Table of Contents
Brief of Amici Curiae on Writ of Certiorari - TikTok v. Garland
![FIRElogo before a file with papers in it](/sites/default/files/styles/515x386/public/2023/04/果冻传媒app官方%20Resource%20Stock%20Image_0.png.webp?itok=XleE0u5h)
No. 24-656
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
TikTok, Inc., et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND EXPRESSION, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, REASON FOUNDATION, FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH, WOODHULL FREEDOM FOUNDATION, FIRST AMENDMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, STOP CHILD PREDATORS, PELICAN INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, AND CJ PEARSON
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
William Creeley
Aaron TerrFoundation for Individual
Rights and Expression
510 Walnut Street
Suite 900
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Robert Corn-Revere
Counsel of Record
Foundation for Individual
Rights and Expression
700 Pennsylvania Avenue, SE
Suite 340
Washington, DC 20003
(215) 717-3473
bob.corn-revere@thefire.org
Counsel for Amici Curiae[1]
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The 果冻传媒app官方 (鈥湽炒絘pp官方鈥) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that defends the rights of all Americans to the freedoms of speech, expression, and conscience 鈥 the essential qualities of liberty. Through litigation and advocacy, FIREworks to vindicate First Amendment rights without regard to the speakers鈥 views. These cases include matters involving state attempts to regulate the internet and social media platforms, both directly and indirectly. See, e.g., NetChoice, LLC v. Bonta, 113 F.4th 1101 (9th Cir. 2024); Volokh v. James, 656 F. Supp. 3d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), appeal argued, No. 23-356 (2d Cir. Feb. 16, 2024). FIREregularly acts to protect First Amendment rights by challenging laws that restrict access to protected speech online. E.g., Zoulek v. Hass, No. 2:24-cv-00031-RJS-CMR (D. Utah); FIRE Engaged in Advancing Texas v. Paxton, No. 1:24-cv-949-RP (N.D. Texas). Amicus FIRE also has a particular interest in this case given its use of TikTok as an advocacy tool. FIREregularly posts videos updating over 78,000 followers about threats to expressive rights nationwide. FIREalso uses TikTok to educate viewers on their own First Amendment rights.[2] Since 2022, FIREhas posted 323 videos garnering over 14 million views.
The Institute for Justice (鈥淚J鈥) is a nonprofit, public interest law firm that seeks to end widespread abuses of government power and secure the constitutional rights that allow all Americans to pursue their dreams. Its free-speech advocacy particularly focuses on governmental attempts to silence speech through economic regulations, see Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and on government officials鈥 attempts to use their power to retaliate against individuals and businesses whose speech they dislike. See Gonzalez v. Trevino, 602 U.S. 653 (2024). Both interests are implicated by this case, where the United States Congress has, in the guise of an economic regulation, prohibited an entire channel of communication and explicitly done so, at least in part, because of concern about what might be said through that channel. IJ also engages in public advocacy about constitutional rights, through which it has (for example) saved tens of thousands of homes and businesses from eminent-domain abuse. As an advocate, IJ constantly seeks new avenues to reach the American public to convey messages about important legal issues 鈥 and, in its direct experience, TikTok is one of those avenues.[3] It therefore has an interest in this case both as a defender of free speech and as a speaker in its own right.
Reason Foundation (鈥淩eason鈥) is a nonpartisan and nonprofit public policy think tank, founded in 1978. Reason鈥檚 mission is to promote free markets, individual liberty, equality of rights, and the rule of law. Reason advances its mission by publishing the critically acclaimed Reason magazine, as well as commentary on its websites, www.reason.com and www.reason.org. To further Reason鈥檚 commitment to 鈥淔ree Minds and Free Markets,鈥 Reason has participated as amicus curiae in numerous cases raising significant legal and constitutional issues, including cases implicating free expression and social media platforms. See, e.g., Brief of Reason Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024); Brief of Reason Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent. Gonzalez v. Google, 598 U.S. 617 (2023). Reason also has an interest in this case as a speaker because it uses TikTok to promote its messages to an audience of over 24,000 followers.[4]
The Future of Free Speech (鈥淔oFS鈥) is a nonpartisan and nonprofit think tank, founded in 2023 and located at Vanderbilt University. FoFS鈥 mission is to promote a resilient global culture of free speech for all and reverse the current worldwide free speech recession that threatens democracy and freedom around the world. FoFS advances its mission by publishing policy reports, original research, surveys, books, op-eds and engaging in advocacy on the state of free speech globally. FoFS has published several reports documenting how speech-restrictive measures adopted in European democracies help create the blueprint and legitimacy for crackdowns on social media and online speech in authoritarian countries.
