FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. CRUZ
Supreme Court Cases
596 U.S. ___ (2022)
Opinions
Majority Opinion Author
John Roberts
Majority Participants
Dissenting Participants
NOTE:鈥俉here it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE et al.
appeal from the united states district court for the district of columbia
No. 21鈥12.鈥傾rgued January 19, 2022鈥擠ecided May 16, 2022
During his 2018 Senate reelection campaign and consistent with federal law, see 11 CFR 搂110.10; 52 U. S. C. 搂30101(9)(A)(i), appellee Ted Cruz loaned $260,000 to his campaign committee, Ted Cruz for Senate (Committee). To repay these and other campaign debts, campaigns may continue to receive contributions after election day. See 11 CFR 搂110.1(b)(3)(i). Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) restricts the use of post-election contributions by limiting the amount that a candidate may be repaid from such funds to $250,000. 52 U. S. C. 搂30116(j). Relevant here, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has promulgated regulations establishing three rules to implement that limitation: First, a campaign may repay up to $250,000 in candidate loans using contributions made 鈥渁t any time.鈥 11 CFR 搂116.12(a). Second, to the extent the loans exceed $250,000, a campaign may use pre-election funds to repay the portion exceeding $250,000 only if the repayment occurs 鈥渨ithin 20 days of the election.鈥 搂116.11(c)(1). Third, when the 20-day post-election deadline expires, the campaign must treat any portion above $250,000 as a contribution to the campaign, precluding later repayment. 搂116.11(c)(2).
The Committee began repaying Cruz鈥檚 loans after the 20-day post-election window for repaying amounts over $250,000 had closed. It accordingly repaid Cruz only $250,000, leaving $10,000 of his personal loans unpaid. Cruz and the Committee filed this action in Federal District Court, alleging that Section 304 of BCRA violates the First Amendment and raising challenges to the FEC鈥檚 implementing regulation, 搂116.11. The District Court granted Cruz and his Committee summary judgment on their constitutional claim, holding that the loan-repayment limitation burdens political speech without sufficient justification, and dismissed as moot their challenges to the regulation.
Held:
1. Appellees have standing to challenge the threatened enforcement of Section 304. Pp. 3鈥10.
(a) The Government recognizes that the Committee鈥檚 present inability to repay the final $10,000 of Cruz鈥檚 loans constitutes an injury in fact both to Cruz and his Committee. It maintains, however, that appellees lack Article III standing because these injuries are not traceable to the threatened enforcement of Section 304, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560鈥561. First, the Government argues that appellees knowingly triggered the application of the loan-repayment limitation and thus their injuries are traceable to themselves, not the Government. This Court has never recognized an exception to Article III standing鈥檚 traceability requirement for injuries that a party purposely incurs. Moreover, this Court has made clear that an injury resulting from the application or threatened application of an unlawful enactment remains fairly traceable to such application, even if the injury could be described in some sense as willingly incurred. See Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202, 204 (per curiam). Cases cited by the Government鈥Clapper v. Amnesty Int鈥檒 USA, 568 U.S. 398, and Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (per curiam)鈥攄o not alter that conclusion. In contrast to those cases, here the appellees鈥 injuries are directly inflicted by the FEC鈥檚 threatened enforcement of the provisions they now challenge. That appellees chose to subject themselves to those provisions does not change the fact that they are subject to them, and will face genuine legal penalties if they do not comply. Finally, the Government鈥檚 observation that it should not be blamed for appellees鈥 injuries because the Committee had a legally available alternative鈥i.e., repaying Cruz鈥檚 loans in full with pre-election funds, within 20 days of the election鈥攎isses the point. Demanding that the Committee do so would require it to forgo the exercise of the First Amendment right the Court must assume it has when assessing standing鈥攖he right to repay its campaign debts in full, at any time. Pp. 3鈥6.
(b) The Government next argues that although appellees would have standing to challenge the FEC鈥檚 implementing regulation, 搂116.11, they do not have standing to challenge Section 304 itself. The Government contends that the Committee used pre-election funds to repay the first $250,000, and thus Section 304鈥檚 cap on using post-election funds to repay a candidate鈥檚 loan does not prohibit repayment of the final $10,000 here. Instead, it is the agency鈥檚 regulation鈥攚ith its 20-day limit鈥攖hat prevents repayment. Appellees insist that they used post-election funds鈥攊n the form of overlimit contributions to the 2018 campaign that were 鈥渞edesignated鈥 as contributions to the 2024 campaign鈥攖o repay Cruz鈥檚 loans. Ordinarily, it would not matter whether a plaintiff was challenging the statute鈥檚 enforcement or instead the enforcement of a regulation. Here, however, the parties assume that the distinction makes a difference because the subject-matter jurisdiction of the three-judge District Court is limited to actions challenging the enforcement of the statute. See BRCA 搂304(a). Even under the Government鈥檚 account, the present inability of the Committee to repay and Cruz to recover the final $10,000 is traceable to the operation of Section 304 itself. An agency鈥檚 regulation cannot 鈥渙perate independently of鈥 the statute that authorized it. California v. Texas, 593 U. S. ___, ___. Here, the FEC鈥檚 20-day rule was expressly promulgated to implement Section 304. Thus, if Section 304 is invalid and unenforceable, the agency鈥檚 20-day rule is as well, and the remedy appellees sought in the District Court would redress appellees鈥 harm by preventing enforcement of the agency鈥檚 20-day rule. See Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561. In challenging the FEC鈥檚 threatened enforcement of the loan-repayment limitation, through its implementing regulation, appellees may raise constitutional claims against Section 304, the statutory provision that, through the agency鈥檚 regulation, is being enforced. Cf. Collins v. Yellen, 594 U. S. ___, ___鈥揰__. And because they are challenging 鈥渢he constitutionality of [a] provision of [BCRA],鈥 搂403(a), jurisdiction was proper in the three-judge District Court. Pp. 6鈥10.
2. Section 304 of BCRA burdens core political speech without proper justification. Pp. 10鈥22.
(a) The loan-repayment limitation abridges First Amendment rights by burdening candidates who wish to make expenditures on behalf of their own candidacy through personal loans. Restricting the sources of funds that campaigns may use to repay candidate loans increases the risk that such loans will not be repaid in full, which, in turn, deters candidates from loaning money to their campaigns. This burden is no small matter. Debt is a ubiquitous tool for financing electoral campaigns, especially for new candidates and challengers. By inhibiting a candidate from using this critical source of campaign funding, Section 304 raises a barrier to entry鈥攖hus abridging political speech. Pp. 10鈥13.
(b) The Government has not demonstrated that the loan-repayment limitation furthers a permissible goal. Any law that burdens First Amendment freedoms, even slightly, must be justified by a permissible interest. Pp. 13鈥22.
(i) The only permissible ground for restricting political speech recognized by this Court is the prevention of 鈥quid pro quo鈥 corruption or its appearance. See McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm鈥檔, 572 U.S. 185, 207. Here, the Government argues that the contributions at issue raise a heightened risk of corruption because they are used to repay a candidate鈥檚 personal loans. But given that these contributions are already capped at $2,900 per election in order to prevent corruption or its appearance, the approach of adding an additional layer of regulation is a significant indicator that the regulation may not be necessary for the interest it seeks to protect. See id, at 221. Because the Government is defending a restriction on speech, it must do more than 鈥渟imply posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured鈥; it must instead point to 鈥渞ecord evidence or legislative findings鈥 demonstrating the need to address a special problem. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm鈥檔, 518 U.S. 604, 618. 鈥淸M]ere conjecture鈥 is 鈥淸in]adequate to carry a First Amendment burden.鈥 McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 210. Yet the Government is unable to identify a single case of quid pro quo corruption in this context, even though most States do not impose a limit on the use of post-election contributions to repay candidate loans. Pp. 13鈥16.
(ii) In the absence of direct evidence, the Government turns to a scholarly article, a poll, and statements by Members of Congress to show that the contributions used to repay candidate loans carry a heightened risk of at least the appearance of corruption. All of this evidence, however, concerns the sort of 鈥渃orruption,鈥 loosely conceived, that this Court has repeatedly explained is not legitimately regulated under the First Amendment. Nor is it equivalent to 鈥渓egislative findings鈥 that demonstrate the need to address a special problem. Pp. 16鈥19.
