Table of Contents
Trump v. Selzer - Motion and Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION
PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, an individual, REPRESENTATIVE MARIANNETTE MILLER-MEEKS, an individual, and FORMER STATE SENATOR BRADLEY ZAUN, an individual,
Plaintiffs,
v.
J. ANN SELZER, SELZER & COMPANY, DES MOINES REGISTER AND TRIBUNE COMPANY, and GANNETT CO., INC.,
Defendants.
Civil Case No. 4:24-cv-449-RGE-WPK
DEFENDANTS J. ANN SELZER
AND SELZER & COMPANY鈥橲 BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6)
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Defendants J. Ann Selzer and Selzer & Company move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for dismissal of the Amended Complaint because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In support, Ms. Selzer and Selzer & Company rely on the Brief in Support filed as an attachment to the Local Rule 7(h) motion for leave to file an over-length brief.
Pursuant to Local Rule 7(c), Ms. Selzer and Selzer & Company respectfully request oral argument on their motion in order to address the critical First Amendment principles at stake in this case.
Defendants J. Ann Selzer and Selzer & Company respectfully request this Court dismiss Plaintiffs鈥 claims with prejudice.
Dated: February 21, 2025
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Robert Corn-Revere
Robert Corn-Revere*鈥
(DC Bar No. 375415)
Conor T. Fitzpatrick*
(Mich. Bar No. P78981)
FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS AND EXPRESSION (果冻传媒app官方)
700 Pennsylvania Ave., SE; Suite 340
Washington, D.C. 20003
(215) 717-3473
bob.corn-revere@thefire.org
conor.fitzpatrick@thefire.org
Greg Greubel
(Iowa Bar No. AT0015474)
Adam Steinbaugh*
(Cal. Bar No. 304829)
FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS AND EXPRESSION (果冻传媒app官方)
510 Walnut St., Suite 900
Philadelphia, PA 19106
(215) 717-3473
greg.greubel@thefire.org
adam@thefire.org
Matthew A. McGuire
(Iowa Bar No. AT0011932)
NYEMASTER GOODE, P.C.
700 Walnut St., Suite 1300
Des Moines, IA 50309
(515) 283-8014
mmcguire@nyemaster.com
Attorneys for Defendants J. Ann Selzer and
Selzer & Company
* Admitted pro hac vice.
鈥 Lead counsel
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
281 Care Comm. v. Arneson,
766 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2014)
Ambassador Press, Inc. v. Durst Image Techn. U.S., LLC,
949 F.3d 417 (8th Cir. 2020)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009)
Behlmann v. Century Sur. Co.,
794 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2015)
Bertrand v. Mullin,
846 N.W.2d 884 (Iowa 2014)
Brandt v. Weather Channel, Inc.,
42 F. Supp. 2d 1344 (S.D. Fla.)
Briehl v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
172 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1999)
Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass鈥檔,
564 U.S. 786 (2011)
Butts v. Iowa Health Sys.,
863 N.W.2d 36, 2015 WL 1046119 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015)
C. Mac. Chambers Co. v. Iowa Tae Kwon Do Acad., Inc.,
412 N.W.2d 593 (Iowa 1987)
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942)
Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp.,
883 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2018)
Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010)
Cognitest Corp. v. Riverside Publ鈥檊 Co.,
1995 WL 382984 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 1995)
Commonwealth v. Lucas,
34 N.E.3d 1242 (Mass. 2015)
Daily Herald Co. v. Munro,
838 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988)
De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States,
451 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1971)
Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co.,
432 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,
518 U.S. 727 (1996)
Doe v. Grinnell Coll.,
473 F. Supp. 3d 909 (S.D. Iowa. 2019)
E-Shops Corp v. U.S. Bank Nat鈥檒 Ass鈥檔,
678 F.3d 659 (8th Cir. 2012)
FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med.,
602 U.S. 367 (2024)
FEC v. Cruz,
596 U.S. 289 (2022)
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974)
Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co.,
621 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 2001)
Gorog v. Best Buy Co.,
760 F.3d 787 (8th Cir. 2014)
Grimmett v. Freeman,
59 F.4th 689 (4th Cir. 2023)
Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233 (1936)
HOK Sport, Inc. v. FC Des Moines, L.C.,
495 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2007)
Hollander v. CBS News, Inc.,
2017 WL 1957485 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2017)
Hollander v. Garrett,
710 Fed. Appx. 35 (2d Cir. 2018)
Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46 (1988)
Hutchinson v. Miller,
797 F.2d 1279 (4th Cir. 1986)
Illinois, ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc.,
538 U.S. 600 (2003)
Kirk v. Farm & City Ins. Co.,
457 N.W.2d 906 (Iowa 1990)
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm鈥檔,
514 U.S. 334 (1995)
Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214 (1966)
Minn. Star & Trib. Co. v. Minn. Comm鈥檙 of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575 (1983)
Monson v. DEA,
589 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2009)
Mulhern v. Catholic Health Initiatives,
799 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 2011)
Murray Energy Holdings Co. v. Mergermarket USA, Inc.,
2016 WL 3365422 (S.D. Ohio June 17, 2016)
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964)
Nat鈥檒 Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Raoul,
685 F. Supp. 3d 688 (N.D. Ill. 2023)
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,
283 U.S. 697 (1931)
Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539 (1976)