The Woodhull Freedom Foundation (鈥淲oodhull鈥) is a non-profit organization that works to advance the recognition of sexual freedom, gender equality, and free expression. Woodhull鈥檚 name was inspired by the Nineteenth Century suffragette and women鈥檚 rights leader, Victoria Woodhull. The organization works to improve the well-being, rights, and autonomy of every individual through advocacy, education, and action. Woodhull鈥檚 mission is focused on affirming sexual freedom as a fundamental human right. Woodhull is particularly concerned with government censorship of speech involving human sexuality.
The First Amendment Lawyers Association is a non-profit bar association comprised of attorneys throughout the United States and elsewhere whose practices emphasize defense of freedom of speech and of the press, and which advocates against all forms of government censorship. Since its founding, its members have been involved in many of the nation鈥檚 landmark free expression cases and it has frequently addressed First Amendment issues as amicus curiae in the Supreme Court and federal and state appellate courts throughout the country.
Stop Child Predators (鈥淪CP鈥) is a nonpartisan nonprofit organization, founded in 2005, that brings together a team of policy experts, law enforcement officers, community leaders, and parents to launch state and federal campaigns to inform lawmakers and the public about policy changes that will protect America鈥檚 children from sexual predators. SCP spearheaded the passage of Jessica鈥檚 Law in 46 states, and work on legislation in all 50 states. Recognizing that sex offender management and child safety must be addressed in both the real world and the digital world, SCP launched the Stop Internet Predators initiative in 2008 to focus on protecting children from online exploitation while also defending parents鈥 rights to choose how and when their family engages in the use of social media and the internet. To promote SCP鈥檚 commitment to parental rights, SCP participated as amicus curiae in multiple court cases, including Moody v. NetChoice, 603 U.S. 707 (2024), challenging restrictions limiting First Amendment rights of teens and families to access social media platforms. As a group of experts in child welfare and child protection, SCP has become increasingly concerned that proposed policy developments in child exploitation, including banning social media platforms like TikTok, has largely failed to address prevention, support law enforcement, or make the critical connection between digital and real-world exploitation of children.
The Pelican Institute for Public Policy is a non-partisan research and educational organization 鈥 a think tank 鈥 and the leading voice for free markets in Louisiana. The Institute鈥檚 mission is to conduct research and analysis that advances sound policies based on free enterprise, individual liberty, and constitutionally limited government.
CJ Pearson is a longtime Gen Z conservative activist and National Co-Chair of the Republican National Committee Youth Advisory Council. For more than a decade, Pearson has fought on the frontlines of the political youth movement and, as an extension of his activism, has developed a deep passion for the protection of civil liberties and the safeguarding of free speech online. Pearson鈥檚 TikTok account (@thecjpearson) has garnered 3.6 million 鈥渓ikes鈥 and reaches 159,500 followers.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The nationwide ban on TikTok is the first time in history our government has proposed 鈥 or a court approved 鈥 prohibiting an entire medium of communications. Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion: The TikTok court case has staggering implications for free speech in America, Los Angeles Times (Dec. 9, 2024), . The law imposes a prior restraint, and restricts speech based on both its content and its viewpoint. As such, if not unconstitutional per se, it must be subject to the highest level of First Amendment scrutiny. Given the grave consequences, both for free speech doctrine and for the 170 million Americans who use TikTok to communicate with one another, this Court should reverse the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
The D.C. Circuit rejected the government鈥檚 framing of the case and correctly recognized the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, Pub. L. No. 118-50, Div. H (Apr. 24, 2024) (鈥渢he Act鈥), as a direct regulation of speech. Exercising original and exclusive jurisdiction over TikTok鈥檚 constitutional challenge, the court found the Act 鈥渋mplicates the First Amendment and is subject to heightened scrutiny,鈥 assuming but not deciding strict scrutiny was the correct standard. TikTok Inc. v. Garland, Nos. 24-1113, 24-1130, 24-1183, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 30916, at *28 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 6, 2024). However, the court held the Act 鈥渃lears this high bar,鈥 granting deference to the government鈥檚 public characterization of alleged national security concerns. It concluded the Act was 鈥渃arefully crafted to deal only with control by a foreign adversary, and it was part of a broader effort to counter a well-substantiated national security threat posed by the [People鈥檚 Republic of China].鈥 Id. at *39鈥40.
The appellate panel was correct to find the highest level of First Amendment scrutiny is appropriate but failed to faithfully apply strict scrutiny or hold the government to its burden of proof. Instead, it too readily deferred to unsupported assertions of a potential national security threat.
Congress has not met the heavy constitutional burden the First Amendment demands for regulating speech, let alone to justify banning an entire expressive platform. The danger Congress identified is purely speculative 鈥 it is neither clear nor present. No published legislative findings or other official public records attempt to explain or substantiate any real and serious problem that supports severely encroaching upon millions of Americans鈥 right to speak and to receive information. Nor was there any serious attempt to show the ban would effectively address the asserted risks.
