NOTICE:鈥俆his opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports.鈥僐eaders are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 15鈥1293
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JOSEPH MATAL, INTERIM DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PETITIONER v. SIMON SHIAO TAM
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the federal circuit
[June 19, 2017]
Justice Alito announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III鈥揂, and an opinion with respect to Parts III鈥揃, III鈥揅, and IV, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice Breyer join.
This case concerns a dance-rock band鈥檚 application for federal trademark registration of the band鈥檚 name, 鈥淭he Slants.鈥 鈥淪lants鈥 is a derogatory term for persons of Asian descent, and members of the band are Asian-Americans. But the band members believe that by taking that slur as the name of their group, they will help to 鈥渞eclaim鈥 the term and drain its denigrating force.
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied the application based on a provision of federal law prohibiting the registration of trademarks that may 鈥渄isparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute鈥 any 鈥減ersons, living or dead.鈥 15 U. S. C. 搂1052(a). We now hold that this provision violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It offends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.
I
A
鈥淭he principle underlying trademark protection is that distinctive marks鈥攚ords, names, symbols, and the like鈥攃an help distinguish a particular artisan鈥檚 goods from those of others.鈥 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 3); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U. S. 205, 212 (2000) . A trademark 鈥渄esignate[s] the goods as the product of a particular trader鈥 and 鈥減rotect[s] his good will against the sale of another鈥檚 product as his.鈥 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90, 97 (1918) ; see also Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 鈥413 (1916). It helps consumers identify goods and services that they wish to purchase, as well as those they want to avoid. See Wal-Mart Stores, supra, at 212鈥213; Park 鈥橬 Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 198 (1985) .
鈥淸F]ederal law does not create trademarks.鈥 B&B Hardware, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 3). Trademarks and their precursors have ancient origins, and trademarks were protected at common law and in equity at the time of the founding of our country. 3 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition 搂19:8 (4th ed. 2017) (hereinafter McCarthy); 1 id., 搂搂5:1, 5:2, 5:3; Pattishal, The Constitutional Foundations of American Trademark Law, 78 Trademark Rep. 456, 457鈥458 (1988); Pattishall, Two Hundred Years of American Trademark Law, 68 Trademark Rep. 121, 121鈥123 (1978); see Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 92 (1879) . For most of the 19th century, trademark protection was the province of the States. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U. S. 763 鈥782 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 785 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Eventually, Congress stepped in to provide a degree of national uniformity, passing the first federal legislation protecting trademarks in 1870. See Act of July 8, 1870, 搂搂77鈥84, 16Stat. 210鈥212. The foundation of current federal trademark law is the Lanham Act, enacted in 1946. See Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60Stat. 427. By that time, trademark had expanded far beyond phrases that do no more than identify a good or service. Then, as now, trademarks often consisted of catchy phrases that convey a message.
Under the Lanham Act, trademarks that are 鈥渦sed in commerce鈥 may be placed on the 鈥減rincipal register,鈥 that is, they may be federally registered. 15 U. S. C. 搂1051(a)(1). And some marks 鈥渃apable of distinguishing [an] applicant鈥檚 goods or services and not registrable on the principal register . . . which are in lawful use in commerce by the owner thereof鈥 may instead be placed on a different federal register: the supplemental register. 搂1091(a). There are now more than two million marks that have active federal certificates of registration. PTO Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2016, p. 192 (Table 15), (all Internet materials as last visited June 16, 2017). This system of federal registration helps to ensure that trademarks are fully protected and supports the free flow of commerce. 鈥淸N]ational protection of trademarks is desirable,鈥 we have explained, 鈥渂ecause trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.鈥 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U. S. 522, 531 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Park 鈥橬 Fly, Inc., supra, at 198 (鈥淭he Lanham Act provides national protection of trademarks in order to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers鈥).
B
Without federal registration, a valid trademark may still be used in commerce. See 3 McCarthy 搂19:8. And an unregistered trademark can be enforced against would-be infringers in several ways. Most important, even if a trademark is not federally registered, it may still be enforceable under 搂43(a) of the Lanham Act, which creates a federal cause of action for trademark infringement. See Two Pesos, supra, at 768 (鈥淪ection 43(a) prohibits a broader range of practices than does 搂32, which applies to registered marks, but it is common ground that 搂43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks鈥 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).[1] Unregistered trademarks may also be entitled to protection under other federal statutes, such as the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U. S. C. 搂1125(d). See 5 McCarthy 搂25A:49, at 25A鈥198 (鈥淸T]here is no requirement [in the Anticybersquatting Act] that the protected 鈥榤ark鈥 be registered: unregistered common law marks are protected by the Act鈥). And an unregistered trademark can be enforced under state common law, or if it has been registered in a State, under that State鈥檚 registration system. See 3 id., 搂19:3, at 19鈥23 (explaining that 鈥淸t]he federal system of registration and protection does not preempt parallel state law protection, either by state common law or state registration鈥 and 鈥淸i]n the vast majority of situations, federal and state trademark law peacefully coexist鈥); id., 搂22:1 (discussing state trademark registration systems).