Off. of Consumer Advoc. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,
744 N.W.2d 640 (Iowa 2008).
Pitts v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co.,
818 N.W.2d 91 (Iowa. 2012)
Pro Com., LLC v. K & L Custom Farms, Inc.,
870 N.W.2d 273, 2015 WL 2406782 (Iowa. Ct. App. 2015)
Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
536 U.S. 765 (2002)
Rickert v. State Pub. Disclosure Comm鈥檔,
168 P.3d 826 (Wash. 2007)
Snyder v. Phelps,
562 U.S. 443 (2011)
Spreitzer v. Hawkeye State Bank,
779 N.W.2d 726 (Iowa 2009)
Stancik v. CNBC,
420 F. Supp. 2d 800 (N.D. Ohio 2006)
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,
814 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2016)
Sw. Publ鈥檊 Co. v. Horsey,
230 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1956)
Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516 (1945)
Tumminello v. Bergen Evening Rec., Inc.,
454 F. Supp. 1156 (D.N.J. 1978)
United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke鈥檚 Hosp., Inc.,
441 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2006)
United States v. Alvarez,
567 U.S. 709 (2012)
United States v. Kepler,
879 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (S.D. Iowa 2011)
United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460 (2010)
Van Sickle Const. Co. v. Wachovia Comm. Mortg., Inc.,
783 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1990)
Wash. League for Increased Transparency & Ethics v. Fox News,
2021 WL 3910574 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2021)
Westchester Cnty. Indep. Party v. Astorino,
137 F. Supp. 3d 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
Young ex rel. Young v. Rally Appraisal, L.L.C.,
928 N.W.2d 660, 2019 WL 1486608 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019)
Statutes
Iowa Code 搂 50.48
Iowa Code 搂 714.16
Iowa Code 搂 714H.2
Iowa Code 搂 714H.3
Iowa Code 搂 714H.5
Other Authorities
Black鈥檚 Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)
Merriam-Webster Dictionary
Restatement (Second) of Torts 搂 522
Restatement (Second) of Torts 搂 525
Restatement (Second) of Torts 搂 548A
William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 搂 105 (4th ed. 1971)
Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs鈥 claims are barred by the First Amendment and the Court should dismiss them with prejudice. In the United States there is no such thing as a claim for 鈥渇raudulent news.鈥 No court in any jurisdiction has ever held such a cause of action might be valid, and few plaintiffs have ever attempted to bring such outlandish claims. Those who have were promptly dismissed. E.g., Hollander v. CBS News, Inc., 2017 WL 1957485 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2017) (dismissing wire fraud claims based on allegedly false and misleading news stories about candidate Donald Trump) 补蹿蹿鈥檇 but vacated on other grounds sub nom. Hollander v. Garrett, 710 Fed. Appx. 35 (2d Cir. 2018); Wash. League for Increased Transparency & Ethics v. Fox News, 2021 WL 3910574 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2021) (affirming dismissal of claims under the Washington Consumer Protection Act against Fox News for allegedly false reporting about COVID-19); cf. Nat鈥檒 Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Raoul, 685 F. Supp. 3d 688, 695 (N.D. Ill. 2023) (enjoining application of Illinois Consumer Fraud Act to anti-abortion advocacy as 鈥渂oth stupid and very likely unconstitutional鈥).
There is good reason for this. History鈥檚 judgment repudiated the 1798 Sedition Act which prohibited 鈥渇alse, scandalous and malicious . . . writings against the government of the United States鈥 or its president, and that fraught episode 鈥渇irst crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment.鈥 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964). Since then, courts at all levels have confirmed our 鈥減rofound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,鈥 id. at 270, holding that speech is presumptively protected unless it falls within one of a few limited and narrowly defined categories. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468鈥70 (2010). Those categories do not include a general exception for 鈥渇alse speech,鈥 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722 (2012). Plaintiffs seek to illegitimately expand them to include 鈥渇ake news,鈥 a tag line that may play well for some on the campaign trail but has no place in America鈥檚 constitutional jurisprudence. In this regard, civil damages, no less than criminal sanctions, cannot lie against protected speech. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277.
Even if such a cause of action existed, the Amended Complaint is fatally flawed on every level: Plaintiffs fail at the threshold to allege any recoverable damages, and do not state plausible claims, either on the law or on the facts as alleged. No court has ever accepted claims like these, and this Court should not be the first.
ALLEGATIONS IN PLAINTIFFS鈥 AMENDED COMPLAINT
Defendant J. Ann Selzer is a resident of Des Moines, Iowa, and holds a Ph.D. in Communication Theory and Research from the University of Iowa. (Am. Compl. 露 23.) She is the founder and president of Selzer & Company (鈥淪elzer鈥), which conducts opinion research, including polls. (Id. at 露 23.) Selzer has been the Des Moines Register鈥檚 primary pollster for four decades, overseeing all its polls 鈥 including its Iowa Poll. (Id.)
Selzer鈥檚 polls have a reputation for consistency and accuracy. (Id. at 露 36.) In 2016, 鈥淐lare Malone of FiveThirtyEight described Selzer as 鈥榯he best pollster in politics.鈥欌 (Id.) And 鈥渋n a June 2024 rating of 25 pollsters, Nate Silver rated Selzer first with an A+ score.鈥 (Id.) Indeed, Selzer鈥檚 polls were 鈥渞egarded as the gold standard nationally and in Iowa.鈥 (Id. at 露 139.)
Pollsters, however, are not seers. Every election has outlier polls, and the results of polls do not always conform to the final election tally. (See id. at 露露 70 (news reports describing Selzer鈥檚 November 2024 poll as an 鈥渙utlier鈥), 137.) In 2018, Selzer鈥檚 final poll of the Iowa gubernatorial race between Democrat Fred Hubbell and Republican Kim Reynolds showed Hubbell up by two points, but Reynolds prevailed by three. (Id. at 露 39.) In 2020, Selzer鈥檚 final Senate poll showed Republican Joni Ernst ahead by four points, and Ernst prevailed by seven. (Id. at 露 40.) Occasionally, polls miss by larger margins. In 2022, Selzer released a poll the October before the general election for Iowa Attorney General showing Republican Brenna Bird trailing Democratic incumbent Tom Miller by sixteen points, but Bird defeated Miller by two. (Id. at 露 38.)
The Des Moines Register published its final Iowa Poll of the 2024 presidential race on November 2 and 3, 2024. (Id. at 露 3.)1 The poll surveyed 808 likely voters in Iowa. (Id. at 露露 1, 3.) It showed Plaintiff Donald J. Trump trailing Kamala Harris by three points. (Id. at 露 2.) It also asked whether respondents preferred a Republican or Democrat in their congressional race. (Id. at 露 1.) In Iowa鈥檚 First Congressional District, where incumbent Congresswoman Plaintiff Mariannette Miller-Meeks faced former state representative Democrat Christina Bohannan, the 鈥淩epublican Party鈥 response trailed the 鈥淒emocratic Party鈥 option by sixteen points. (Id. at 露 84.) The poll results were surprising because Selzer鈥檚 preceding polls showed Mr. Trump leading the race, and other contemporaneous polls showed him with a seven- to nine-point lead. (Id. at 露露 53, 56.) The Des Moines Register published Selzer鈥檚 methodology along with a detailed analysis of the poll which compared the latest results to previous polls. (Id. at 露露 1, 3.)
Mr. Trump and other Republicans immediately disputed the poll鈥檚 results. The same day Selzer released the poll, PollFair 鈥渞eweighted鈥 the poll with its own metrics and calculated Mr. Trump leading Iowa by six points. (Id. at 露 75.) Ultimately, President Trump won Iowa by thirteen points, and Miller-Meeks won by two-tenths of a point 鈥 meaning the poll was approximately sixteen points off from the election results in both races. (Id. at 露 4.)