(iii) As a fallback argument, the Government analogizes post-election contributions used to repay a candidate鈥檚 loans to gifts because they enrich the candidate as opposed to the campaign鈥檚 treasury. But this analogy is meaningful only if the baseline is that the campaign will default. The record suggests, however, that winning candidates are commonly repaid in full. For these candidates, post-election contributions bear little resemblance to a gift; they instead restore the candidate to the status quo ante. As for losing candidates, the Government does not provide any anticorruption rationale to explain why contributions to those candidates should be restricted. Finally, the Government argues for deference to Congress鈥檚 鈥渓egislative judgment鈥 that Section 304 furthers an anticorruption goal. Given scant evidence of corruption, deference to Congress would be especially inappropriate where, as here, the legislative act may have been an effort to 鈥渋nsulate[ ] legislators from effective electoral challenge.鈥 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 404 (Breyer, J., concurring). In the end, it remains the role of this Court to decide whether a particular legislative choice is constitutional. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129. Pp. 19鈥22.
542 F. Supp. 3d 1, affirmed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Kagan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer and Sotomayor, JJ., joined.
NOTICE:鈥俆his opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports.鈥僐eaders are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 21鈥12
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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, APPELLANT v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE, et al.
on appeal from the united states district court for the district of columbia
[May 16, 2022]
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.
In order to jumpstart a fledgling campaign or finish strong in a tight race, candidates for federal office often loan money to their campaign committees. A provision of federal law regulates the repayment of such loans. Among other things, it bars campaigns from using more than $250,000 of funds raised after election day to repay a candidate鈥檚 personal loans. This limit on the use of post-election funds increases the risk that candidate loans over $250,000 will not be repaid in full, inhibiting candidates from making such loans in the first place. The question is whether this restriction violates the First Amendment rights of candidates and their campaigns to engage in political speech.
I
A
Candidates for federal office may, consistent with federal law, use various sources to fund their campaigns. A candidate may spend an unlimited amount of his own money in support of his campaign. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52鈥54 (1976) (per curiam). His campaign鈥攁 legal entity distinct from the candidate himself鈥攎ay borrow an unlimited amount from third-party lenders or from the candidate himself. See 11 CFR 搂110.10 (2017); 52 U. S. C. 搂30101(9)(A)(i); see also Buckley, 424 U. S., at 52鈥54. And campaigns may, of course, accept contributions directly from other organizations or from individuals, subject to monetary limitations. Individual contributions are capped at $2,900 for the primary and $2,900 for the general election. See 搂搂30116(a), (c); 86 Fed. Reg. 7869 (2021). Campaigns may continue to receive contributions after election day, so long as those contributions go toward repaying campaign debts. See 11 CFR 搂110.1(b)(3)(i).
Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116Stat. 98, 52 U. S. C. 搂30116(j), further restricts the use of post-election funds. Under that provision, a candidate who loans money to his campaign may not be repaid more than $250,000 of such loans from contributions made to the campaign after the date of the election. Ibid. To implement that limit, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has promulgated regulations establishing three rules pertinent here: First, a campaign may repay up to $250,000 in candidate loans using contributions made 鈥渁t any time before, on, or after the date of the election.鈥 11 CFR 搂116.12(a). Second, to the extent the loans exceed $250,000, a campaign may use pre-election funds to repay the portion exceeding $250,000 only if the repayment occurs 鈥渨ithin 20 days of the election.鈥 搂116.11(c)(1). And third, if more than $250,000 remains unpaid when the 20-day post-election deadline expires, the campaign must treat the portion above $250,000 as a contribution to the campaign, precluding later repayment. 搂116.11(c)(2).
B
Appellee Ted Cruz represents Texas in the United States Senate. This case arises from his 2018 reelection campaign, which was, at the time, the most expensive Senate race in history. Before election day, Cruz loaned $260,000 to the other appellee here, Ted Cruz for Senate (Committee). At the end of election day, however, the Committee was in the red by approximately $340,000. App. 285. It eventually began repaying Cruz鈥檚 loans, but by that time the 20-day post-election window for repaying amounts over $250,000 had closed. See 11 CFR 搂搂116.11(c)(1), (2). The Committee accordingly repaid Cruz only $250,000, leaving $10,000 of his personal loans unpaid.
Cruz and the Committee filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that Section 304 of BCRA violates the First Amendment. They also raised challenges to the FEC鈥檚 implementing regulation, 11 CFR 搂116.11. A three-judge panel was convened to hear the case. See BCRA 搂403(a)(1), 116Stat. 113; see also 28 U. S. C. 搂2284.
The three-judge District Court granted Cruz and his Committee summary judgment on their constitutional claim, holding that the loan-repayment limitation burdens political speech without sufficient justification. 542 F. Supp. 3d 1 (2021). The District Court also ordered that appellees鈥 challenges to the regulation, previously held in abeyance, be dismissed as moot. The Government appealed directly to this Court, as authorized by 28 U. S. C. 搂1253. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction. 594 U. S. ___ (2021).
II
The Constitution limits federal courts to deciding 鈥淐ases鈥 and 鈥淐ontroversies.鈥 Art. III, 搂2. Among other things, that limitation requires a plaintiff to have standing. The requisite elements of Article III standing are well established: A plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact, (2) fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, (3) that is likely to be redressed by the requested relief. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560鈥561 (1992).
As the Government recognizes, the Committee鈥檚 present inability to repay the final $10,000 of Cruz鈥檚 loans constitutes an injury in fact both to Cruz and to his Committee. See Reply Brief 8. Cruz, of course, suffers a $10,000 pocketbook harm. See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451, 464 (2017). And the bar on repayment injures the Committee by preventing it from discharging its obligation to repay its debt, which may inhibit that form of financing in the future. The Government maintains, however, that these injuries are not traceable to the threatened enforcement of Section 304, for two reasons: first, because the inability to repay Cruz鈥檚 loans was 鈥渟elf-inflicted,鈥 and second, because it is the threatened enforcement of an agency regulation, not the statute itself, that causes the harm. We address each argument in turn.
A
First, the Government argues that appellees lack standing because their injuries were 鈥渟elf-inflicted.鈥 Brief for Appellant 20. Because appellees knowingly triggered the application of the loan-repayment limitation, the Government says, any resulting injury is in essence traceable to them, not the Government. The predicate for this argument is appellees鈥 stipulation in the District Court that 鈥渢he sole and exclusive motivation behind Senator Cruz鈥檚 actions in making the 2018 loan[s] and the [C]ommittee鈥檚 actions in waiting to repay them was to establish the factual basis for this challenge.鈥 App. 325. At bottom, the Government asks us to recognize an exception to traceability for injuries that a party purposely incurs.
We have never recognized a rule of this kind under Article III. To the contrary, we have made clear that an injury resulting from the application or threatened application of an unlawful enactment remains fairly traceable to such application, even if the injury could be described in some sense as willingly incurred. See Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202, 204 (1958) (per curiam) (that the plaintiff subjected himself to discrimination 鈥渇or the purpose of instituting th[e] litigation鈥 did not defeat his standing); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374 (1982) (a 鈥渢ester鈥 plaintiff posing as a renter for purposes of housing-discrimination litigation still suffered an injury under Article III).
The cases the Government cites do not alter our conclusion. In Clapper v. Amnesty Int鈥檒 USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013), for example, the plaintiffs attempted to manufacture standing by voluntarily taking costly and burdensome measures that they said were necessary to protect the confidentiality of their communications in light of the Government surveillance policy they sought to challenge. Id., at 402. Their problem, however, was that they could not show that they had been or were likely to be subjected to that policy in any event. Id., at 416. Likewise, in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (per curiam), we held that the unilateral decisions by a group of States to reimburse their residents for taxes levied by other States was not a basis to attack the legality of those taxes. Nothing in the challenged taxes required the plaintiff States to offer reimbursements; accordingly, the financial injury those States suffered was due to their own independent response to taxes levied on others. Id., at 664. Here, by contrast, the appellees鈥 injuries are directly inflicted by the FEC鈥檚 threatened enforcement of the provisions they now challenge. That appellees chose to subject themselves to those provisions does not change the fact that they are subject to them, and will face genuine legal penalties if they do not comply. See 52 U. S. C. 搂30109(a)(5); 11 CFR 搂111.24.