The legislative record showing the law鈥檚 purpose reveals illegitimate intent to suppress disfavored speech and generalized concerns about data privacy under the general umbrella of 鈥渘ational security.鈥 The goal of 鈥渢ilt[ing] public debate in a preferred direction鈥 is not even a valid governmental purpose. Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 741 (2024) (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552, 578鈥79 (2011)). And the evidence the D.C. Circuit relied upon falls far short of satisfying the 鈥渉eavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.鈥 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (citation omitted). The D.C. Circuit鈥檚 passive deference to governmental conjecture is unwarranted, misguided, and dangerous. The Act is not narrowly tailored to serve any compelling government interest, as the First Amendment requires.
The D.C. Circuit鈥檚 decision justifies the Act鈥檚 sweeping censorship by invoking 鈥渇ree speech fundamentals.鈥 In so doing, it confuses the First Amendment values at stake and sacrifices our constitutional tradition of debate and dialogue for enforced silence. The D.C. Circuit鈥檚 misguided reasoning is sharply at odds with longstanding First Amendment precedent, violating the constitutional protections it claims to preserve. Instead of following the instructive example set by Taiwan, which has eschewed a blanket TikTok ban in favor of robust counterspeech, the D.C. Circuit鈥檚 logic echoes the authoritarianism of North Korea and Iran.
If a constitutional intrusion of this unprecedented magnitude is allowed to stand, it will not only sanction the ban of an important platform for expression but also open the door to broad regulation of other media based on purely speculative national security concerns. This Court should reverse the D.C. Circuit鈥檚 decision and enjoin enforcement of the Act as unconstitutional.
ARGUMENT
I. The Act Effectively Bans a Specified Platform for Communication.
In passing the Act, Congress effectively banned an important channel of communication and exposed other online platforms to onerous regulations, including potential bans. That this drastic measure is unprecedented did not deter the appellate panel, which held 鈥淐ongress was entitled to address the threat posed by TikTok directly and create a generally applicable framework, however imperfect, for future use.鈥 TikTok Inc. at *60. However imperfect? This vastly understates what the Constitution requires. While the First Amendment does not demand perfection, it does hold the government to certain standards of proof and requires solutions tailored to meet specific problems. But the panel鈥檚 broad deference cannot be squared with the First Amendment and this Court鈥檚 longstanding precedent.
This Court has repeatedly 鈥渧oiced particular concern with laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression.鈥 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994). The First Amendment protects the 鈥減rocess of expression through a medium鈥 as well as 鈥渢he expression itself.鈥 Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061鈥62 (9th Cir. 2010). It is no answer to observe that other platforms exist, for 鈥渙ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.鈥 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997) (citation omitted). Even when such prohibitions are 鈥渃ompletely free of content or viewpoint discrimination,鈥 which this Act is not, 鈥渢he danger they pose to the freedom of speech is readily apparent 鈥 by eliminating a common means of speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech.鈥 City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 55. And if anything can be said to be a 鈥渃ommon means of speaking,鈥 it is a social media platform used by 170 million Americans.
A ban on a particular nationwide chain of bookstores would no doubt trigger strict First Amendment scrutiny, even if Americans remained free to buy books from other stores or sellers. A nationwide prohibition on a specific social media platform is no different, as 鈥渞egulation of a medium inevitably affects communication itself.鈥 City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 48.
Although the Act provides that TikTok can avoid a ban if sold within 270 days to an approved entity, Pub. L. 118-50, Div. H 搂搂 2(a)(2)(A), (c)(1), TikTok has stated that 鈥渄ivestiture of the TikTok U.S. business and its severance from the globally integrated platform of which it is an integral part is not commercially, technologically, or legally feasible.鈥 Pet鈥檙s TikTok and ByteDance Ltd.鈥檚 Pet. Review 15. A forced divestiture to which TikTok cannot and will not submit is the functional equivalent of a ban.
Despite the government鈥檚 acknowledged targeting of a specific medium of communication, the Act contains no legislative findings, and Congress failed to create an official public record supporting the Act鈥檚 purpose and rationale.[5] Some lawmakers raised concerns about national security related to U.S. TikTok users鈥 data potentially falling into the Chinese government鈥檚 hands. But many other comments reveal the Act鈥檚 purpose, at least in part, of suppressing disfavored speech on TikTok.
The House Energy and Commerce Committee Report (鈥淗ECC Report鈥), for example, states the Act is in part intended to prevent TikTok and other regulated communications platforms from 鈥減ush[ing] misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda on the American public,鈥 notwithstanding that foreign actors remain free to do so on other platforms.[6] Similarly, the Act鈥檚 co-sponsor, Rep. Mike Gallagher, cited the 鈥減ropaganda threat鈥 as the 鈥済reater concern鈥 about TikTok.[7] And before the D.C. Circuit, the government argued the Act is necessary to address the possibility that the People鈥檚 Republic of China (鈥淧RC鈥) 鈥渕ight shape the content that American users receive,鈥 including promotion of content that aligns with PRC interests. TikTok Inc. at *36鈥37.