Federal registration, however, 鈥渃onfers important legal rights and benefits on trademark owners who register their marks.鈥 B&B Hardware, 575 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted). Registration on the principal register (1) 鈥渟erves as 鈥榗onstructive notice of the registrant鈥檚 claim of ownership鈥 of the mark,鈥 ibid. (quoting 15 U. S. C. 搂1072); (2) 鈥渋s 鈥榩rima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the owner鈥檚 ownership of the mark, and of the owner鈥檚 exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate,鈥 鈥 B & B Hardware, 575 U. S. ___ (slip op., at 3) (quoting 搂1057(b)); and (3) can make a mark 鈥 鈥榠ncontestable鈥 鈥 once a mark has been registered for five years,鈥 ibid. (quoting 搂搂1065, 1115(b)); see Park 鈥橬 Fly, 469 U. S., at 193. Registration also enables the trademark holder 鈥渢o stop the importation into the United States of articles bearing an infringing mark.鈥 3 Mc-Carthy 搂19:9, at 19鈥38; see 15 U. S. C. 搂1124.
C
The Lanham Act contains provisions that bar certain trademarks from the principal register. For example, a trademark cannot be registered if it is 鈥渕erely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive鈥 of goods, 搂1052(e)(1), or if it is so similar to an already registered trademark or trade name that it is 鈥渓ikely . . . to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,鈥 搂1052(d).
At issue in this case is one such provision, which we will call 鈥渢he disparagement clause.鈥 This provision prohibits the registration of a trademark 鈥渨hich may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.鈥 搂1052(a).[2] This clause appeared in the original Lanham Act and has remained the same to this day. See 搂2(a), 60Stat. 428.
When deciding whether a trademark is disparaging, an examiner at the PTO generally applies a 鈥渢wo-part test.鈥 The examiner first considers 鈥渢he likely meaning of the matter in question, taking into account not only dictionary definitions, but also the relationship of the matter to the other elements in the mark, the nature of the goods or services, and the manner in which the mark is used in the marketplace in connection with the goods or services.鈥 Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure 搂1203.03(b)(i) (Apr. 2017), p. 1200鈥150, http://tmep.uspto.gov. 鈥淚f that meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols,鈥 the examiner moves to the second step, asking 鈥渨hether that meaning may be disparaging to a substantial composite[3] of the referenced group.鈥 Ibid. If the examiner finds that a 鈥渟ubstantial composite, although not necessarily a majority, of the referenced group would find the proposed mark . . . to be disparaging in the context of contemporary attitudes,鈥 a prima facie case of disparagement is made out, and the burden shifts to the applicant to prove that the trademark is not disparaging. Ibid. What is more, the PTO has specified that 鈥淸t]he fact that an applicant may be a member of that group or has good intentions underlying its use of a term does not obviate the fact that a substantial composite of the referenced group would find the term objectionable.鈥 Ibid.
D
Simon Tam is the lead singer of 鈥淭he Slants.鈥 In re Tam, 808 F. 3d 1321, 1331 (CA Fed. 2015) (en banc), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016). He chose this moniker in order to 鈥渞eclaim鈥 and 鈥渢ake ownership鈥 of stereotypes about people of Asian ethnicity. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The group 鈥渄raws inspiration for its lyrics from childhood slurs and mocking nursery rhymes鈥 and has given its albums names such as 鈥淭he Yellow Album鈥 and 鈥淪lanted Eyes, Slanted Hearts.鈥 Ibid.
Tam sought federal registration of 鈥淭HE SLANTS,鈥 on the principal register, App. 17, but an examining attorney at the PTO rejected the request, applying the PTO鈥檚 two-part framework and finding that 鈥渢here is . . . a substantial composite of persons who find the term in the applied-for mark offensive.鈥 Id., at 30. The examining attorney relied in part on the fact that 鈥渘umerous dictionaries define 鈥榮lants鈥 or 鈥榮lant-eyes鈥 as a derogatory or offensive term.鈥 Id., at 29. The examining attorney also relied on a finding that 鈥渢he band鈥檚 name has been found offensive numerous times鈥濃攃iting a performance that was canceled because of the band鈥檚 moniker and the fact that 鈥渟everal bloggers and commenters to articles on the band have indicated that they find the term and the applied-for mark offensive.鈥 Id., at 29鈥30.
Tam contested the denial of registration before the examining attorney and before the PTO鈥檚 Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) but to no avail. Eventually, he took the case to federal court, where the en banc Federal Circuit ultimately found the disparagement clause facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment鈥檚 Free Speech Clause. The majority found that the clause en-gages in viewpoint-based discrimination, that the clause regulates the expressive component of trademarks and consequently cannot be treated as commercial speech, and that the clause is subject to and cannot satisfy strict scrutiny. See 808 F. 3d, at 1334鈥1339. The majority also rejected the Government鈥檚 argument that registered trademarks constitute government speech, as well as the Government鈥檚 contention that federal registration is a form of government subsidy. See id., at 1339鈥1355. And the majority opined that even if the disparagement clause were analyzed under this Court鈥檚 commercial speech cases, the clause would fail the 鈥渋ntermediate scrutiny鈥 that those cases prescribe. See id., at 1355鈥1357.