One final point bears mentioning. The Government maintains that it should not be blamed for appellees鈥 injuries because it provided the Committee with a legally available 鈥渁lternative鈥 that would have avoided any liability鈥攔epaying Cruz鈥檚 loans in full with pre-election funds, within 20 days of the election. But even if such funds were available, the Government鈥檚 argument largely misses the point. For standing purposes, we accept as valid the merits of appellees鈥 legal claims, so we must assume that the loan- repayment limitation鈥攊ncluding the 20-day rule鈥攗nconstitutionally burdens speech. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (鈥渟tanding in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff 鈥檚 contention that particular conduct is illegal鈥). Demanding that the Committee comply with the Government鈥檚 鈥渁lternative鈥 would therefore require it to forgo the exercise of a First Amendment right we must assume it has鈥攖he right to repay its campaign debts in full, at any time. And this would require the Committee to subject itself to the very framework it says unconstitutionally burdens its speech. Such a principle finds no support in our standing jurisprudence. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158鈥159 (2014).
B
The Government next asserts that although appellees would have standing to challenge the FEC鈥檚 implementing regulation, 11 CFR 搂116.11, they do not have standing to challenge Section 304 itself. As a reminder, Section 304 prohibits the use of post-election funds to repay a candidate鈥檚 personal loans; it does not restrict the use of funds raised before the election. See 52 U. S. C. 搂30116(j). That restriction comes instead from Section 304鈥檚 implementing regulation, 11 CFR 搂116.11. This regulation provides that neither pre-election nor post-election funds may be used to repay candidate loans above $250,000 outstanding 20 days after the election. 搂搂116.11(c)(1)鈥(2). Such amounts must instead be treated as contributions to the campaign, barring their repayment.
Bearing that in mind, the Government contends that the record before the District Court reveals that the Committee used funds raised before the election to repay the first $250,000 of Cruz鈥檚 loans. For support, it naturally points to appellees鈥 stipulation that 鈥渘one of the $250,000 of the loan that was repaid was from contributions raised after the election.鈥 App. 329. Thus, the Government says, the Committee has not yet reached the cap in Section 304 on the use of post-election funds, and can still repay the remaining balance without running afoul of that statutory restriction. It is instead the agency鈥檚 regulation鈥攚ith its 20-day limit鈥攖hat prevents repayment of the final $10,000. This matters, the Government insists, because 鈥淸s]tanding is not dispensed in gross,鈥 and plaintiffs must establish standing separately for each claim that they press and each form of relief that they seek. Brief for Appellant 17 (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 15)). A challenge to the regulation, the Government argues, is separate from a challenge to the statute that authorized it.
For their part, appellees insist that the record, properly interpreted, shows that the Committee used post-election funds to repay Cruz. During the period between election day and when the Committee repaid Cruz鈥檚 loans, the Committee received more than $250,000 in 鈥渞edesignated鈥 contributions to Cruz鈥檚 2024 campaign. Those contributions came from individuals who donated to the 2018 election in amounts exceeding their base limit and who, subsequent to the election, redesignated the overlimit amount to the 2024 campaign. See 11 CFR 搂110.1(b)(5). Such funds, appellees say, qualify as 鈥減ost-election contributions鈥 for purposes of Section 304, and may have been used to repay the first $250,000 of Cruz鈥檚 loans. See 搂116.12(a).
These arguments have an Alice in Wonderland air about them, with the Government arguing that appellees would not violate the statute by repaying Cruz, and the appellees arguing that they would. But this case has unfolded in an unusual way. After all, Cruz and the Committee likely would have had standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge (as they do now) to Section 304 in a much easier manner鈥攂y simply alleging and credibly demonstrating that Cruz wished to loan his campaign an amount larger than $250,000, but would not do so only because the loan- repayment limitation made it unlikely that such amount would be repaid. See Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U. S., at 158鈥159. In addition, it ordinarily would not matter whether a plaintiff was challenging the statute鈥檚 enforcement or instead the enforcement of a regulation and, in doing so, raising arguments about the validity of the statute that authorized the regulation. Cf. Collins v. Yellen, 594 U. S. ___, ___鈥揰__ (2021) (slip op., at 18鈥19). The parties here, however, assume that the distinction makes a difference because the subject-matter jurisdiction of the three-judge District Court is limited to actions challenging the enforcement of the statute. See BCRA 搂403(a) (authorizing a three-judge court to hear any 鈥渁ction . . . brought for declaratory or injunctive relief to challenge the constitutionality of any provision of this Act or any amendment made by this Act鈥).
It seems to us that the Government is likely correct that appellees have not shown that they exhausted Section 304鈥檚 cap on the use of post-election funds. The loan-repayment limitation applies to contributions 鈥渕ade鈥 after the date of the election. 52 U. S. C. 搂30116(j). And a contribution is 鈥渃onsidered to be made when the contributor relinquishes control鈥 over it, which occurs when the contribution is 鈥渄elivered鈥 to the Committee or the candidate. 11 CFR 搂110.1(b)(6). The redesignated contributions on which appellees now rely, however, involve funds that were delivered to the Committee before the 2018 election. And those funds have remained under the Committee鈥檚 control from that date, even if they were later redesignated to a different campaign.
But we need not go further down this rabbit hole. Even under the Government鈥檚 account, appellees have standing to challenge the threatened enforcement of Section 304. The present inability of the Committee to repay and Cruz to recover the final $10,000 Cruz loaned his campaign is, even if brought about by the agency鈥檚 threatened enforcement of its regulation, traceable to the operation of Section 304 itself. An agency, after all, 鈥渓iterally has no power to act鈥濃攊ncluding under its regulations鈥攗nless and until Congress authorizes it to do so by statute. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm鈥檔 v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000). An agency鈥檚 regulation cannot 鈥渙perate independently of 鈥 the statute that authorized it. California v. Texas, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 15). And here, the FEC鈥檚 20-day rule was expressly promulgated to implement Section 304. See 68 Fed. Reg. 3973 (2003). Indeed, the Government admitted at oral argument that it could find no other basis to authorize enforcement of this regulation, Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, and 鈥渃oncede[d]鈥 that 鈥渢he most likely result, if the statute were declared invalid, is that the regulation would cease to be on the books or would cease to be enforceable,鈥 ibid. Thus, if Section 304 is invalid and unenforceable鈥攁s Cruz and the Committee contend鈥攖he agency鈥檚 20-day rule is as well. And the remedy appellees sought in the District Court鈥攁n order enjoining the Government from taking any action to enforce the loan- repayment limitation, App. 27鈥攚ould redress appellees鈥 harm by preventing enforcement of the agency鈥檚 20-day rule. See Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561.
Contrary to the Government鈥檚 suggestion, the foregoing analysis does not call into question the principle that 鈥渁 plaintiff injured by one law does not thereby acquire standing to challenge a different law.鈥 Brief for Appellant 17. It is true that a litigant cannot, 鈥渂y virtue of his standing to challenge one government action, challenge other governmental actions that did not injure him.鈥 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 353, n. 5 (2006). Here, however, appellees seek to challenge the one Government action that causes their harm: the FEC鈥檚 threatened enforcement of the loan-repayment limitation, through its implementing regulation. In doing so, they may raise constitutional claims against Section 304, the statutory provision that, through the agency鈥檚 regulation, is being enforced. Cf. Collins, 594 U. S., at ___鈥揰__ (slip op., at 18鈥19). Even on the Government鈥檚 version of the facts, then, we are satisfied that appellees have standing to challenge the threatened enforcement of Section 304. And because they are challenging 鈥渢he constitutionality of [a] provision of [BCRA],鈥 搂403(a), jurisdiction was proper in the three-judge District Court. We thus proceed to the merits.
III
A
The First Amendment 鈥渉as its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.鈥 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971). It safeguards the ability of a candidate to use personal funds to finance campaign speech, protecting his freedom 鈥渢o speak without legislative limit on behalf of his own candidacy.鈥 Buckley, 424 U. S., at 54. This broad protection, we have explained, 鈥渞eflects our profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.鈥 Id., at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Government seems to agree with appellees that the loan-repayment limitation abridges First Amendment rights, at least to some extent, see Brief for Appellant 27鈥32, and we reach the same conclusion. This provision, by design and effect, burdens candidates who wish to make expenditures on behalf of their own candidacy through personal loans. See 52 U. S. C. 搂30101(9)(A)(i) (defining 鈥渆xpenditure鈥 to include loans); see also Buckley, 424 U. S., at 52. By restricting the sources of funds that campaigns may use to repay candidate loans, Section 304 increases the risk that such loans will not be repaid. That in turn inhibits candidates from loaning money to their campaigns in the first place, burdening core speech.