Winning, however, wasn鈥檛 enough for Mr. Trump or Ms. Miller-Meeks. Joined by Defendant Bradley Zaun, an Iowa state senator who lost his re-election bid (but whose race Selzer did not poll), they sued Ms. Selzer, Selzer & Company, and the Des Moines Register and its parent, Gannett. Plaintiffs allege the final 2024 Iowa Poll was 鈥渇ake鈥 and sought to foster enthusiasm for Democrats. (Id. at 露露 19, 81.) Selzer denies these conspiracies, but must treat them as true herein.
Mr. Trump and Ms. Miller-Meeks allege their campaigns 鈥渆xpend[ed] extensive time and resources to mitigate and counteract the harms鈥 of the Iowa Poll, though they do not allege what those resources or expenditures were. (Id. at 露露 131鈥32.) Rep. Miller-Meeks alleges her close race triggered a 鈥渃ostly recount.鈥 (Id. at 露 91.) Under Iowa law, the State of Iowa 鈥 not Rep. Miller-Meeks or her campaign 鈥 paid for the recount. Iowa Code 搂 50.48(2)(a). Mr. Zaun, who lost his state senate seat to Democrat Matt Blake by four points, alleges Blake鈥檚 victory 鈥渦pon information and belief [was] fueled by momentum from鈥 the Iowa Poll. (Id. at 露 101.) Plaintiffs also allege the poll 鈥渄eceived Iowans who contributed to their campaigns.鈥 (Id. at 露露 117鈥18.)
Mr. Trump filed this action in Iowa state court on December 16, 2024, raising one claim under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act. Gannett removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Id. at 露 28.) On January 31, 2025, Mr. Trump filed an Amended Complaint, which added Ms. Miller-Meeks and Mr. Zaun as plaintiffs as well as common law claims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. This motion followed.
LEGAL STANDARD
Plaintiffs鈥 Amended Complaint fails because it does not 鈥渃ontain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.鈥 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). While this Court must draw reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs鈥 favor, it is 鈥渇ree to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences, and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.鈥 Monson v. DEA, 589 F.3d 952, 961 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).
Plaintiffs鈥 fraud claims face a heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b). See E-Shops Corp v. U.S. Bank Nat鈥檒 Ass鈥檔, 678 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2012) (鈥淩ule 9(b)鈥檚 heightened pleading requirement applies to statutory fraud claims.鈥) Plaintiffs 鈥渕ust state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.鈥 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), including, 鈥渟uch facts as the time, place, and content of the defendant鈥檚 false representations, as well as the details of the defendant鈥檚 fraudulent acts, including when the acts occurred, who engaged in them, and what was obtained as a result.鈥 United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke鈥檚 Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006).
ARGUMENT
I. The First Amendment Bars Plaintiffs鈥 Claims.
This Court need not even address the elements of Plaintiffs鈥 claims because the First Amendment bars the action. It is a transparent attempt to punish news coverage and analysis of a political campaign, speech that not only is presumptively protected but 鈥渙ccupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.鈥 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 451鈥52 (quotation omitted). Given the obvious affront to basic constitutional values, Plaintiffs try to change to subject by framing their claims around a state consumer protection law applicable to misrepresentations 鈥渋n connection with the advertisement, sale, or lease of consumer merchandise.鈥 Iowa Code 搂 714H.3(1). Undaunted by the poor fit between commercial transactions and speech on public affairs, Plaintiffs try to pound their square peg into a round hole without any attempt to reconcile the constitutional mismatch. But as the Supreme Court has made clear, 鈥渟imply labeling an action one for 鈥榝raud鈥 . . . will not carry the day.鈥 Illinois, ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 617 (2003).
Plaintiffs are hardly the first to use artful pleading seeking to evade the First Amendment, and courts are adept at seeing through such artifice. Even at the dawn of modern First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court recognized government could not suppress a 鈥渕alicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper鈥 simply by labeling it a 鈥減ublic nuisance.鈥 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 706鈥08, 720 (1931) (鈥淐haracterizing the publication as a business, and the business as a nuisance, does not permit an invasion of the constitutional immunity against restraint.鈥) The Court similarly barred another demagogue 鈥 Governor Huey Long 鈥 from imposing a 鈥渢ax on lying鈥 on big city newspapers that criticized him. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245鈥50 (1936). See Minn. Star & Trib. Co. v. Minn. Comm鈥檙 of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 579鈥80 (1983) (Long denounced 鈥溾榣ying newspapers鈥 as conducting 鈥榓 vicious campaign鈥 and the tax as 鈥榓 tax on lying鈥欌). In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court barred segregationists from using defamation law as a tool to cripple the civil rights movement, giving no weight 鈥渢o the epithet 鈥榣ibel鈥 than . . . to other 鈥榤ere labels鈥 of state law.鈥 376 U.S. at 268鈥69 (citation omitted). The Amended Complaint fits squarely within this rogue鈥檚 gallery.
A. Plaintiffs Illegitimately Seek to Create a New First Amendment Exception.
Mr. Trump and his co-plaintiffs assume 鈥渇alse news鈥 falls outside the First Amendment鈥檚 protection, but over 200 years of American free speech law and practice prove otherwise. 鈥淎uthoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth 鈥 whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials 鈥 and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker.鈥 Id. at 271. As the Supreme Court recently explained, 鈥淸o]ur constitutional tradition stands against the idea that we need Oceania鈥檚 Ministry of Truth.鈥 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723.
鈥淔rom 1791 to the present, . . . the First Amendment has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, and has never include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.鈥 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468 (cleaned up). These 鈥渉istoric and traditional categories long familiar to the bar鈥 include obscenity, child pornography, defamation, fraud, incitement, fighting words, and speech integral to criminal activity. Id. (cleaned up) (collecting cases). Former Justice Souter observed that 鈥淸r]eviewing speech regulations under fairly strict categorical rules keeps the starch in the standards for those moments when the daily politics cries loudest for limiting what may be said.鈥 Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 774 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring). Consequently, the Court steadfastly resists efforts to increase or expand the boundaries of these categories as 鈥渟tartling and dangerous鈥 and has rejected any 鈥渇reewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.鈥 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470, 472.