Several judges wrote separately, advancing an assortment of theories. Concurring, Judge O鈥橫alley agreed with the majority鈥檚 reasoning but added that the disparagement clause is unconstitutionally vague. See id., at 1358鈥1363. Judge Dyk concurred in part and dissented in part. He argued that trademark registration is a government subsidy and that the disparagement clause is facially constitutional, but he found the clause unconstitutional as applied to THE SLANTS because that mark constitutes 鈥渃ore expression鈥 and was not adopted for the purpose of disparaging Asian-Americans. See id., at 1363鈥1374. In dissent, Judge Lourie agreed with Judge Dyk that the clause is facially constitutional but concluded for a variety of reasons that it is also constitutional as applied in this case. See id., at 1374鈥1376. Judge Reyna also dissented, maintaining that trademarks are commercial speech and that the disparagement clause survives intermediate scrutiny because it 鈥渄irectly advances the government鈥檚 substantial interest in the orderly flow of commerce.鈥 See id., at 1376鈥1382.
The Government filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted in order to decide whether the disparagement clause 鈥渋s facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.鈥 Pet. for Cert. i; see sub. nom. Lee v. Tam, 579 U. S. ___ (2016).
II
Before reaching the question whether the disparagement clause violates the First Amendment, we consider Tam鈥檚 argument that the clause does not reach marks that disparage racial or ethnic groups. The clause prohibits the registration of marks that disparage 鈥減ersons,鈥 and Tam claims that the term 鈥減ersons鈥 鈥渋ncludes only natural and juristic persons,鈥 not 鈥渘on-juristic entities such as racial and ethnic groups.鈥 Brief for Respondent 46.
Tam never raised this argument before the PTO or the Federal Circuit, and we declined to grant certiorari on this question when Tam asked us to do so, see Brief Responding to Petition for Certiorari, pp. i, 17鈥21. Normally, that would be the end of the matter in this Court. See, e.g., Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519 鈥538 (1992); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868 鈥895 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
But as the Government pointed out in connection with its petition for certiorari, accepting Tam鈥檚 statutory interpretation would resolve this case and leave the First Amendment question for another day. See Reply Brief 9. 鈥淸W]e have often stressed鈥 that it is 鈥渋mportan[t] [to] avoid[d] the premature adjudication of constitutional questions,鈥 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 690 (1997) , and that 鈥渨e ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable,鈥 Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105 (1944) . See also Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450, 461 (1945) ; Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 295 (1905) . We thus begin by explaining why Tam鈥檚 argument about the definition of 鈥減ersons鈥 in the Lanham Act is meritless.
As noted, the disparagement clause prohibits the registration of trademarks 鈥渨hich may disparage . . . persons, living or dead.鈥 15 U. S. C. 搂1052(a). Tam points to a definition of 鈥減erson鈥 in the Lanham Act, which provides that 鈥淸i]n the construction of this chapter, unless the contrary is plainly apparent from the context . . . [t]he term 鈥榩erson鈥 and any other word or term used to designate the applicant or other entitled to a benefit or privilege or rendered liable under the provisions of this chapter includes a juristic person as well as a natural person.鈥 搂1127. Because racial and ethnic groups are neither natural nor 鈥渏uristic鈥 persons, Tam asserts, these groups fall outside this definition. Brief for Respondent 46鈥48.
Tam鈥檚 argument is refuted by the plain terms of the disparagement clause. The clause applies to marks that disparage 鈥減ersons.鈥 A mark that disparages a 鈥渟ubstantial鈥 percentage of the members of a racial or ethnic group, Trademark Manual 搂1203.03(b)(i), at 1200鈥150, necessar-ily disparages many 鈥減ersons,鈥 namely, members of that group. Tam鈥檚 argument would fail even if the clause used the singular term 鈥減erson,鈥 but Congress鈥 use of the plural 鈥減ersons鈥 makes the point doubly clear.[4]
Tam鈥檚 narrow reading of the term 鈥減ersons鈥 also clashes with the breadth of the disparagement clause. By its terms, the clause applies to marks that disparage, not just 鈥減ersons,鈥 but also 鈥渋nstitutions鈥 and 鈥渂eliefs.鈥 15 U. S. C. 搂1052(a). It thus applies to the members of any group whose members share particular 鈥渂eliefs,鈥 such as political, ideological, and religious groups. It applies to marks that denigrate 鈥渋nstitutions,鈥 and on Tam鈥檚 reading, it also reaches 鈥渏uristic鈥 persons such as corporations, unions, and other unincorporated associations. See 搂1127. Thus, the clause is not limited to marks that disparage a particular natural person. If Congress had wanted to confine the reach of the disparagement clause in the way that Tam suggests, it would have been easy to do so. A neighboring provision of the Lanham Act denies registration to any trademark that 鈥淸c]onsists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent.鈥 搂1052(c) (emphasis added).