The data bear out the deterrent effect of Section 304. After BCRA was passed, there appeared a 鈥渃lear clustering of [candidate] loans right at the $250,000 threshold.鈥 A. Ovtchinnikov & P. Valta, Debt in Political Campaigns 26 (2020), Record 65鈥1 (Ovtchinnikov, Debt); see also Brief for United States Senator Roy Blunt et al. as Amici Curiae 6鈥7. There was no such clustering before the loan-repayment limitation went into effect. The Government鈥檚 evidence in the District Court, moreover, reflects that the percentage of loans by Senate candidates for exactly $250,000 has increased tenfold since BCRA was passed. See App. 312鈥313. Section 304, then, has altered 鈥渢he propensity of many politicians to make large loans.鈥 Ovtchinnikov, Debt 26; see also Brief for Protect the First Foundation as Amicus Curiae 10鈥11. In doing so, it has predictably restricted a candidate鈥檚 speech on behalf of his own candidacy. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 54.
Quite apart from this record evidence, the burden on First Amendment expression is 鈥渆vident and inherent鈥 in the choice that candidates and their campaigns must confront. Arizona Free Enterprise Club鈥檚 Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 745 (2011); see also id., at 746 (鈥渨e do not need empirical evidence to determinate that the law at issue is burdensome鈥); Davis v. Federal Election Comm鈥檔, 554 U.S. 724, 738鈥740 (2008) (requiring no empirical evidence of a burden). Although Section 304 鈥渄oes not impose a cap on a candidate鈥檚 expenditure of personal funds, it imposes an unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercises that First Amendment right.鈥 Id., at 738鈥739. That penalty, of course, is the significant risk that a candidate will not be repaid if he chooses to loan his campaign more than $250,000. And that risk in turn may deter some candidates from loaning money to their campaigns when they otherwise would, reducing the amount of political speech. This 鈥渄rag鈥 on a candidate鈥檚 First Amendment right to use his own money to facilitate political speech is no less burdensome 鈥渟imply because it attaches as a consequence of a statutorily imposed choice.鈥 Id., at 739.
The 鈥渄rag,鈥 moreover, is no small matter. Debt is a ubiquitous tool for financing electoral campaigns. The raw dollar amount of loans made to campaigns in any one election cycle is in the nine figures, 鈥渟ignificantly exceeding鈥 the amount of independent expenditures. Ovtchinnikov, Debt 11. And personal loans from candidates themselves constitute the bulk of this financing. See Brief for Appellant 35 (鈥渕ore than 90% of campaign debt consists of candidate loans鈥). In fact, candidates who self-fund usually do so using personal loans. See J. Steen, Self-Financed Candidates in Congressional Elections 21 (2006).
The ability to lend money to a campaign is especially important for new candidates and challengers. As a practical matter, personal loans will sometimes be the only way for an unknown challenger with limited connections to front-load campaign spending. See G. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections 97鈥101 (1980). And early spending鈥攁nd thus early expression鈥攊s critical to a newcomer鈥檚 success. See Steen, Self-Financed Candidates in Congressional Elections, at 35, 171. A large personal loan also may be a useful tool to signal that the political outsider is confident enough in his campaign to have skin in the game, attracting the attention of donors and voters alike. See R. Biersack, P. Herrnson, C. Wilcox, Seeds for Success: Early Money in Congressional Elections, 18 Leg. Studies Q. 535, 537 (1993); see also Brief for United States Senator Roy Blunt et al. as Amici Curiae 13. By inhibiting a candidate from using this critical source of campaign funding, however, Section 304 raises a barrier to entry鈥攖hus abridging political speech.
The dissent cannot and does not claim that Section 304 imposes no burden on candidate speech. See post, at 5 (opinion of Kagan, J.) (鈥渆very contribution regulation has some kind of indirect effect on electoral speech鈥). The dissent instead dismisses that burden as minor and insignificant. Post, at 4鈥6. As just explained, the extent of the burden may vary depending on the circumstances of a particular candidate and particular election. But there is no doubt that the law does burden First Amendment electoral speech, and any such law must at least be justified by a permissible interest. See McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm鈥檔, 572 U.S. 185, 210 (2014) (plurality opinion) (鈥淲hen the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.鈥).
B
With those First Amendment costs in mind, we turn to whether the loan-repayment limitation is justified. The parties debate whether strict or 鈥渃losely drawn鈥 scrutiny should apply in answering that question. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 25. We need not resolve this dispute because, under either standard, the Government must prove at the outset that it is in fact pursuing a legitimate objective. See McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 210. It has not done so here.
1
This Court has recognized only one permissible ground for restricting political speech: the prevention of 鈥quid pro quo鈥 corruption or its appearance. See id., at 207; see also Federal Election Comm鈥檔 v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985). We have consistently rejected attempts to restrict campaign speech based on other legislative aims. For example, we have denied attempts to reduce the amount of money in politics, see McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 191, to level electoral opportunities by equalizing candidate resources, see Bennett, 564 U. S., at 749鈥750, and to limit the general influence a contributor may have over an elected official, see Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm鈥檔, 558 U.S. 310, 359鈥360 (2010). However well intentioned such proposals may be, the First Amendment鈥攁s this Court has repeatedly emphasized鈥攑rohibits such attempts to tamper with the 鈥渞ight of citizens to choose who shall govern them.鈥 McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 227; see also Davis, 554 U. S., at 742; Bennett, 564 U. S., at 750.
The Government argues that the contributions at issue raise a heightened risk of corruption because of the use to which they are put: repaying a candidate鈥檚 personal loans. It also maintains that post-election contributions are particularly troubling because the contributor will know鈥攏ot merely hope鈥攖hat the recipient, having prevailed, will be in a position to do him some good.
We greet the assertion of an anticorruption interest here with a measure of skepticism, for the loan-repayment limitation is yet another in a long line of 鈥減rophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach[es]鈥 to regulating campaign finance. McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 221 (quoting Federal Election Comm鈥檔 v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 479 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C. J.)). Individual contributions to candidates for federal office, including those made after the candidate has won the election, are already regulated in order to prevent corruption or its appearance. Such contributions are capped at $2,900 per election, see 86 Fed. Reg. 7869, and nontrivial contributions must be publicly disclosed, see 52 U. S. C. 搂搂30104(b)(3)(A), (c)(1). The dissent鈥檚 dire predictions about the impact of today鈥檚 decision elide the fact that the contributions at issue remain subject to these requirements. See post, at 3, 14鈥15. And the requirements are themselves prophylactic measures, given that 鈥渇ew if any contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo&苍产蝉辫;补谤谤补苍驳别尘别苍迟蝉.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 357. Such a prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach, we have explained, is a significant indicator that the regulation may not be necessary for the interest it seeks to protect. See McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 221; see also Bennett, 564 U. S., at 752 (鈥淚n the face of [the State鈥檚] contribution limits [and] strict disclosure requirements . . . it is hard to imagine what marginal corruption deterrence could be generated by [an additional measure].鈥).
There is no cause for a different conclusion here. Because the Government is defending a restriction on speech as necessary to prevent an anticipated harm, it must do more than 鈥渟imply posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured.鈥 Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm鈥檔, 518 U.S. 604, 618 (1996). It must instead point to 鈥渞ecord evidence or legislative findings鈥 demonstrating the need to address a special problem. Ibid. We have 鈥渘ever accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden.鈥 McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 210 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000)).
Yet the Government is unable to identify a single case of quid pro quo corruption in this context鈥攅ven though most States do not impose a limit on the use of post-election contributions to repay candidate loans. Cf. Brief for Campaign Legal Center et al. as Amici Curiae 17鈥18 (citing the 10 States that do impose such a prohibition). Our previous cases have found the absence of such evidence significant. See Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 357 (the Government did not claim that the political process was corrupted in the 26 States that allowed unrestricted independent expenditures by corporations); McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 209, n. 7 (the Government presented no evidence of corruption in the 30 States that did not impose aggregate limits on individual contributions).