Plaintiffs try to shoehorn their claims into an existing category by calling the Iowa Poll 鈥渇ake鈥 and asserting actionable 鈥渇raud鈥 occurred. But 鈥渋n the famous words of Inigo Montoya from the movie The Princess Bride, 鈥榊ou keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.鈥欌 Pro Com., LLC v. K & L Custom Farms, Inc., 870 N.W.2d 273, 2015 WL 2406782, at *5 n.3 (Iowa. Ct. App. 2015) (table). As a matter of basic law, Plaintiffs鈥 allegations about polls and news stories they dislike have nothing to do with fraud. See infra Section I.B. They also sprinkle the complaint with loose talk of 鈥渆lection interference,鈥 (Am. Compl. 露露 1, 3, 39, 62, 72), although they stop short of including a separate claim on that basis, perhaps out of awareness that 鈥渘o court has held that a scheme to rig an election itself constitutes money or property fraud.鈥 Westchester Cnty. Indep. Party v. Astorino, 137 F. Supp. 3d 586, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
Categories of unprotected speech are defined by precise legal tests, and Plaintiffs cannot stretch those boundaries to serve a political narrative. The Supreme Court routinely rejects attempts to broaden those limits based on assertions that the speech at issue is somehow 鈥渓ike鈥 a recognized exception. See, e.g., Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470鈥71 (Other 鈥渄escriptions are just that 鈥 descriptive. They do not set forth a test that may be applied as a general matter . . . .鈥); Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass鈥檔, 564 U.S. 786, 793鈥96 (2011) (rejecting 鈥渁ttempt to shoehorn speech about violence into obscenity,鈥 citing a lack of 鈥渓ongstanding tradition in this country鈥 restricting such speech); Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55鈥56 (1988) (rejecting bid to leave 鈥渙utrageous鈥 speech unprotected because it 鈥渄oes not seem to us to be governed by any exception to the . . . First Amendment鈥); Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 721鈥22 (鈥淭he Government has not demonstrated that false statements . . . should constitute a new category of unprotected speech鈥 based on a 鈥渢radition of proscription.鈥) (quotation omitted).
Because the categories are governed by history and tradition, the Plaintiffs could not have chosen a worse candidate for inclusion than 鈥渇ake news.鈥 America鈥檚 first experience with prohibiting false news 鈥 the Sedition Act of 1798 鈥 expired under its own terms, and all fines assessed under that misbegotten law were remitted. President Thomas Jefferson denounced it as an unconstitutional 鈥渘ullity, as absolute and palpable as if Congress had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image.鈥 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272鈥76. While the Supreme Court never adjudicated the Sedition Act鈥檚 attempt to punish 鈥渇alse鈥 writings about public officials, 鈥渢he attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history,鈥 defined 鈥渢he central meaning of the First Amendment,鈥 id., and conditioned 鈥渢he fabric of jurisprudence woven across the years,鈥 Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1253 (Mass. 2015).
Plaintiffs鈥 quest to punish 鈥渇ake news鈥 not only ignores this history, it also fumbles the conceptual basis for unprotected speech categories, which the Court first described as speech 鈥渙f slight social value.鈥 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Here, Plaintiffs seek to create a new First Amendment exception for speech that has always received the highest level of constitutional protection 鈥 political speech and commentary. In a word, it just doesn鈥檛 fit.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that the First Amendment 鈥溾榟as its fullest and most urgent application鈥 to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.鈥 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (citation omitted). Speech about the political process is 鈥渁t the core of our First Amendment freedoms,鈥 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002), because a 鈥渕ajor purpose鈥 of the First Amendment was to protect 鈥渇ree discussion of . . . candidates.鈥 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). Accordingly, the 鈥淔irst Amendment affords the broadest protection鈥 to 鈥淸d]iscussion of public issues and debate on鈥 the political process. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm鈥檔, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995) (citation omitted). Political polling is 鈥渟peech protected by the First Amendment鈥 both because it 鈥渞equires a discussion between pollster and voter鈥 and the resulting poll itself 鈥渋s speech.鈥 Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1988).
The First Amendment accords speech in this area wide berth because 鈥渆rroneous statement[s] [are] inevitable in free debate, and [they] must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space that they need to survive.鈥 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271鈥72 (cleaned up). Efforts to regulate 鈥渢ruth鈥 in political commentary are thus presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny. See 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 784-85 (8th Cir. 2014) (invalidating Minnesota law prohibiting knowingly false statements on ballot measures); Grimmett v. Freeman, 59 F.4th 689, 692 (4th Cir. 2023) (invalidating North Carolina statute prohibiting false statements about candidates 鈥渒nowing such report to be false or in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity鈥); Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir. 2016) (invalidating Ohio law prohibiting knowingly false statements about candidates); Lucas, 34 N.E.3d at 1253 (invalidating Massachusetts law prohibiting false statements about candidates and ballot measures); Rickert v. State Pub. Disclosure Comm鈥檔, 168 P.3d 826 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (invalidating Washington law prohibiting false statements of material fact about political candidates). Bottom line, political polls and news reports are not the stuff of which First Amendment exceptions are made.
Beyond that, Plaintiffs compound the constitutional problem by asking this Court for an injunction to prevent the publication of 鈥渁ny further deceptive polls.鈥 (Am. Compl. 露 134.) Such an order is a classic prior restraint 鈥 鈥渢he most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights,鈥 Neb. Press Ass鈥檔 v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976), and 鈥渢he essence of censorship.鈥 Near, 283 U.S. at 713. As a matter of basic law, this Court cannot censor future speech because of Plaintiffs鈥 hunch it will be 鈥渄eceptive.鈥 See, e.g., Cognitest Corp. v. Riverside Publ鈥檊 Co., 1995 WL 382984, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 1995) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of request 鈥渢o enjoin future, as yet unspoken and unidentified speech which the plaintiffs assert will be false if spoken.鈥); Murray Energy Holdings Co. v. Mergermarket USA, Inc., 2016 WL 3365422, at *8 (S.D. Ohio June 17, 2016) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of request for an order prohibiting defendants from future statements, noting 鈥渋t operates as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech鈥). Plaintiffs do not allege any legal basis for a prior restraint.
B. Plaintiffs Cannot Plead Around the First Amendment by Alleging Fraud.
Plaintiffs wield the terms 鈥渆lection interference鈥 and 鈥渇raud鈥 like an alchemist鈥檚 incantation, hoping to transform their political dross into legal gold. But no amount of vacuous repetition can convert their expansive concept of 鈥渇ake news鈥 to the very limited and specific legal concept of fraud. The Supreme Court has made clear that slapping the 鈥渇raud鈥 label on a claim cannot satisfy the specific showing required or extinguish the First Amendment. Madigan, 538 U.S. at 617. Fraud has 鈥渆xacting鈥 requirements in order 鈥渢o provide sufficient breathing room for protected speech,鈥 so a 鈥淸f]alse statement alone鈥 cannot trigger liability. Id. at 620.