Tam contends that his interpretation of the disparagement clause is supported by its legislative history and by the PTO鈥檚 willingness for many years to register marks that plainly denigrated African-Americans and Native Americans. These arguments are unpersuasive. As always, our inquiry into the meaning of the statute鈥檚 text ceases when 鈥渢he statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.鈥 Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 450 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it is clear that the prohibition against registering trademarks 鈥渨hich may disparage . . . persons,鈥 搂1052(a), prohibits registration of terms that disparage persons who share a common race or ethnicity.
Even if resort to legislative history and early enforcement practice were appropriate, we would find Tam鈥檚 arguments unconvincing. Tam has not brought to our attention any evidence in the legislative history showing that Congress meant to adopt his interpretation. And the practice of the PTO in the years following the enactment of the disparagement clause is unenlightening. The admitted vagueness of the disparagement test[5] and the huge volume of applications have produced a haphazard record of enforcement. (Even today, the principal register is replete with marks that many would regard as disparaging to racial and ethnic groups.[6]) Registration of the offensive marks that Tam cites is likely attributable not to the acceptance of his interpretation of the clause but to other factors鈥攎ost likely the regrettable attitudes and sensibilities of the time in question.
III
Because the disparagement clause applies to marks that disparage the members of a racial or ethnic group, we must decide whether the clause violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. And at the outset, we must consider three arguments that would either eliminate any First Amendment protection or result in highly permissive rational-basis review. Specifically, the Government contends (1) that trademarks are government speech, not private speech, (2) that trademarks are a form of government subsidy, and (3) that the constitutionality of the disparagement clause should be tested under a new 鈥済overnment-program鈥 doctrine. We address each of these arguments below.
A
The First Amendment prohibits Congress and other government entities and actors from 鈥渁bridging the freedom of speech鈥; the First Amendment does not say that Congress and other government entities must abridge their own ability to speak freely. And our cases recognize that 鈥淸t]he Free Speech Clause . . . does not regulate government speech.鈥 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460, 467 (2009); see Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U. S. 550, 553 (2005) (鈥淸T]he Government鈥檚 own speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny鈥); Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U. S. 217, 235 (2000) .
As we have said, 鈥渋t is not easy to imagine how government could function鈥 if it were subject to the restrictions that the First Amendment imposes on private speech. Summum, supra, at 468; see Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U. S. ___, ___鈥揰__ (2015) (slip op., at 5鈥7). 鈥 鈥榌T]he First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others,鈥 鈥 Lamb鈥檚 Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384, 394 (1993) , but imposing a requirement ofviewpoint-neutrality on government speech would be para-lyzing. When a government entity embarks on a courseof action, it necessarily takes a particular viewpointand rejects others. The Free Speech Clause does not re-quire government to maintain viewpoint neutrality when its officers and employees speak about that venture.
Here is a simple example. During the Second World War, the Federal Government produced and distributed millions of posters to promote the war effort.[7] There were posters urging enlistment, the purchase of war bonds, and the conservation of scarce resources.[8] These posters expressed a viewpoint, but the First Amendment did not demand that the Government balance the message of these posters by producing and distributing posters encouraging Americans to refrain from engaging in these activities.
But while the government-speech doctrine is important鈥攊ndeed, essential鈥攊t is a doctrine that is susceptible to dangerous misuse. If private speech could be passed off as government speech by simply affixing a government seal of approval, government could silence or muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints. For this reason, we must exercise great caution before extending our government-speech precedents.
At issue here is the content of trademarks that are registered by the PTO, an arm of the Federal Government. The Federal Government does not dream up these marks, and it does not edit marks submitted for registration. Except as required by the statute involved here, 15 U. S. C. 搂1052(a), an examiner may not reject a mark based on the viewpoint that it appears to express. Thus, unless that section is thought to apply, an examiner does not inquire whether any viewpoint conveyed by a mark is consistent with Government policy or whether any such viewpoint is consistent with that expressed by other marks already on the principal register. Instead, if the mark meets the Lanham Act鈥檚 viewpoint-neutral requirements, registration is mandatory. Ibid. (requiring that 鈥淸n]o trademark . . . shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless鈥 it falls within an enumerated statutory exception). And if an examiner finds that a mark is eligible for placement on the principal register, that decision is not reviewed by any higher official unless the registration is challenged. See 搂搂1062(a), 1071; 37 CFR 搂41.31(a) (2016). Moreover, once a mark is registered, the PTO is not authorized to remove it from the register unless a party moves for cancellation, the registration expires, or the Federal Trade Commission initiates proceedings based on certain grounds. See 15 U. S. C. 搂搂1058(a), 1059, 1064; 37 CFR 搂搂2.111(b), 2.160.
In light of all this, it is far-fetched to suggest that the content of a registered mark is government speech. If the federal registration of a trademark makes the mark government speech, the Federal Government is babbling prodigiously and incoherently. It is saying many unseemly things. See App. to Brief for Pro-Football, Inc., as Amicus Curiae. It is expressing contradictory views.[9] It is unashamedly endorsing a vast array of commercial products and services. And it is providing Delphic advice to the consuming public.