The Government instead puts forward a handful of media reports and anecdotes that it says illustrate the special risks associated with repaying candidate loans after an election. But as the District Court found, those reports 鈥渕erely hypothesize that individuals who contribute after the election to help retire a candidate鈥檚 debt might have greater influence with or access to the candidate.鈥 542 F. Supp. 3d, at 15. That is not the type of quid pro quo corruption the Government may target consistent with the First Amendment. See McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 207鈥208.
The dissent at points shrugs off this distinction, see post, at 2, 12, n. 3, 13, but our cases make clear that 鈥渢he Government may not seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access.鈥 McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 208. As we have explained, influence and access 鈥渆mbody a central feature of democracy鈥攖hat constituents support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns.鈥 Id., at 192.
To be sure, the 鈥渓ine between quid pro quo corruption and general influence may seem vague at times, but the distinction must be respected in order to safeguard basic First Amendment rights.鈥 Id., at 209. And in drawing that line, 鈥渢he First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.鈥 Ibid. (quoting Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U. S., at 457 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.)).
2
In the absence of direct evidence, the Government turns elsewhere. It contends that a scholarly article, a poll, and statements by Members of Congress show that these contributions carry a heightened risk of at least the appearance of corruption. Essentially all the Government鈥檚 evidence, however, concerns the sort of 鈥渃orruption,鈥 loosely conceived, that we have repeatedly explained is not legitimately regulated under the First Amendment.
The academic article鈥攃ited for various propositions by both sides鈥攃oncludes that 鈥渋ndebted politicians鈥 are 鈥渕ore likely to switch their votes鈥 if they receive contributions from the banking or insurance industries. Ovtchinnikov, Debt 31. But the authors explicitly note that they cannot distinguish between voting pattern changes traceable to legitimate donor influence or access, and voting pattern changes as part of an illicit quid pro quo. See A. Ovtchinnikov & P. Valta, Self-Funding of Political Campaigns, Management Science, Articles in Advance 18 (April 7, 2022) (Ovtchinnikov, Self-Funding). As noted, our precedents demand adherence to that distinction. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 209. The authors also state that their analysis is merely a 鈥渇irst step鈥 in understanding whether politicians鈥 self-funding decisions impact voting behavior, because they cannot 鈥減in down a causal link鈥 yet. Ovtchinnikov, Self-Funding 21.
The online poll the Government asks us to consider similarly misses the mark. The poll, conducted at the Government鈥檚 behest for this litigation, reports that most respondents thought it 鈥渧ery likely鈥 or 鈥渓ikely鈥 that a person who 鈥渄onate[s] money to a candidate鈥檚 campaign after the election expect[s] a political favor in return.鈥 App. 351鈥352. But it failed to ask whether those same respondents thought it likely that donors who contribute to a campaign before the election also are likely to expect political favors in return. Nor did the poll mention that the individual base limits still apply to such contributions. And it failed to define the term 鈥減olitical favor,鈥 leaving unclear the critical issue whether the respondents associated such contributions with the direct exchange of money for official acts, which Congress may regulate, or simply increased influence and access, which Congress may not.
Finally, the Government places great weight on statements made by certain Members of Congress during debates that preceded the enactment of BCRA. One Senator, for example, remarked that without the loan-repayment limitation, a winning candidate who loaned money to his campaign could 鈥済et it back from [his] constituents [at] fundraising events鈥 where he could ask, 鈥淗ow would you like me to vote now that I am a Senator?鈥 147 Cong. Rec. S2462 (March 19, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Domenici). Another stated that candidates 鈥渉ave a constitutional right to try to buy the office, but they do not have a constitutional right to resell it.鈥 147 Cong. Rec. S2541 (March 20, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Hutchison). Nothing these legislators said, however, constitutes actual evidence that the loan-repayment limitation was necessary to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. And a few stray floor statements are not the same as 鈥渓egislative findings鈥 that might suggest a special problem to be addressed. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 518 U. S., at 618.
All the above is pretty meager, given that we are considering restrictions on 鈥渢he most fundamental First Amendment activities鈥濃攖he right of candidates for political office to make their case to the American people. Buckley, 434 U. S., at 14. In any event, the legislative record helps appellees just as much as the Government, given that some Senators evidently viewed the limit as designed to protect incumbents like themselves from wealthy challengers. See 147 Cong. Rec. S2465 (March 19, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Sessions) (鈥淸Section 304] prohibits wealthy candidates, who incur personal loans in connection with their campaign that exceed $250,000, from repaying those loans from any contributions made to the candidate. . . . I am glad I didn鈥檛 face a person who could write a check for $60 million, $10 million鈥攐r $5 million, for that matter. If so, I would like to be able to have a level playing field so I could stay in the ball game.鈥); see also 147 Cong. Rec. S2541 (March 20, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Hutchison) (鈥淥ur purpose is to level the playing field.鈥).
That the limit may have been designed to protect incumbents should come as no surprise. Section 304 was enacted as part of the 鈥淢illionaire鈥檚 Amendment鈥 to BCRA, designed to hobble wealthy candidates mounting self-financed campaigns. See Davis, 554 U. S., at 739. And it was debated together with another provision we have already held unconstitutional, in part because it pursued the same impermissible goal of 鈥渓evel[ing] electoral opportunities for candidates of different personal wealth.鈥 Id., at 741. The connection between these two provisions casts further doubt on the anticorruption interest the Government now asserts in this case.
3
Perhaps to make up for its evidentiary shortcomings, the Government falls back on what it calls a 鈥渃ommon sense鈥 analogy: Post-election contributions used to repay a candidate鈥檚 loans are akin to a 鈥済ift鈥 because they 鈥渁dd to the candidate鈥檚 personal wealth鈥 as opposed to the campaign鈥檚 treasury. Brief for Appellant 33. The risk of corruption is thus greater, the Government argues, because the donor is lining the pockets of a legislator or legislator-elect.
The dissent at multiple points makes the same argument, contending that contributions that go toward repaying a candidate鈥檚 loan 鈥渆nrich the candidate personally,鈥 allowing him to 鈥渂uy a car or make tuition payments or join a country club.鈥 Post, at 7, 14; see also post, at 2, 3, 8, 13. But this forgets that we are talking about repayment of a loan, not a gift. If the candidate did not have the money to buy a car before he made a loan to his campaign, repayment of the loan would not change that in any way.
On top of that, contributions that go toward retiring a candidate鈥檚 debt could only arguably enrich the candidate if the candidate does not otherwise expect to be repaid. In other words, the Government鈥檚 gift comparison is meaningful only if the baseline is that the campaign will default. The Government, however, provides no reason to believe that most or even many winning candidates鈥攖he only candidates with whom its anticorruption interest is concerned鈥攅xpect not to be repaid by their campaigns. To the contrary, the Government has recognized throughout this litigation that winning candidates are commonly repaid in full. See App. 31鈥32 (citing the former FEC Commissioner鈥檚 statement that 鈥渙nly winners have an easy time dealing with debt鈥); id., at 317 (same); see also Ovtchinnikov, Self-Funding 11 (concluding that, even with BCRA鈥檚 limitations on loan repayment in place, two out of three winning campaigns were able to repay a candidate鈥檚 loans in full). For such a candidate, then, post-election contributions bear little resemblance to a gift, because there is less of a chance that his campaign will default. Such contributions instead restore the candidate to the status quo ante, a position to which he legitimately expected to return. As for losing candidates, they are of course in no position to grant official favors, and the Government does not provide any anticorruption rationale to explain why post-election contributions to those candidates should be restricted. See Brief for Appellant 45鈥46.
The analogy also proves too much. By the Government鈥檚 logic, post-election contributions to retire candidate loans are little different from gifts given directly to the candidate. But that logic is belied by how the Government treats the two categories of purported 鈥済ifts.鈥 On the one hand, federal law flatly prohibits candidates from using campaign contributions for personal purposes. See 52 U. S. C. 搂30114(b)(2). And it forbids Senators from accepting gifts worth $250 or more. See 2 U. S. C. 搂4725(a)(1). By contrast, the postulated 鈥済ift-by-loan-repayment鈥 limits are simply the individual contribution limits, which are now more than ten times higher than the gift limit: $2,900 per election. And Section 304 allows over 86 such 鈥済ifts鈥 before a campaign hits the Act鈥檚 $250,000 cap. Either the Government is openly tolerating a significant number of 鈥済ifts鈥 far more generous than what it would normally think fit to allow, or post-election contributions that go toward retiring campaign debt are in no real sense 鈥済ifts鈥 to a candidate. We find the latter answer more persuasive.