Plaintiffs鈥 lawsuit simply misunderstands fraud. Fraud is 鈥淸a] knowing misrepresentation or knowing concealment of a material fact made to induce another to act to his or her detriment.鈥 Fraud, Black鈥檚 Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Fraud requires not just a false statement, but one made by the defendant in the context of persuading the plaintiff to 鈥減art[] with money, or property of value in reliance upon the defendant鈥檚 representations.鈥 William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 搂 105, at 684 (4th ed. 1971); see Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 722鈥23 (distinguishing false statements generally from fraud, which is designed to 鈥渟ecure moneys or other valuable considerations, [like] offers of employment鈥). The classic example of fraud is a crooked used-car salesman rolling back an odometer. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 搂 525, cmt.b, illus. 1.
Plaintiffs allege no representations by Selzer for the purpose of inducing them into a transaction. Instead, Plaintiffs skip (several) steps. They allege Selzer made false statements and tack on conclusory allegations that Plaintiffs later 鈥渞elied on鈥 and were 鈥渄amaged鈥 by the statements. Even accepting such unspecific allegations as true, that鈥檚 not fraud. There is no transactional nexus between the parties and no purpose by Selzer to induce Plaintiffs into doing anything. Being wrong (even intentionally) does not become fraud when someone listens and acts.
This Court illustrated the difference between falsity and fraud in United States v. Kepler, where it rejected the argument that a statute prohibiting false claims of receiving Army medals could survive First Amendment scrutiny through the 鈥渇raud鈥 exception. 879 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1012 (S.D. Iowa 2011). The Court explained 鈥渇raud is not mere lying,鈥 because lying, by itself, 鈥渓acks an essential element of a fraud claim: proof of detrimental reliance or actual harm to the plaintiff.鈥 Id. at 1009 n. 1 (citing Madigan, 538 U.S. at 620鈥21).
The elements of Plaintiffs鈥 fraud claims reflect these commonsense boundaries. To state a claim under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act (鈥淚CFA鈥), Plaintiffs must allege a false statement 鈥渙f a material fact, with the intent that others rely upon [it], . . . in connection with the advertisement, sale, or lease of consumer merchandise.鈥 Iowa Code 搂 714H.3(1). Similarly, fraudulent misrepresentation covers only those situations where a defendant 鈥渇raudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it.鈥 Kirk v. Farm & City Ins. Co., 457 N.W.2d 906, 909 (Iowa 1990) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 搂 525). Both claims require a false statement from the defendant about a critical aspect of a proposed transaction for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to enter that transaction. That is what fraud is and what Plaintiffs鈥 鈥渇alse news鈥 claims against Selzer lack, both conceptually and in the pled facts, as described in Section II below.
C. Plaintiffs鈥 Theory of Liability Would Eviscerate the First Amendment.
No court has ever adopted Plaintiffs鈥 extraordinary theory of liability for 鈥渇alse news鈥 because it has no limiting principle. Admittedly, it required casting a wide net to find litigants even proposing a similar theory, but those claims have uniformly failed. For example, the Southern District of Florida, affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit, rejected a 鈥渘ovel and unprecedented expansion of the scope of tort law鈥 seeking to hold the Weather Channel liable for damage caused by an incorrect forecast. Brandt v. Weather Channel, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1345鈥46 (S.D. Fla.), 补蹿蹿鈥檇, 204 F.3d 1123 (11th Cir. 1999)).
The court explained the plaintiffs鈥 theory contravened core First Amendment principles and declined, as a matter of law, to impose a 鈥渇orecaster鈥檚 duty.鈥 Id. at 1346. 鈥淚f the court were to impose such a duty . . . [it] could extend to farmers who plant their crops based on a forecast of no rain, construction workers who pour concrete or lay foundation based on the forecast of dry weather, or families who go to the beach for a week based on a forecast of sunny weather.鈥 Id. Just as with the election coverage here, 鈥淸p]redicting possible future events whose outcome is uncertain is not an exact science for which a [publisher] should be held liable.鈥 Id.
Similarly, the Eastern District of New York rejected an attempt to contort the elements of fraud against protected speech. Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). Demuth involved a 鈥渘ovel claim鈥 against chemical encyclopedia publisher Merck for 鈥渨illful misrepresentation鈥 of the toxicity of a chemical used in Demuth鈥檚 equipment that it alleged scared away purchasers. Id. at 991. The court explained Demuth could not 鈥減oint to any relationship of the parties, arising out of contract or otherwise, which in morals or good conscience, placed Merck under any duty towards plaintiff or its business.鈥 Id. at 993 (quotation marks omitted). The court held 鈥淢erck鈥檚 right to publish free of fear of liability is guaranteed by the First Amendment, and the overriding societal interest in the untrammeled dissemination of knowledge.鈥 Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)).
鈥淔raud鈥 does not exist when someone believes dishonest behavior took place and they lost money. If it did, courthouses would overflow on Monday mornings with claims against National Football League referees. Especially in debate over public affairs, 鈥渆very person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.鈥 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
America鈥檚 history and tradition protects political commentary; it does not subject 鈥渇alse鈥 reports to liability. Plaintiffs鈥 claims are barred by the First Amendment.
II. Plaintiffs鈥 Claims Are Facially Deficient.
A. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Recoverable Damages.
Even if the First Amendment did not bar Plaintiffs鈥 claims, each claim fails at the starting gate because Plaintiffs do not plead legally cognizable damages. See Briehl v. Gen. Motors Corp., 172 F.3d 623, 630 (8th Cir. 1999) (damages are an 鈥渆ssential element鈥 of a tort claim). First, stating the obvious: President Trump and Congresswoman Miller-Meeks won their elections, and Selzer did not poll Mr. Zaun鈥檚 race at all. Plaintiffs鈥 attempt to plead monetary damage rests on vague allegations of harm to nonparties and violates core principles of causation.
Mr. Trump and Ms. Miller-Meeks allege that, as candidates, they 鈥渆xpend[ed] extensive time and resources,鈥 including 鈥渄irect federal campaign expenditures鈥 to 鈥渃ounteract the harms鈥 of the Iowa Poll.2 But they filed this lawsuit in their personal capacities, and the Supreme Court has made clear that a campaign is 鈥渁 legal entity distinct from the candidate.鈥 FEC v. Cruz, 596 U.S. 289, 294 (2022). Mr. Trump and Ms. Miller-Meeks allege no cognizable harm to them as individuals from the Iowa Poll, so they have not plead the element of damages.