For example, if trademarks represent government speech, what does the Government have in mind when it advises Americans to 鈥渕ake.believe鈥 (Sony),[10] 鈥淭hink different鈥 (Apple),[11] 鈥淛ust do it鈥 (Nike),[12] or 鈥淗ave it your way鈥 (Burger King)[13]? Was the Government warning about a coming disaster when it registered the mark 鈥淓ndTime Ministries鈥漑14]?
The PTO has made it clear that registration does not constitute approval of a mark. See In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 USPQ 2d 1216, 1220, n. 3 (TTAB 1993) (鈥淸I]ssuance of a trademark registration . . . is not a government imprimatur鈥). And it is unlikely that more than a tiny fraction of the public has any idea what federal registration of a trademark means. See Application of National Distillers & Chemical Corp., 49 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 854, 863, 297 F. 2d 941, 949 (1962) (Rich, J., concurring) (鈥淭he purchasing public knows no more about trademark registrations than a man walking down the street in a strange city knows about legal title to the land and buildings he passes鈥 (emphasis deleted)).
None of our government speech cases even remotely supports the idea that registered trademarks are government speech. In Johanns, we considered advertisements promoting the sale of beef products. A federal statute called for the creation of a program of paid advertising 鈥 鈥榯o advance the image and desirability of beef and beef products.鈥 鈥 544 U. S., at 561 (quoting 7 U. S. C. 搂 2902(13)). Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture provided guidelines for the content of the ads, Department of Agriculture officials attended the meetings at which the content of specific ads was discussed, and the Secretary could edit or reject any proposed ad. 544 U. S., at 561. Noting that 鈥淸t]he message set out in the beef promotions [was] from beginning to end the message established by the Federal Government,鈥 we held that the ads were government speech. Id., at 560. The Government鈥檚 involvement in the creation of these beef ads bears no resemblance to anything that occurs when a trademark is registered.
Our decision in Summum is similarly far afield. A small city park contained 15 monuments. 555 U. S., at 464. Eleven had been donated by private groups, and one of these displayed the Ten Commandments. Id., at 464鈥465. A religious group claimed that the city, by accepting donated monuments, had created a limited public forum for private speech and was therefore obligated to place in the park a monument expressing the group鈥檚 religious beliefs.
Holding that the monuments in the park represented government speech, we cited many factors. Governments have used monuments to speak to the public since ancient times; parks have traditionally been selective in accepting and displaying donated monuments; parks would be overrun if they were obligated to accept all monuments offered by private groups; 鈥淸p]ublic parks are often closely identified in the public mind with the government unit that owns the land鈥; and 鈥淸t]he monuments that are accepted . . . are meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a government message.鈥 Id., at 472.
Trademarks share none of these characteristics. Trademarks have not traditionally been used to convey a Government message. With the exception of the enforcement of 15 U. S. C. 搂1052(a), the viewpoint expressed by a mark has not played a role in the decision whether to place it on the principal register. And there is no evidence that the public associates the contents of trademarks with the Federal Government.
This brings us to the case on which the Government relies most heavily, Walker, which likely marks the outer bounds of the government-speech doctrine. Holding that the messages on Texas specialty license plates are government speech, the Walker Court cited three factors distilled from Summum. 576 U. S., at ___鈥揰__ (slip op., at 7鈥8). First, license plates have long been used by the States to convey state messages. Id., at ___鈥揰__ (slip op., at 9鈥10). Second, license plates 鈥渁re often closely identified in the public mind鈥 with the State, since they are manufactured and owned by the State, generally designed by the State, and serve as a form of 鈥済overnment ID.鈥 Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10) (internal quotation marks omitted). Third, Texas 鈥渕aintain[ed] direct control over the mes-sages conveyed on its specialty plates.鈥 Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11). As explained above, none of these factors are present in this case.
In sum, the federal registration of trademarks is vastly different from the beef ads in Johanns, the monuments in Summum, and even the specialty license plates in Walker. Holding that the registration of a trademark converts the mark into government speech would constitute a huge and dangerous extension of the government-speech doctrine. For if the registration of trademarks constituted government speech, other systems of government registration could easily be characterized in the same way.
Perhaps the most worrisome implication of the Government鈥檚 argument concerns the system of copyright registration. If federal registration makes a trademark government speech and thus eliminates all First Amendment protection, would the registration of the copyright for a book produce a similar transformation? See 808 F. 3d, at 1346 (explaining that if trademark registration amounts to government speech, 鈥渢hen copyright registration鈥 which 鈥渉as identical accoutrements鈥 would 鈥渓ikewise amount to government speech鈥).
The Government attempts to distinguish copyright on the ground that it is 鈥 鈥榯he engine of free expression,鈥 鈥 Brief for Petitioner 47 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U. S. 186, 219 (2003) ), but as this case illustrates, trademarks often have an expressive content. Companies spend huge amounts to create and publicize trademarks that convey a message. It is true that the necessary brevity of trademarks limits what they can say. But powerful messages can sometimes be conveyed in just a few words.