As a final argument, the Government claims that if the matter is otherwise in doubt, we should defer to Congress鈥檚 鈥渓egislative judgment鈥 that Section 304 furthers an anticorruption goal. Brief for Appellant 39; see also post, at 8 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (also arguing that we have no 鈥渞eason to second-guess Congress鈥檚 experience-based judgment鈥). Such deference, the Government contends, is grounded 鈥渋n part on the understanding that Congress 鈥榠s far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions.鈥 鈥 Brief for Appellant 40 (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (some internal quotation marks omitted)). But as explained, the evidence here is scant, and Congress鈥檚 judgment is hardly based on 鈥渧ast amounts of data.鈥 Id., at 195. Moreover, deference to Congress would be especially inappropriate where, as here, the legislative act may have been an effort to 鈥渋nsulate[ ] legislators from effective electoral challenge.鈥 Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S., at 404 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248鈥249 (2006) (plurality opinion).
In the end, it remains our role to decide whether a particular legislative choice is constitutional. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989); see also Randall, 548 U. S., at 248鈥249 (stressing need for 鈥渢he exercise of independent judicial judgment鈥 in case raising concern that 鈥渃ontribution limits that are too low [may] harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders鈥). And here the Government has not shown that Section 304 furthers a permissible anticorruption goal, rather than the impermissible objective of simply limiting the amount of money in politics.
*鈥冣赌*鈥冣赌*
For the reasons set forth, we conclude that Cruz and the Committee have standing to challenge the threatened enforcement of Section 304 of BCRA. We also conclude that this provision burdens core political speech without proper justification. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 21鈥12
_________________
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, APPELLANT v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE, et al.
on appeal from the united states district court for the district of columbia
[May 16, 2022]
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Breyer and Justice Sotomayor join, dissenting.
A candidate for public office extends a $500,000 loan to his campaign organization, hoping to recoup the amount from benefactors鈥 post-election contributions. Once elected, he devotes himself assiduously to recovering the money; his personal bank account, after all, now has a gaping half-million-dollar hole. The politician solicits donations from wealthy individuals and corporate lobbyists, making clear that the money they give will go straight from the campaign to him, as repayment for his loan. He is deeply grateful to those who help, as they know he will be鈥攎ore grateful than for ordinary campaign contributions (which do not increase his personal wealth). And as they paid him, so he will pay them. In the coming months and years, they receive government benefits鈥攎aybe favorable legislation, maybe prized appointments, maybe lucrative contracts. The politician is happy; the donors are happy. The only loser is the public. It inevitably suffers from government corruption.
The campaign finance measure at issue here has for two decades checked the crooked exchanges just described. The provision, Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, prohibited a candidate from using post-election donations to repay loans exceeding $250,000 that he made to his campaign. The theory of the legislation is easy to grasp. Political contributions that will line a candidate鈥檚 own pockets, given after his election to office, pose a special danger of corruption. The candidate has a more-than-usual interest in obtaining the money (to replenish his personal finances), and is now in a position to give something in return. The donors well understand his situation, and are eager to take advantage of it. In short, everyone鈥檚 incentives are stacked to enhance the risk of dirty dealing. At the very least鈥攅ven if an illicit exchange does not occur鈥攖he public will predictably perceive corruption in post-election payments directly enriching an officeholder. Congress enacted Section 304 to protect against those harms.
In striking down the law today, the Court greenlights all the sordid bargains Congress thought right to stop. The theory of the decision (unlike of the statute) is hard to fathom. The majority says that Section 304 violates the candidate鈥檚 First Amendment rights by interfering with his ability to 鈥渟elf-fund鈥 his campaign. Ante, at 12. But the candidate can in fact self-fund all he likes. The law impedes only his ability to use other people鈥檚 money to finance his campaign鈥攎uch as standard (and permissible) contribution limits do. And even that third-party restriction is a modest one, applying only to post- (not pre-) election donations to repay sizable (not small) loans. So the majority overstates the First Amendment burdens Section 304 imposes. At the same time, the majority understates the anti-corruption values Section 304 serves. In the majority鈥檚 view, there is 鈥渟cant鈥 danger here of quid pro quo corruption; loan repayments produce only the 鈥渟ort of 鈥榗orruption鈥 鈥 in which contributors wield 鈥済reater influence鈥 over candidates than they otherwise would. Ante, at 16鈥17, 21. Assume away all objections to that distinction, which even the majority concedes is 鈥渧ague,鈥 ante, at 16; for better or worse, it underlies this Court鈥檚 recent campaign finance decisions. Still, the conduct targeted by Section 304 threatens, if anything does, both corruption and the appearance of corruption of the quid pro quo kind. That is because the regulated transactions鈥攁s Members of Congress well knew from experience鈥攑ersonally enrich those already elected to office. In allowing those payments to go forward unrestrained, today鈥檚 decision can only bring this country鈥檚 political system into further disrepute.
I
In assessing a law鈥檚 burden on speech, this Court鈥檚 decisions all distinguish between restricting expenditures and restricting contributions. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19鈥23 (1976) (per curiam). (The majority glosses over that core distinction, for reasons that will soon become clear.) According to settled precedent, expenditure restrictions鈥攃aps on a campaign鈥檚 or candidate鈥檚 electoral spending鈥攊mpose the greatest burdens on expression. The First Amendment, as the majority notes, 鈥渉as its fullest and most urgent application鈥 when a 鈥渓egislative limit鈥 prevents a candidate from 鈥渦s[ing] personal funds to finance campaign speech鈥濃攖hat is, speech 鈥渙n behalf of his own candidacy.鈥 Ante, at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, laws focused on third-party contributions to a campaign (a category the majority mostly prefers to ignore) typically 鈥渆ntail[ ] only a marginal restriction鈥 on First Amendment interests. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 20. Take, for example, a simple limit on the amount someone can donate to a campaign, like the federal $2,900 ceiling. That kind of restriction, we have reasoned, in no way interferes with the donor鈥檚 鈥渇reedom to discuss candidates and issues鈥 through independent spending. Id., at 21. And it has only an indirect effect on the campaign itself. To be sure, the cap makes raising money (for speech and other things) harder: It forces candidates 鈥渢o raise funds from a greater number鈥 of people and generally results in the campaign taking in less money than it otherwise would. Id., at 22. But the Court has viewed such limits as troublesome only if they are so low as to prevent candidates from raising 鈥渢he resources necessary for effective advocacy.鈥 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 247 (2006) (plurality opinion) (quoting Buckley, 424 U. S., at 21). In the usual case, the incidental effect of a contribution restriction on a campaign鈥檚 speech does not count as a significant First Amendment burden. See Randall, 548 U. S., at 246鈥247.
Under that precedent, Section 304 鈥渆ntails only a marginal restriction鈥 on speech, because it regulates contributions alone. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 20. The provision leaves a campaign free to spend any amount of money for speech. Likewise, it leaves the candidate himself鈥攈ere, Senator Ted Cruz鈥攆ree to do so. The candidate can (in the majority鈥檚 words) 鈥渦se personal funds to finance campaign speech鈥 without limit; if he wishes, he can devote his whole fortune to 鈥渟peech on behalf of his own candidacy.鈥 Ante, at 10鈥11. Section 304 restricts only the use of third-party contributions to support his efforts鈥攚hich, as just shown, imposes a far more modest First Amendment burden. Recall how Section 304 works: It prevents post-election campaign contributions from going to repay large loans that the candidate has made to his campaign. So the provision limits鈥攎uch as standard contribution caps do鈥攐nly the candidate鈥檚 ability to shift the costs of his electoral speech to others. Or said a bit differently, it addresses not a candidate鈥檚 鈥渟elf-fund[ing],鈥 ante, at 12, but only his reliance on third-party financing.
And even that regulation of third-party contributions is a narrow one. Under Section 304, a campaign can always accept donations for small loans a candidate makes. And it can use pre-election donations to retire even his sizable loans. The statute just insists that donations for that purpose occur when speech is ongoing, and before everyone knows which candidate won (and so is in a position to return the favor by delivering government benefits). Consistent with our caselaw, that minor restriction on a candidate鈥檚 use of other people鈥檚 money does not severely burden his (or anyone else鈥檚) expression.