Mr. Zaun鈥檚 claims are even more implausible (if that is possible). Mr. Zaun alleges he 鈥渟ustained actual damages due to the loss of his Senate seat.鈥 (Am. Compl. 露 133.) Mr. Zaun does not explain what those damages are, nor does he explain how he could have suffered financial damage from a poll that did not mention him or poll his race. Even if he had offered some explanation, there鈥檚 no causation for damages consisting of losing elections. 鈥淔ederal courts do not sit to award post-election damages to defeated candidates.鈥 Hutchinson v. Miller, 797 F.2d 1279, 1287鈥88 (4th Cir. 1986); see also Sw. Publ鈥檊 Co. v. Horsey, 230 F.2d 319, 322鈥23 (9th Cir. 1956) (holding 鈥渓oss of an election鈥 damages are 鈥渟peculative and conjectural鈥 because 鈥渢here may be not less than a thousand factors which enter into the vagaries of an election鈥).
Plaintiffs鈥 Amended Complaint also does not support legally cognizable causation between the Iowa Poll and the alleged damages. For fraud to be the legal cause of Plaintiffs鈥 damages, their loss must 鈥渃onnect[] to the misrepresentation in a way to which the law attaches legal significance.鈥 Spreitzer v. Hawkeye State Bank, 779 N.W.2d 726, 740 (Iowa 2009) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 搂 548A, cmt. a). Relying on statements by a speaker who (1) did not direct them to the complaining party and (2) made them for a purpose unrelated to the alleged damages is not a connection with a legal significance. See, e.g., Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 883 F.3d 68, 91鈥92 (2d Cir. 2018) (third-party reliance on a statement being merely 鈥渇oreseeable鈥 is insufficient because it would trigger 鈥渂oundless liability鈥). Plaintiffs can no more sue a newspaper pollster for diverted resources than a farmer could sue a TV weatherman for crop damage due to unexpected frost. Brandt, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1345鈥46.
The remaining 鈥渄amages鈥 Plaintiffs assert are not cognizable. Plaintiffs allege 鈥渕illions of Americans . . . were lied to, deceived, and maligned by鈥 the Iowa Poll. (Am. Compl. 露 13.) But courts are not 鈥渁 vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.鈥 FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 382 (2024) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs feeling 鈥渄eceived,鈥 鈥渓ied to,鈥 and 鈥渕aligned鈥 by a poll are not cognizable damages because, as explained above, even intentionally false statements, without more, do not provide a basis for liability. See also Iowa Code 搂 714H.2(1) (鈥淸a]ctual damages鈥 must be ascertainable amounts and do not include 鈥渕ental distress鈥.) A plaintiff still must adequately allege a cognizable cause of action. Madigan, 538 U.S. at 620. Plaintiffs have not.
B. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim Under the ICFA.
1. Plaintiffs do not have a claim under the ICFA because they allege no actual or contemplated transaction between them and Selzer.
Plaintiffs have no claim under the ICFA against Selzer because they do not allege that they purchased or leased anything from Selzer. The ICFA is a consumer fraud statute designed to protect Iowa consumers deceived into buying or leasing a product. It provides a cause of action for victims of 鈥渄eception鈥 and 鈥渇raud鈥 鈥渋n connection with the advertisement, sale, or lease of consumer merchandise.鈥 Iowa Code 搂 714H.3. And it allows consumers to recover damages if they suffer an 鈥渁scertainable loss of money or property as the result鈥 of that deception or fraud. Iowa Code 搂 714H.5(1). Plaintiffs allege no 鈥渇raud鈥 or 鈥渄eception鈥 to induce them into a transaction with Selzer, nor do they allege any 鈥渁scertainable loss of money or property.鈥 And Plaintiffs鈥 Amended Complaint identifies no instance of the ICFA ever being applied to a context other than actual or attempted contractual privity between a seller/lessor and a consumer.
2. Plaintiffs cannot invoke the ICFA, which covers only 鈥渃onsumer merchandise鈥 bought or leased for 鈥減ersonal purposes.鈥
The Court should also dismiss Plaintiffs鈥 ICFA claim based on the statute鈥檚 unambiguous text. When interpreting state statues, federal courts 鈥渁ppl[y] that state鈥檚 rules of statutory construction.鈥 Behlmann v. Century Sur. Co., 794 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2015). 鈥淭he first step in ascertaining the true intent of the legislature is to look at the statute鈥檚 language.鈥 Mulhern v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 799 N.W.2d 104, 113 (Iowa 2011) (citation omitted). When that 鈥渓anguage is plain and unambiguous, [courts] will look no further.鈥 Id. The ICFA鈥檚 plain text forecloses Plaintiffs鈥 ICFA claim against Selzer.[3]
First, Plaintiffs do not allege Selzer sold or leased anything to them. And the ICFA defines 鈥渁dvertisement鈥 as 鈥渢he attempt by publication, dissemination, solicitation, or circulation to induce directly or indirectly any person to enter into any obligation or acquire any title or interest in any merchandise.鈥 Iowa Code 搂 714H.2(2) (citing and incorporating Iowa Code 搂 714.16(1)(a)). The Iowa Poll offered and induced no obligation or transaction; it鈥檚 an opinion poll. It did nothing more than explain its view on which candidates were leading and set out its methodology for how it arrived at that opinion. (Am. Compl. 露露 1, 3.) The Iowa Poll is textually outside the ICFA鈥檚 scope.
Second, a political opinion poll of the Iowa electorate is not 鈥渃onsumer merchandise.鈥 Under Iowa law, 鈥渃ourts generally presume words contained in a statute or rule are used in their ordinary and usual sense with the meaning commonly attributed to them.鈥 Off. of Consumer Advoc. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 744 N.W.2d 640, 643 (Iowa 2008). And in the ICFA, 鈥渃onsumer merchandise鈥 is 鈥渕erchandise offered for sale or lease, or sold or leased, primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.鈥 Iowa Code 搂 714H.2(4) (emphasis added). Merriam-Webster defines the possessory form of 鈥減ersonal鈥 as 鈥渋ntended for private use or use by one person.鈥 It defines 鈥渇amily鈥 as 鈥渢he basic unit in society traditionally consisting of two parents rearing their children.鈥 And 鈥渉ousehold鈥 means 鈥渢hose who dwell under the same roof and compose a family.鈥[4] Bars of soap and minivans 鈥 purchases everyday Iowans make while taking care of themselves and their families 鈥 are 鈥渃onsumer merchandise.鈥 Any logical and plain reading of the ICFA shows a comprehensive opinion poll of the Iowa electorate intended for general publication is not 鈥渕erchandise鈥 鈥減rimarily for personal, family, or household purposes.鈥 See Butts v. Iowa Health Sys., 863 N.W.2d 36, 2015 WL 1046119, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (table) (ICFA does not apply when defendant 鈥渄oes not offer or sell consumer merchandise鈥).