Trademarks are private, not government, speech.
B
We next address the Government鈥檚 argument that this case is governed by cases in which this Court has upheld the constitutionality of government programs that subsidized speech expressing a particular viewpoint. These cases implicate a notoriously tricky question of constitutional law. 鈥淸W]e have held that the Government 鈥榤ay not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.鈥 鈥 Agency for Int鈥檒 Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int鈥檒, Inc., 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 8) (some internal quotation marks omitted). But at the same time, government is not required to subsidize activities that it does not wish to promote. Ibid. Determining which of these principles applies in a particular case 鈥渋s not always self-evident,鈥 id., at ___ (slip op., at 11), but no difficult question is presented here.
Unlike the present case, the decisions on which the Government relies all involved cash subsidies or their equivalent. In Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173 (1991) , a federal law provided funds to private parties for family planning services. In National Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U. S. 569 (1998) , cash grants were awarded to artists. And federal funding for public libraries was at issue in United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U. S. 194 (2003) . In other cases, we have regarded tax benefits as comparable to cash subsidies. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540 (1983) ; Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S 498 (1959).
The federal registration of a trademark is nothing like the programs at issue in these cases. The PTO does not pay money to parties seeking registration of a mark. Quite the contrary is true: An applicant for registration must pay the PTO a filing fee of $225鈥$600. 37 CFR 搂2.6(a)(1). (Tam submitted a fee of $275 as part of his application to register THE SLANTS. App. 18.) And to maintain federal registration, the holder of a mark must pay a fee of $300鈥$500 every 10 years. 搂2.6(a)(5); see also 15 U. S. C. 搂1059(a). The Federal Circuit concluded that these fees have fully supported the registration system for the past 27 years. 808 F. 3d, at 1353.
The Government responds that registration provides valuable non-monetary benefits that 鈥渁re directly trace-able to the resources devoted by the federal government to examining, publishing, and issuing certificates of registration for those marks.鈥 Brief for Petitioner 27. But just about every government service requires the expenditure of government funds. This is true of services that benefit everyone, like police and fire protection, as well as services that are utilized by only some, e.g., the adjudication of private lawsuits and the use of public parks and highways.
Trademark registration is not the only government registration scheme. For example, the Federal Government registers copyrights and patents. State governments and their subdivisions register the title to real property and security interests; they issue driver鈥檚 licenses, motor vehicle registrations, and hunting, fishing, and boating licenses or permits.
Cases like Rust and Finley are not instructive in analyzing the constitutionality of restrictions on speech imposed in connection with such services.
C
Finally, the Government urges us to sustain the disparagement clause under a new doctrine that would apply to 鈥済overnment-program鈥 cases. For the most part, this argument simply merges our government-speech cases and the previously discussed subsidy cases in an attempt to construct a broader doctrine that can be applied to the registration of trademarks. The only new element in this construct consists of two cases involving a public employer鈥檚 collection of union dues from its employees. Butthose cases occupy a special area of First Amendment case law, and they are far removed from the registration of trademarks.
In Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn., 551 U. S. 177 鈥182 (2007), a Washington law permitted a public employer automatically to deduct from the wages of employees who chose not to join the union the portion of union dues used for activities related to collective bargaining. But unless these employees affirmatively consented, the law did not allow the employer to collect the portion of union dues that would be used in election activities. Id., at 180鈥182. A public employee union argued that this law unconstitutionally restricted its speech based on its con-tent; that is, the law permitted the employer to assist union speech on matters relating to collective bargaining but made it harder for the union to collect money to support its election activities. Id., at 188. Upholding this law, we characterized it as imposing a 鈥渕odest limitation鈥 on an 鈥渆xtraordinary benefit,鈥 namely, taking money from the wages of non-union members and turning it over to the union free of charge. Id., at 184. Refusing to confer an even greater benefit, we held, did not upset the marketplace of ideas and did not abridge the union鈥檚 free speech rights. Id., at 189鈥190.
Ysursa v. Pocatello Ed. Assn., 555 U. S. 353 (2009) , is similar. There, we considered an Idaho law that allowed public employees to elect to have union dues deducted from their wages but did not allow such a deduction for money remitted to the union鈥檚 political action committee. Id., at 355. We reasoned that the 鈥渢he government . . . [was] not required to assist others in funding the expression of particular ideas.鈥 Id., at 358; see also id., at 355 (鈥淭he First Amendment . . . does not confer an affirmative right to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression鈥).
