor is a generally accepted and
otherwise lawful . . . form of conduct occurring
solely for the purpose of or in support of . . .
fishing, hunting, or trapping鈥)
Utah Utah Code Ann. 搂76鈥9鈥301(1)(b)(ii)(D) (Lexis
2008) (鈥 鈥楢nimal鈥 does not include . . . wildlife, as
defined in Section 23鈥13鈥2, including protected
and unprotected wildlife, if the conduct toward
the wildlife is in accordance with lawful hunt
ing, fishing, or trapping practices or other lawful
practices鈥), 搂76鈥9鈥301(9)(C) (鈥淭his section does
not affect or prohibit . . . the lawful hunting of,
fishing for, or trapping of, wildlife鈥)
Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, 搂351b(1) (2009) (鈥淭his
subchapter shall not apply to . . . activities
regulated by the department of fish and wildlife
pursuant to Part 4 of Title 10鈥)
Virginia Va. Code Ann. 搂3.2鈥6570D (Lexis 2008) (鈥淭his
section shall not prohibit authorized wildlife
28 UNITED STATES v. STEVENS
Appendix to J., dissenting , J.
ALITO, opinion of ALITO
management activities or hunting, fishing or
trapping [as regulated by state law]鈥)
Washington Wash. Rev. Code 搂16.52.180 (2008) (鈥淣o part of
this chapter shall be deemed to interfere with
any of the laws of this state known as the 鈥榞ame
laws鈥 . . . or to interfere with the right to kill
animals to be used for food鈥)
West Virginia W. Va. Code Ann. 搂61鈥8鈥19(f) (Lexis Supp.
2009) (鈥淭he provisions of this section do not
apply to lawful acts of hunting, fishing, [or]
trapping鈥)
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. 搂951.015(1) (2007鈥2008) (鈥淭his chap
ter may not be interpreted as controverting any
law regulating wild animals that are subject to
regulation under ch. 169 [regulating, among
other things, hunting], [or] the taking of wild
animals鈥)
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. 搂6鈥3鈥203(m)(iv) (2009) (鈥淣oth
ing in subsection (a), (b) or (n) of this section
shall be construed to prohibit . . . [t]he hunting,
capture or destruction of any predatory animal
or other wildlife in any manner not otherwise
prohibited by law鈥)