Finally, the Iowa Poll did not 鈥渞elate[] to a material fact or facts鈥 in an advertisement, sale, or lease. Iowa Code 搂 714H.3(1). Under the ICFA, it is not enough to allege a 鈥渄eceptive鈥 or 鈥渇raudulent鈥 representation generally. Instead, a plaintiff 鈥渕ust prove that the prohibited practice related to a material fact鈥 conveyed 鈥渋n connection with the advertisement, sale, or lease of merchandise.鈥 Id. The representation Plaintiffs rely upon is the polling results. But those results are not, and do not relate to, 鈥渁 material fact or facts鈥 in an advertisement, sale, or lease. Material facts in consumer transactions are representations about facts like price, use restrictions, a car鈥檚 gas mileage, or bedding thread count. Not only is the poll not a representation in connection with an advertisement or sale/lease, but it plays no role as a material fact in a representation. Plaintiffs鈥 ICFA claim is misplaced: it is not a consumer fraud claim, and this Court should dismiss it.
C. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim for Fraudulent Misrepresentation.
Plaintiffs鈥 allegations likewise cannot support a common law claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. For such a claim, 鈥渁 plaintiff must prove (1) defendant made a representation to the plaintiff, (2) the representation was false, (3) the representation was material, (4) the defendant knew the representation was false, (5) the defendant intended to deceive the plaintiff, (6) the plaintiff acted in reliance on the truth of the representation and was justified in relying on the representation, (7) the representation was a proximate cause of plaintiff鈥檚 damages, and (8) the amount of damages.鈥 Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 388, 400 (Iowa 2001). Even crediting Plaintiffs鈥 allegations and conspiracies as true, they don鈥檛 even satisfy half the elements.
First, as explained in Section I.B, Plaintiffs butcher the concept of fraud. Representations, falsity, reliance, scienter, and damages are components of a claim arising in a situation where a defendant lies to induce a plaintiff into a transaction to the plaintiff鈥檚 detriment. Here, Selzer made no actionable representation 鈥渢o the Plaintiffs.鈥 And Plaintiffs have not alleged the Iowa Poll was 鈥渕aterial鈥 to an inducement directed to Plaintiffs by Selzer. Plaintiffs similarly do not allege Selzer intended to induce them into a transaction. Nor, as explained in Section II.A, do they allege cognizable damages. Plaintiffs thus fail to even plead elements (1), (3), (5), (7), or (8).
Plaintiffs also fail to plead element (6), justifiable reliance. In Iowa, the 鈥渏ustifiable-reliance standard does not mean a plaintiff can blindly rely on a representation.鈥 Spreitzer, 779 N.W.2d at 737. Rather, 鈥淸a] person may not justifiably rely on a professional representation if 鈥榬ed flags鈥 signal such reliance is unwarranted.鈥 Young ex rel. Young v. Rally Appraisal, L.L.C., 928 N.W.2d 660, 2019 WL 1486608, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019) (table). Here, according to Plaintiffs, the Iowa Poll defied 鈥渃ommon sense, electoral history, [and] all other public polls.鈥 (Am. Compl. 露 60.) They allege media coverage identified the poll as an 鈥渙utlier.鈥 (Id. at 露 70.) Plaintiffs also allege Selzer had a history of undercounting Republican support. (Id. at 露露 36鈥40.) And Plaintiffs allege that 鈥渁ny responsible pollster or journalist with experience in Iowa politics would recognize the clear inaccuracy of鈥 the poll. (Id. at 露 140.) In short, so desperate to spike the football regarding Selzer鈥檚 polling inaccuracies, Plaintiffs aggressively concede the element of reliance.
Moreover, in contrast to their repetitive allegations that everyone with experience in Iowa politics recognized the poll as an unreliable outlier, Plaintiffs assert (remarkably) that they 鈥渏ustifiably relied on鈥 the polls. (Id. at 露 143.) That allegation is both conclusory and contradicted by Plaintiffs鈥 actual allegations. 鈥淧arties alleging fraud must plead reliance with 鈥榮ufficient particularity to state a plausible claim of justifiable reliance,鈥欌 and 鈥淸c]onclusory allegations that a plaintiff detrimentally relied on鈥 representations do not provide 鈥渟ufficient factual matter to state a claim of relief plausible on its face.鈥 Ambassador Press, Inc. v. Durst Image Techn. U.S., LLC, 949 F.3d 417, 423 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). As Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege six out of the eight elements of fraudulent misrepresentation, the Court should dismiss the claim.
D. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim for Negligent Misrepresentation.
The same infirmities infecting Plaintiffs鈥 fraudulent misrepresentation claim undermine their negligent misrepresentation claim. In Iowa, plaintiffs asserting negligent misrepresentation must establish: 鈥(1) the defendant was in the business or profession of supplying information to others; (2) the defendant intended to supply information to the plaintiff or knew that the recipient intended to supply it to the plaintiff; (3) the information was false; (4) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the information was false; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the information in the transaction that the defendant intended the information to influence; (6) and the false information was the proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff.鈥 Doe v. Grinnell Coll., 473 F. Supp. 3d 909, 937 (S.D. Iowa. 2019) (citation omitted).
When, as here, a plaintiff鈥檚 claim involves only 鈥渋ntangible economic interests,鈥 it is subject to 鈥渕ore restrictive rules of recovery.鈥 Id. (quoting Pitts v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 818 N.W.2d 91, 111 (Iowa. 2012)). That is due to 鈥渢he extent to which misinformation may be, and may be expected to be, circulated, and the magnitude of losses which may follow from reliance on it.鈥 Van Sickle Const. Co. v. Wachovia Comm. Mortg., Inc., 783 N.W.2d 684, 690 (Iowa 1990) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 搂 522 cmt. a). It is not enough to allege Selzer鈥檚 awareness that the poll might reach Plaintiffs and influence them. Instead, recovery is limited to 鈥渢he person or one of a limited group of persons whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it.鈥 Id. at 691. In short, Plaintiffs must allege a cognizable legal duty by Selzer to supply Plaintiffs with accurate information. Id.