Davenport and Ysursa are akin to our subsidy cases. Although the laws at issue in Davenport and Ysursa did not provide cash subsidies to the unions, they conferred a very valuable benefit鈥攖he right to negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement under which non-members would be obligated to pay an agency fee that the public employer would collect and turn over to the union free of charge. As in the cash subsidy cases, the laws conferred this benefit because it was thought that this arrangement served important government interests. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 鈥226 (1977). But the challenged laws did not go further and provide convenient collection mechanisms for money to be used in political activities. In essence, the Washington and Idaho lawmakers chose to confer a substantial non-cash benefit for the purpose of furthering activities that they particularly desired to promote but not to provide a similar benefit for the purpose of furthering other activities. Thus, Davenport and Ysursa are no more relevant for present purposes than the subsidy cases previously discussed.[15]
Potentially more analogous are cases in which a unit of government creates a limited public forum for private speech. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98 鈥107 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rec-tor and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 831 (1995) ; Lamb鈥檚 Chapel, 508 U. S., at 392鈥393. See also Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 531 U. S. 533 鈥544 (2001). When government creates such a forum, in either a literal or 鈥渕etaphysical鈥 sense, see Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 830, some content- and speaker-based restrictions may be allowed, see id., at 830鈥831. However, even in such cases, what we have termed 鈥渧iewpoint discrimination鈥 is forbidden. Id., at 831.
Our cases use the term 鈥渧iewpoint鈥 discrimination in a broad sense, see ibid., and in that sense, the disparagement clause discriminates on the bases of 鈥渧iewpoint.鈥 To be sure, the clause evenhandedly prohibits disparagement of all groups. It applies equally to marks that damn Democrats and Republicans, capitalists and socialists, and those arrayed on both sides of every possible issue. It denies registration to any mark that is offensive to a substantial percentage of the members of any group. But in the sense relevant here, that is viewpoint discrimination: Giving offense is a viewpoint.
We have said time and again that 鈥渢he public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.鈥 Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969) . See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 414 (1989) (鈥淚f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable鈥); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46 鈥56 (1988); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 615 (1971) ; Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U. S. 564, 567 (1970) ; Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 鈥514 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 551 (1965) ; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 鈥238 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 鈥5 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 311 (1940) ; Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147, 161 (1939) ; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 365 (1937) .
For this reason, the disparagement clause cannot be saved by analyzing it as a type of government program in which some content- and speaker-based restrictions are permitted.[16]
IV
Having concluded that the disparagement clause cannot be sustained under our government-speech or subsidy cases or under the Government鈥檚 proposed 鈥済overnment-program鈥 doctrine, we must confront a dispute between the parties on the question whether trademarks are commercial speech and are thus subject to the relaxed scrutiny outlined in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm鈥檔 of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557 (1980) . The Government and amici supporting its position argue that all trademarks are commercial speech. They note that the central purposes of trademarks are commercial and that federal law regulates trademarks to promote fair and orderly interstate commerce. Tam and his amici, on the other hand, contend that many, if not all, trademarks have an expressive component. In other words, these trademarks do not simply identify the source of a product or service but go on to say something more, either about the product or service or some broader issue. The trademark in this case illustrates this point. The name 鈥淭he Slants鈥 not only identifies the band but expresses a view about social issues.
We need not resolve this debate between the parties because the disparagement clause cannot withstand even Central Hudson review.[17] Under Central Hudson, a restriction of speech must serve 鈥渁 substantial interest,鈥 and it must be 鈥渘arrowly drawn.鈥 Id., at 564鈥565 (internal quotation marks omitted). This means, among other things, that 鈥淸t]he regulatory technique may extend only as far as the interest it serves.鈥 Id., at 565. The disparagement clause fails this requirement.
It is claimed that the disparagement clause serves two interests. The first is phrased in a variety of ways in the briefs. Echoing language in one of the opinions below, the Government asserts an interest in preventing 鈥 鈥榰nderrepresented groups鈥 鈥 from being 鈥 鈥榖ombarded with demeaning messages in commercial advertising.鈥 鈥 Brief for Petitioner 48 (quoting 808 F. 3d, at 1364 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). An amicus supporting the Government refers to 鈥渆ncouraging racial tolerance and protecting the privacy and welfare of individuals.鈥 Brief for Native American Organizations as Amici Curiae 21. But no matter how the point is phrased, its unmistakable thrust is this: The Government has an interest in preventing speech expressing ideas that offend. And, as we have explained, that idea strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express 鈥渢he thought that we hate.鈥 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
The second interest asserted is protecting the orderly flow of commerce. See 808 F. 3d, at 1379鈥1381 (Reyna, J., dissenting); Brief for Petitioner 49; Brief for Native American Organizations as Amicus Curiae 18鈥21. Commerce, we are told, is disrupted by trademarks that 鈥渋nvolv[e] disparagement of race, gender, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, and similar demographic classification.鈥 808 F. 3d, at 1380鈥1381 (opinion of Reyna, J.). Such trademarks are analogized to discriminatory conduct, which has been recognized to have an adverse effect on commerce. See ibid.; Brief for Petitioner 49;Brief for Native American Organizations as Amici Curiae 18鈥20.
A simple answer to this argument is that the disparagement clause is not 鈥渘arrowly drawn鈥 to drive out trademarks that support invidious discrimination. The clause reaches any trademark that disparages any person, group, or institution. It applies to trademarks like the following: 鈥淒own with racists,鈥 鈥淒own with sexists,鈥 鈥淒own with homophobes.鈥 It is not an anti-discrimination clause; it is a happy-talk clause. In this way, it goes much further than is necessary to serve the interest asserted.