The majority鈥檚 argument to the contrary focuses not on the restriction Section 304 actually imposes, but on the indirect effects the provision might have. The majority does not dispute that Section 304 places no limits on the amount a candidate can spend for expression. See ante, at 11. Nor does (or could) the majority even claim that the provision caps what a candidate can lend his campaign. Instead, the majority argues that the law 鈥渕ay deter鈥 a candidate from making large loans because it curtails a potential source of repayment鈥i.e., post-election donations. Ante, at 12. In that way, the majority insists, the law鈥攖hough concededly regulating only the use of contributions鈥攆unctions to 鈥渞estrict[ ] a candidate鈥檚 speech.鈥 Ante, at 11; see ante, at 13.
But every contribution regulation has some kind of indirect effect on electoral speech, and we have still understood them to impose only minimal burdens. Consider again a standard contribution ceiling, like the federal $2,900 cap. That limit, as we have acknowledged, makes raising money harder. See Randall, 548 U. S., at 247; Buckley, 424 U. S., at 20鈥21. And so it predictably gives a campaign less money to spend. (In fact, a lot less: Just think of a world in which a candidate could raise an unlimited sum from every supporter.) With the contribution cap in effect, the campaign cannot pay for (nearly) as many advertisements, mailings, signs, and so forth. And likewise, to return to the fact pattern here, the campaign has less money available than it otherwise would to repay a candidate鈥檚 (or any other) loans. By the majority鈥檚 logic, that downstream effect would mean the contribution cap imposes a significant First Amendment burden. But as noted above, we have always held to the contrary, save for the rare case in which the limit is so low as to preclude effective advocacy. See supra, at 3鈥4. There is no reason to treat Section 304 differently. In fact, its restriction on post-election contributions for loan repayment probably has much smaller indirect effects on a campaign鈥檚 or candidate鈥檚 speech than the contribution ceilings this Court has approved. (Again, just think of all the multi-million-dollar donations those ceilings prevent.) So the majority鈥檚 view cannot be right.
And more fundamentally, the majority fails to appreciate what Section 304 has an indirect effect on: lending, rather than spending, money. In the majority鈥檚 view, those two activities count as one and the same. See ante, at 10鈥11. But they are not, in an obvious way. The expenditure of 鈥減ersonal funds鈥 for speech, this Court has observed, 鈥渞educes the candidate鈥檚 dependence鈥 on donors鈥攑recisely because he is not trying to speak on their dime. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 53. The loan of personal funds has the opposite effect, as further shown in this opinion鈥檚 next part. When a candidate lends substantial funds to his campaign, he wants (maybe desperately needs) them returned; he thus risks鈥攊ndeed, invites鈥攄ependence on donors, who alone can make him financially whole. Section 304 responds to that difference in whether a candidate is speaking independently, or instead relying on others鈥 largesse. The provision at most deters a single mechanism for financing electoral activities, because it carries a heightened threat of corruption.
II
Preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance is a compelling interest by any measure. See Federal Election Comm鈥檔 v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496鈥497 (1985). Quid pro quo corruption鈥攚hich extends beyond criminal bribery to 鈥渓ess blatant and specific鈥 arrangements鈥斺渟ubver[ts] the political process鈥 and threatens 鈥渢he integrity of our system of representative democracy.鈥 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388鈥389 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). And the appearance of that corruption (though scarcely mentioned in the majority opinion) is 鈥淸o]f almost equal concern.鈥 Id., at 388. Avoiding that appearance is 鈥渃ritical鈥 if public 鈥渃onfidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.鈥 Id., at 389.
Serious dangers of actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption attend the transactions Section 304 regulates鈥攁gain, the use of post-election contributions to repay a candidate鈥檚 personal loans. Consider a simple comparison. When a campaign uses a donation to fund routine electoral activities (including speech), the money marginally aids the candidate鈥檚 electoral odds, but in no way adds to his personal wealth. By contrast, when a campaign uses a donation to repay the candidate鈥檚 loan, every dollar given goes straight into the candidate鈥檚 pocket. With each such contribution, his assets increase; he can now buy a car or make tuition payments or join a country club鈥攁ll with his donors鈥 dollars. So contributions going to loan repayment have exceptional value to the candidate鈥攚hich his donors of course realize. And when the contributions occur after the election, their corrupting potential further increases. At that time, a campaign can use donations only to repay loans, of which some 97% come from candidates. See 11 CFR 110.1(b)(3)(i) (2017); A. Ovtchinnikov & P. Valta, Self-Funding of Political Campaigns, Management Science, Articles in Advance 5 (Apr. 7, 2022) (Ovtchinnikov, Self-Funding). So post-election donors can be confident their money will enrich a candidate personally. And those donors have of course learned which candidate won. When they give money to repay the victor鈥檚 loan, they know鈥攏ot merely hope鈥攈e will be in a position to perform official favors. The recipe for quid pro quo corruption is thus in place: a donation to enhance the candidate鈥檚 own wealth (the quid), made when he has become able to use the power of public office to the donor鈥檚 advantage (the quo). The heightened threat of corruption鈥攁nd, even more, of its appearance鈥攊s self-evident (except, it seems, to observers allergic to all campaign finance regulation).
In addressing that special danger, Section 304 is anything but a 鈥減rophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis,鈥 as the majority labels it. Ante, at 14. The idea behind that fancy-sounding epithet is just that the statute is a needless precaution: The $2,900 contribution ceiling, the majority asserts, already provides generous protection against the corrupting potential of donations, so the loan-repayment provision is unnecessary. See ibid. But that claim ignores that Section 304 targets only a subset of contributions, which raise (as just described) unique corruption risks. When an added protection addresses an added danger, the existence of a basic protection (however ordinarily ample) fails to show the supplement鈥檚 pointlessness. Regular seatbelts might suffice to protect drivers on the interstate, but special belts鈥攁nd roll cages to boot鈥攁re essential measures on the racetrack. So too, a $2,900 cap might suffice to prevent corruption from normal campaign contributions鈥攂ut not from post-election contributions to repay a candidate鈥檚 loan, and thus to enrich him personally. When Congress, as here, responds to a heightened threat with a heightened safeguard, the majority has no call to 鈥済reet鈥 it 鈥渨ith a measure of skepticism.鈥 Ibid.
Nor does the majority have reason to second-guess Congress鈥檚 experience-based judgment about the specially corrupting effects of post-election donations to repay candidate loans. The majority鈥檚 first attempt to counter that judgment is that 鈥渨e are only talking about repayment of a loan鈥: 鈥淚f the candidate did not have the money to buy a car before he made a loan to his campaign, repayment of the loan would not change that in any way.鈥 Ante, at 19. But that altogether misses the point. However much money the candidate had before he makes a loan to his campaign, he has less after it: The amount of the loan is the size of the hole in his bank account. So whatever he could buy with, say, $250,000鈥攕urely a car, but that鈥檚 beside the point鈥攈e cannot buy any longer. Until, that is, donors pay him back. Then, the hole is filled, the bank account replenished, and the purchasing power restored. That is a significant financial gain to the officeholder, courtesy of donors. If they had not stepped up, the officeholder would have been $250,000 poorer.