But Selzer owed Plaintiffs no legal duty. As the Fifth Circuit explained: 鈥淚f a newspaper prints incorrect information, if a scientist publishes careless statements in a treatise, or if an oil company prints an inaccurate road map, they cannot be 鈥榣iable鈥 to those of the general public who read their works absent some special relationship between [the] writer and reader.鈥 De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140, 148 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Stancik v. CNBC, 420 F. Supp. 2d 800, 808 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (鈥淣ews broadcasters do not owe the general public a heightened duty of care.鈥); Brandt, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1345鈥46 (refusing to 鈥渋mpose on a television broadcaster of weather forecasts a general duty to viewers鈥). As another federal court explained, 鈥渁ccuracy in news reporting is certainly a desideratum, but the chilling effect of imposing a high duty of care on those in the business of news dissemination and making that duty run to a wide range of readers or TV viewers would have a chilling effect which is unacceptable under our Constitution.鈥 Tumminello v. Bergen Evening Rec., Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1156, 1159鈥60 (D.N.J. 1978). Without duty, there is no negligence. And the First Amendment bars states from imposing a common law duty on news suppliers to 鈥済et it right.鈥 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 288; Bertrand v. Mullin, 846 N.W.2d 884, 894 (Iowa 2014).
Plus, Plaintiffs do not allege Selzer 鈥渋ntended to supply information鈥 to Plaintiffs or knew any recipients intended to supply it to them (element (2)). Similarly, Plaintiffs do not allege Selzer intended to influence their decision-making, nor do they allege adequate facts supporting justifiable reliance (element (5)). The claim is facially and constitutionally deficient.
III. The Court Should Dismiss Claims Against Ms. Selzer as an Individual.
The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs鈥 claims against Ms. Selzer as an individual because Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to pierce the corporate veil between Selzer & Company and Ms. Selzer. HOK Sport, Inc. v. FC Des Moines, L.C., 495 F.3d 927, 935 (8th Cir. 2007) (鈥淸T]ypically, a corporate entity and its owners are separate and distinct.鈥) Plaintiffs 鈥渂ear the burden of proving that exceptional circumstances exist which warrant piercing the corporate veil.鈥 C. Mac. Chambers Co. v. Iowa Tae Kwon Do Acad., Inc., 412 N.W.2d 593, 598 (Iowa 1987). Such circumstances may exist 鈥渨here the corporation is a mere shell, serving no legitimate business purpose, and used primarily as an intermediary to perpetuate fraud or promote injustice.鈥 Id. at 597 (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiffs do not allege any of the exceptions apply, much less facts supporting an exception. The Court should dismiss the claims against Ms. Selzer individually.
CONCLUSION
Defendants J. Ann Selzer and Selzer & Company respectfully request this Court grant their motion to dismiss Plaintiffs鈥 claims with prejudice and request oral argument on the motion.
Dated: February 21, 2025
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Robert Corn-Revere .
Robert Corn-Revere*鈥
(DC Bar No. 375415)
Conor T. Fitzpatrick*
(Mich. Bar No. P78981)
Foundation for Individual
Rights and Expression (果冻传媒app官方)
700 Pennsylvania Ave., SE; Suite 340
Washington, DC 20003
(215) 717-3473
bob.corn-revere@thefire.org
conor.fitzpatrick@thefire.org
Greg Greubel
(Iowa Bar No. AT0015474)
Adam Steinbaugh*
(Cal. Bar No. 304829)
Foundation for Individual
Rights and Expression (果冻传媒app官方)
510 Walnut St., Suite 900
Philadelphia, PA 19106
(215) 717-3473
greg.greubel@thefire.org
adam@thefire.org
Matthew A. McGuire
(Iowa Bar No. AT0011932)
Nyemaster Goode, P.C.
700 Walnut St., Suite 1300
Des Moines, IA 50309
(515) 283-8014
mmcguire@nyemaster.com
Attorneys for Defendants J. Ann Selzer and Selzer & Company
* Admitted pro hac vice.
鈥 Lead counsel
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a true copy of the foregoing document was served upon all parties of record through the Court鈥檚 CM/ECF electronic filing system, with copies sent to the below-named individuals by electronic mail on February 21, 2025.
/s/ Robert Corn-Revere
Copy to:
EDWARD ANDREW PALTZIK
Bochner PLLC
1040 Avenue of the Americas
15th Floor
New York, NY 10018
(516) 526-0341
edward@bochner.law
ALAN R. OSTERGREN
Attorney at Law
Alan R. Ostergren, PC
500 East Court Avenue Suite 420
Des Moines, Iowa 50309
(515) 297-0134
alan.ostergren@ostergrenlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Notes
[1] Brianne Pfannenstiel, Iowa Poll: Kamala Harris Leapfrogs Donald Trump to Take Lead Near Election Day. Here鈥檚 How, Des Moines Reg. (Nov. 2, 2024, 6:01PM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/iowa-poll/2024/11/02/iowa-poll-kamala-harris-leads-donald-trump-2024-presidential-race/75354033007 (last updated Nov. 7, 2024), archived at https://archive.is/UqdGz. Because the article releasing the poll is central to Plaintiffs鈥 claims, the Court may consider its contents on a motion to dismiss. See Gorog v. Best Buy Co., 760 F.3d 787, 791 (8th Cir. 2014).
[2] (Am. Compl. 露露 131鈥132; see also id. at 露露 13, 15 [harm to 鈥渢heir Campaigns and affiliated entities鈥漖; 露 18 [action brought to redress harm 鈥渢o the Trump 2024 Campaign, to Representative Miller-Meeks鈥 Campaign, to Zaun鈥檚 Campaign, and to millions of citizens in Iowa and across America鈥漖.).
[3] By its plain terms, the ICFA applies to commercial transactions, not political commentary. Plaintiffs鈥 attempt to extend the law outside its traditional context renders it unconstitutional as applied because it would reach political speech and news coverage the speaker 鈥渞easonably should know鈥 are false. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 288 (evidence of negligently false speech is constitutionally insufficient); Bertrand v. Mullin, 846 N.W.2d 884, 894 (Iowa 2014) (same).
[4] Personal, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/personal (updated Feb. 20, 2025); Family, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/family (updated Feb. 20, 2025); Household, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/household (updated Feb. 20, 2025).