The clause is far too broad in other ways as well. The clause protects every person living or dead as well as every institution. Is it conceivable that commerce would be disrupted by a trademark saying: 鈥淛ames Buchanan was a disastrous president鈥 or 鈥淪lavery is an evil institution鈥?
There is also a deeper problem with the argument that commercial speech may be cleansed of any expression likely to cause offense. The commercial market is well stocked with merchandise that disparages prominent figures and groups, and the line between commercial and non-commercial speech is not always clear, as this case illustrates. If affixing the commercial label permits the suppression of any speech that may lead to political or social 鈥渧olatility,鈥 free speech would be endangered.
*鈥冣赌*鈥冣赌*
For these reasons, we hold that the disparagement clause violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The judgment of the Federal Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Notes
1 In the opinion below, the Federal Circuit opined that although 鈥淪ection 43(a) allows for a federal suit to protect an unregistered trademark,鈥 鈥渋t is not at all clear鈥 that respondent could bring suit under 搂43(a) because 鈥渢here is no authority extending 搂43(a) to marks denied under 搂2(a)鈥檚 disparagement provision.鈥 In re Tam, 808 F. 3d 1321, 1344鈥1345, n.11 (en banc), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016). When drawing this conclusion, the Federal Circuit relied in part on our statement in Two Pesos that 鈥渢he general principles qualifying a mark for registration under 搂2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under 搂43(a).鈥 505 U. S., at 768. We need not decide today whether respondent could bring suit under 搂43(a) if his application for federal registration had been lawfully denied under the disparagement clause.
2 The disparagement clause also prevents a trademark from being registered on the supplemental register. 搂1091(a).
3 By 鈥渃omposite,鈥 we assume the PTO means component.
4 Tam advances a convoluted textual argument that goes as follows. The definition of a 鈥減erson鈥 in 15 U. S. C. 搂1127 does not include a 鈥渘on-juristic person,鈥 i.e., a group that cannot sue or be sued in its own right. Brief for Respondent 46鈥47. Such groups consist of multiple natural persons. Therefore, the members of such groups are not 鈥減ersons鈥 under the disparagement clause. Id., at 46鈥48.
5 The PTO has acknowledged that the guidelines 鈥渇or determining whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging are somewhat vague and the determination of whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging is necessarily a highly subjective one.鈥 In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 USPQ 2d 1653, 1654 (TTAB 1990) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The PTO has similarly observed that whether a mark is disparaging 鈥渋s highly subjective and, thus, general rules are difficult to postulate.鈥 Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50 USPQ 2d 1705, 1737 (TTAB 1999), rev鈥檇, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (DC 2003), rev鈥檇 and remanded in part, 415 F. 3d 44 (CADC 2005) (per curiam).
6 See, e.g., App. to Brief for Pro-Football, Inc., as Amicus Curiae.
7 See, e.g., D. Nelson, The Posters That Won the War (1991).
8 Ibid.
9 Compare 鈥淎bolish Abortion,鈥 Registration No. 4,935,774 (Apr. 12, 2016), with 鈥淚 Stand With Planned Parenthood,鈥 Registration No. 5,073,573 (Nov. 1, 2016); compare 鈥淐apitalism Is Not Moral, Not Fair, Not Freedom,鈥 Registration No. 4,696,419 (Mar. 3, 2015), with 鈥淐apitalism Ensuring Innovation,鈥 Registration No. 3,966,092 (May 24, 2011); compare 鈥淕lobal Warming Is Good,鈥 Registration No. 4,776,235 (July 21, 2015), with 鈥淎 Solution to Global Warming,鈥 Registration No. 3,875,271 (Nov. 10, 2010).
10 鈥渕ake.believe,鈥 Registration No. 4,342,903 (May 28, 2013).
11 鈥淭hink Different,鈥 Registration No. 2,707,257 (Apr. 15, 2003).
12 鈥淛ust Do It,鈥 Registration No. 1,875,307 (Jan. 25, 1995).
13 鈥淗ave It Your Way,鈥 Registration No. 0,961,016. (June 12, 1973)
14 鈥淓ndTime Ministries,鈥 Registration No. 4,746,225 (June 2, 2015).
15 While these cases resemble subsidy cases insofar as the free speech rights of unions and their members are concerned, arrangements like those in these cases also implicate the free speech rights of non-union members. Our decision here has no bearing on that issue.
16 We leave open the question whether this is the appropriate framework for analyzing free speech challenges to provisions of the Lanham Act.
17 As with the framework discussed in Part III鈥揅 of this opinion, we leave open the question whether Central Hudson provides the appropriate test for deciding free speech challenges to provisions of the Lanham Act. And nothing in our decision should be read to speak to the validity of state unfair competition provisions or product libel laws that are not before us and differ from 搂1052(d)鈥檚 disparagement clause.