The majority鈥檚 second theory fares no better. Contributions to repay loans, the majority argues, do not really enrich an officeholder, because he has, from the beginning, 鈥渆xpect[ed] to be repaid.鈥 Ante, at 20. But the record provides no support for that self-assured statement. Contra the majority, the Government 鈥渉as recognized throughout this litigation鈥 not that winning candidates are usually repaid, but only that they are repaid more often than losing ones. Ibid.; see App. 31鈥32, 317.[1] That is no surprise鈥攁nd the fact is affirmatively unhelpful for the majority鈥檚 position, because it shows how post-election donations reflect an expectation of payback from the recipient. Nothing else in the record (or outside it) is helpful to the majority either. The best empirical study suggests that a substantial portion of winning campaigns fail to retire candidate loans, even when their amounts are too small to trigger Section 304鈥檚 restrictions. See Ovtchinnikov, Self-Funding 11; see also Brief for Campaign Legal Center et al. as Amici Curiae 12鈥13 (summarizing research 鈥渟how[ing] that most campaigns fail to pay off candidates鈥 personal loans in any amount at any time,鈥 in confirmation of the 鈥淸c]onventional wisdom鈥 that post-election fundraising is 鈥渘otoriously difficult鈥). So a candidate with a loan outstanding has plenty of reason to feel anxious鈥攁nd to see the loan鈥檚 repayment as a gratitude-inducing personal benefit. The donor takes him off a sharp hook. And even a candidate who expects repayment is far from impervious to corruption. He may have that confidence exactly because he knows that a raft of lobbyists will be eager to pay for political benefits. And with his bank account depleted, he has a great temptation to perform his part in such an exchange.[2]
The common sense of Section 304鈥攖he obviousness of the theory behind it鈥攍essens the need for the Government to identify past cases of quid pro quo corruption involving candidate loan repayments. As this Court has made clear, 鈥淸t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed鈥 to sustain a campaign finance law 鈥渧ar[ies] up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the [law鈥檚] justification.鈥 McConnell v. Federal Election Comm鈥檔, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003). There is nothing novel or implausible about Section 304鈥檚 rationale鈥攐nce again, that payments going to line an elected official鈥檚 pockets pose an especial risk of corruption. It is in fact what everyone knows to be true鈥攂ecause everyone knows people (including politicians) will often do things for money. The majority suggests that we should discard our understanding of how the world works because the Government has not come forward with adjudicated instances of corruption in the loan-repayment context. See ante, at 15鈥16. But quid pro quo exchanges, in that and every other setting, are nigh-impossible to detect and prove. That is indeed why we have campaign finance laws like Section 304. They prohibit conduct posing a heightened risk of corruption, so that the Government does not have to ferret out illicit exchanges case by case by case. To strike down Section 304 because the Government has not proved to a certainty some number of loan-repayments-for-political-paybacks is to miss the provision鈥檚 essential point.
In any event, the Government and its amici have marshalled significant evidence showing that the loan repayments Section 304 targets have exactly the dangers Congress thought. See Brief for Appellant 37鈥40; Brief for Campaign Legal Center et al. 27鈥29. Here is a sampling from the record, involving jurisdictions unprotected by either Section 304 or a state equivalent. In Ohio, various law firms donated almost $200,000 to help the newly elected attorney general recoup his personal loans. Those donors later received more than 200 state contracts worth nearly $10 million in legal fees. See L. Bischoff, Donations Helping DeWine Pay Down Campaign Loan, Springfield News-Sun, Feb. 2, 2012, p. A1. In Alaska, a lobbyist collected almost $100,000 for post-election repayment of the Governor鈥檚 personal loans. A business in which he held an interest later received a $9 million state contract. See B. Curry, Alaska Gov. Sheffield鈥檚 Impeachment Inquiry Has Overtones of Watergate Scandal, L. A. Times, July 19, 1985, p. 11. In Kentucky, two Governors loaned their campaigns millions of dollars, 鈥渙nly to be repaid after the election by contributors seeking no-bid contracts.鈥 J. Moore, Campaign Finance Reform in Kentucky: The Race for Governor, 85 Ky. L. J. 723, 746 (1997). The scandal those transactions created led to a new state campaign-finance law similar to Section 304. In upholding that statute, a court more cognizant than this one about how corruption works explained that 鈥渉eavily indebted candidates鈥 were 鈥渆asy bedfellows for quid pro quo&苍产蝉辫;肠辞苍迟谤颈产耻迟辞谤蝉.鈥&苍产蝉辫;Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916, 930 (WD Ky. 1995). That is also true on the local level. In San Diego, to take just one instance, three city council members cast critical votes benefiting lobbyists who had raised funds to retire their campaign debts. See C. Gustafson, Lobbyists See Benefit From Three City Officials, San Diego Union-Tribune, June 13, 2009, p. A1.[3]
An empirical study in the record confirms the dangers of corruption shown in those examples. The study first found, based on data preceding Section 304鈥檚 enactment, that politicians carrying campaign debt were 鈥渟ignificantly more likely鈥 than their 鈥渄ebt-free counterparts鈥 to 鈥渟witch their votes鈥 after receiving contributions from special interests. A. Ovtchinnikov & P. Valta, Debt in Political Campaigns (2020), in No. 1:19鈥揷v鈥00908 (D DC, July 14, 2020), ECF Doc. 65鈥1, p. 31. In other words, officeholders did more in exchange for donations repaying their personal loans than for other donations. The analysis next looked at Section 304鈥檚 effect. Here, the data showed that politicians with debt exceeding the law鈥檚 $250,000 threshold became 鈥渟ignificantly less responsive鈥 to contributions than before: They began to 鈥渂ehave remarkably similar to their debt free counterparts.鈥 Id., at 28; see Ovtchinnikov, Self-Funding 3 (similarly stating that those politicians became more 鈥渋ndependent of contributions from special interest[s]鈥). In other words, Section 304 did just what Congress thought it would. By preventing post-election contributions from personally enriching politicians, the provision diminished donor-responsive voting. The majority tries to undermine those findings by quoting the kind of careful caveats always accompanying good social science. See ante, at 17; Ovtchinnikov, Self-Funding 21 (noting that the study is a 鈥渇irst step in understanding鈥 and that more work is needed to 鈥渇ully pin down鈥 all aspects of causation). But the authors are confident鈥攁nd rightly so鈥攊n the findings just described: that Section 304 markedly decreased the frequency with which officeholders voted as donors would like. And although the authors could not responsibly claim that all the shifted votes they tallied were part of quid pro quo deals鈥攖hey are, after all, professors, not the FBI鈥攖hey deduce from the data that politicians carrying campaign debt were 鈥渓ess likely to [be] sell[ing] access鈥 than to be 鈥渟ell[ing] votes.鈥 Id., at 18.
Finally, the record evidence addresses the 鈥渁lmost equal[ly]鈥 important matter of the appearance of corruption. Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 390; see supra, at 6鈥7. A Government-commissioned survey of public opinion found that 81% of respondents believed it 鈥渧ery likely鈥 or 鈥渓ikely鈥 that a person who 鈥渄onate[s] money to a candidate鈥檚 campaign after the election expect[s] a political favor in return.鈥 App. 351鈥353. That bears repeating: 81%鈥攁n overwhelming perception across all demographic categories, as well as across all party affiliations and political ideologies. See ibid. As the court reviewing the Kentucky version of Section 304 explained: 鈥淸T]here is an impression鈥 when a contribution repays a loan after an election that the contributor is simply 鈥渓ining the candidate鈥檚 pocket, as there is no ongoing campaign to which the contribution may be made.鈥 Wilkinson, 876 F. Supp., at 930; see supra, at 12. The majority flyspecks the polling questions: Why didn鈥檛 the poll define 鈥減olitical favor鈥? Did the poll mention that the contributions had to comply with the $2,900 cap? And so forth. See ante, at 17鈥18. But really鈥攊s it likely that such tinkering would have made a real difference? The poll results were so lopsided because the post-election contributions Section 304 targets鈥攐nes adding to the candidate鈥檚 personal wealth鈥攈ave so conspicuous a potential to corrupt. The public knows that to be true. The public鈥檚 representatives in Congress knew it to be true. Only this Court鈥攕omehow鈥攄oes not.
*鈥冣赌*鈥冣赌*
鈥淒emocracy works only if the people have faith in those who govern.鈥 Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 390 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the people cannot have faith in representatives who trade official acts for financial gain. Section 304 prevents that kind of corruption, at barely discernable cost to First Amendment freedoms. The provision limits one narrow use of third-party contributions to a campaign, thus 鈥渆ntail[ing] only a marginal restriction鈥 on speech. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 20. And the provision targets a practice posing exceptional risks of quid pro quo deals. Repaying a candidate鈥檚 loan after he has won election cannot serve the usual purposes of a contribution: The money comes too late to aid in any of his campaign activities. All the money does is enrich the candidate personally at a time when he can return the favor鈥攂y a vote, a contract, an appointment. It takes no political genius to see the heightened risk of corruption鈥攖he danger of 鈥淚鈥檒l make you richer and you鈥檒l make me richer鈥 arrangements between donors and officeholders. Section 304 has guarded against that threat for two decades, but no longer. In discarding the statute, the Court fuels non-public-serving, self-interested governance. It injures the integrity, both actual and apparent, of the political process. I respectfully dissent.
Notes