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The Supreme Court found that Arizona's Clean Elections Act placed a burden on groups making protected independent expenditures by forcing them to choose between speech and campaign funds.

Whether BCRAs so-called "Millionaires Amendment," which relaxes campaign finance limits for opponents of congressional candidates spending more than $350,000 of their own money, violates either the First or Fifth Amendments.

Whether a state law requiring voters to have a photo ID violates the Petitioners' First Amendment rights.

Whether the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Acts ban on election season campaign ads by corporations violates the First Amendment.

Whether Vermont's mandatory limits on candidate expenditures violate the 1st and 14th Amendments and the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo? Whether Vermont's treatment of independent expenditures by political parties and committees presumptively coordinated if they benefit fewer than six candidates, and thereby subject to strict contribution and expenditure limits, is consistent with the 1st and 14th Amendments and the Supreme Court's decision in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC? Whether Vermont's contribution limits, which are the lowest in the country, which allow only a single maximum contribution over a two-year election cycle, and which prohibit state political parties from contributing more than $400 to their gubernatorial candidate, fall below an acceptable constitutional threshold and should be struck down?

Whether the three-judge district court correctly dismissed appellant's as-applied constitutional challenge to the federal prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds to finance "electioneering communications."

Whether the district court erred by upholding portions of the "soft money" provision (section 101) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 166 Stat. 81, because it constitutes an invalid exercise of Congress' power to regulate elections under Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution; violates the First Amendment or the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment; or is unconstitutionally vague. Whether the district court erred by upholding portions of the "electioneering communications" provisions (sections 201, 203, 204, and 311), of BCRA, because they violate the First Amendment or the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, or are unconstitutionally vague. Whether the district court erred by holding nonjusticiable challenges to, and upholding, portions of the "advance notice" provisions, the "coordination" provisions, and the "attack ad" provision of BCRA (section 305), because they violates the First Amendment.

Whether certain advocacy groups can contribute to candidates campaigns. Currently, only individuals, political action committees, political parties and other campaign committees can give to candidates. More specifically, the issue is whether North Carolina Right to Life and other nonprofit advocacy corporations groups that raise money not through business ventures but through donations from supporters can make campaign contributions. Such groups have neither business interests nor shareholders.

Whether the Party Expenditure Provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 violates a political party's First Amendment rights by limiting the amount of money a party may spend in coordination with its congressional candidates.

Does New Jersey’s public accommodation law violate the free speech and freedom of association rights of the Boy Scouts of America, a private group, by requiring it to admit a gay scoutmaster?

Whether the Buckley v. Valeodecision authorizes state limits on campaign-contributions to state political candidates. Whether the limits approved in Buckleydefine the scope of permissible state limitations.

Whether several conditions placed by the state of Colorado on the ballot-initiative process infringe on political free-speech rights, including:
(1) a requirement that initiative-petition circulators be registered voters; (2) a requirement that circulators wear an identification badge; and (3) a requirement that proponents of the initiative disclose certain information, such as names and addresses of paid circulators and amount paid to each circulator.

Whether a public television station sponsoring a candidates debate may exclude a legally qualified candidate who the station does not believe can win the election.

Whether campaign spending limits constitutionally can be applied against a state committee of a political party whose spending was not coordinated with a candidate.

Whether the government may constitutionally prohibit the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person issuing it.

Whether an ordinance punishing such action that “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender” violates the First Amendment.

Whether a state may constitutionally prohibit write-in voting.

Whether a state may constitutionally prohibit the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place.

Whether a state, through its election laws, may constitutionally (1) prohibit a political party in one district from using the same name that a different political party uses in another district; (2) require more signatures to get on the ballot in a multidistrict political subdivision than are required to get on a state-wide ballot; and (3) require a political party seeking to be on ballots in both suburban Cook County and in Chicago to obtain 25,000 signatures from both areas.

Did the Michigan Campaign Finance Act violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Whether provisions of the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act restricting union and corporation's funds for political purposes to members of the corporation violate the First Amendment's guarantees of associational rights.

Whether a Kentucky statute prohibiting electoral candidates from offering materials benefits to voters in consideration for their votes violated the candidates free speech rights under the First Amendment.

Whether a $250 limit on contributions to committees in support of or opposition to ballot initiatives in California violated First Amendment guarantees of association and free speech.

Whether a provision of the 1971 Federal Elections Campaign Act prohibiting individual contributions of over $5000 to multicandidate political committees violated First Amendment guarantees of speech and associational freedoms.

Whether a state criminal statute that forbids certain expenditures by banks and business corporations for the purpose of influencing the vote on referendum proposals violates the First Amendment.

Do the Federal Election Campaign Act’s limits on electoral expenditures violate the 1st Amendment?

Does a Chicago city ordinance which bans non-union picketing within 150 feet of a school building violate both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Whether the city’s “anti-picketing” ordinance and “anti-noise” ordinance violated the First Amendment.

The Supreme Court held the government cannot punish incendiary speech unless the intent and likely outcome is to cause "imminent lawless action".

Must a protester, when faced with an injunction enforcing a facially unconstitutional ordinance, engage in an orderly judicial review of that injunction before disobeying it?

Whether a breach of the peace conviction arising out of a peaceful sit-in in a segregated library infringed upon the petitioners First Amendment free speech, assembly, and petition rights.

Whether the freedom of speech provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect a criminal suspect who makes a false statement about a police officer without "actual malice."

Do statutory "disturbance of the peace" and "obstruction of public passageways" convictions, for a peaceable demonstration that contains speech that may potentially incite violence, infringe on a demonstrator's First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly?

Do statutory "disturbance of the peace" and "obstruction of public passageways" convictions, for a peaceable demonstration that contains speech that may potentially incite violence, infringe on a demonstrator's First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly?

To what extent does the First Amendment protections for speech and press limit a state's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct?

Whether the Florida Legislative Investigative Committee, in an attempt to inform itself about activities of subversive organizations, violated petitioners First and Fourteenth Amendment association rights.

Whether the First Amendment was violated when civil rights protestors, marching in front of the state house, were arrested after refusing to disperse when a crowd gathered.

Whether a Virginia barratry statute which banned the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business unconstitutionally burdened the First Amendment freedom of association rights of the petitioner and petitioners clients.

Whether a Louisiana statute, which requires that each local organization affiliated with an out-of-state association annually file an affidavit stating that none of its national officers are members of "subversive" organizations, violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of freedom of association.

Whether a Louisiana statute which compels teachers in public institutions to disclose which organizations they belong or contribute to unconstitutionally burdens a teachers 14th Amendment right of free association.

Whether The City of Little Rocks license tax ordinance which requires the compulsory disclosure of any local organizations membership list in order to verify its tax-exempt status unconstitutionally burdens the freedom of association of an organizations members

Did an Alabama law that required the NAACP to provide the names and addresses of all its members and agents in the state violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Does a California statute that makes the display of a red flag as a statement of "opposition to organized government" violate the First & Fourteenth Amendments?