Even if Congress had characterized its interest as dealing only with problems arising from data collection, its coverage definition manifests its content-based purpose. The Act applies to platforms that feature user-generated content and exempts those dedicated to product, business, or travel reviews. Pub. L. 118-50, Div. H 搂搂 2(g)(2)(A), (B). If this is allowed, the government could use this approach to eliminate other platforms within the United States based in part on the content they host.
From the beginning of internet regulation this Court has recognized that laws targeting the online medium inherently present serious First Amendment concerns. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 868鈥70. This is true even when the government attempts to evade First Amendment scrutiny by recharacterizing its regulations as advancing some non-speech purpose. See, e.g., NetChoice, LLC v. Yost, 716 F. Supp. 3d 539, 553 (S.D. Ohio 2024)
(characterizing Ohio statute requiring social media platforms to obtain parental consent prior to use by minors as 鈥渁n access law masquerading as a contract law鈥 and preliminarily enjoining it on First Amendment grounds). The same principle applies here. The government鈥檚 invocation of 鈥渘ational security鈥 does not permit it to avoid First Amendment scrutiny where it has acted to ban an expressive platform used by half the country.
The Act restricts the flow of information based on speaker- and content-based factors and imposes a de facto ban on an entire platform for expression. Its inexplicable exemption for platforms not used for certain specified subjects (including platforms that collect user data and are 鈥渃ontrolled by a foreign adversary鈥) indicates its purpose is not really focused on protecting data privacy. These content-based provisions, the government鈥檚 arguments in the D.C. Circuit, and comments by various members of Congress reveal its purpose is to regulate speech and the platform used to express it.
II. The Act Fails Any Level of First Amendment Scrutiny.
The Act is unconstitutional for two independent reasons. First, its de facto ban of a specific platform for expression is an unprecedented prior restraint that will restrict the speech of tens of millions of Americans. Second, the ban is content-based and was adopted to purge disfavored viewpoints from public discourse 鈥 which is never a legitimate government interest. Either is grounds for the Court to invalidate the Act, under any level of scrutiny.
A. The Act鈥檚 content-based ban of an entire medium is an unprecedented prior restraint.
Banning a medium of communication cannot be characterized as anything but a classic prior restraint. Prior restraints that 鈥渄eny use of a forum in advance of actual expression,鈥 Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975), are 鈥渢he most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.鈥 Neb. Press Ass鈥檔 v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). The Act鈥檚 scheduled ban on TikTok will, in advance of actual expression, prevent anyone from using the platform to speak or to receive information. TikTok Inc. at *65 (鈥淭ikTok鈥檚 millions of users will need to find alternative media of communication鈥).
The D.C. Circuit dismissed this reality, claiming that, post-divestiture, 鈥淭ikTok Inc.鈥檚 new owners could circulate the same mix of content as before without running afoul of the Act鈥 and that 鈥淸p]eople in the United States could continue to engage with content on TikTok as at present.鈥 Id. at *57. But this ignores both that forced divestiture is effectively a ban because TikTok cannot divest within the Act鈥檚 timeline 鈥 a fact the government did not rebut, id. at *59 鈥 and that divestiture, even if feasible, would significantly change the nature of the platform. Most notably, it would deprive TikTok of the unique content curation tools developed by its parent company, ByteDance. Pet鈥檙s TikTok and ByteDance Ltd.鈥檚 Pet. Review 18鈥19.
In other words, divestiture would impair TikTok鈥檚 ability to 鈥渟elect and shape other parties鈥 expression into [its] own curated speech products.鈥 Moody, 603 U.S. at 717. As the Court recently explained, 鈥渓aws curtailing 鈥 editorial choices must meet the First Amendment鈥檚 requirements. The principle does not change because the curated compilation has gone from the physical to the virtual world.鈥 Id. After divestiture, the platform might still be called 鈥淭ikTok,鈥 but it would no longer be the platform millions of Americans use today. Any way you slice it, the Act imposes a prior restraint.
Prior restraints are 鈥減resumptively unconstitutional鈥 and 鈥済enerally call for strict scrutiny.鈥 In re Sealed Case, 77 F.4th 815, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2023). A prior restraint does not require that the government cut off access to all platforms of a particular category, but only that it block in advance whatever expression it restricts. See Se. Promotions, 420 U.S. at 547鈥48, 556 (municipality鈥檚 denial of use of city auditorium for theatrical production constituted prior restraint, regardless of whether another venue might have hosted the production).
The Act has additional defects. It is content-based, insofar as it 鈥渁pplies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.鈥 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). Treating speakers differently can also be a form of content discrimination: 鈥渓aws favoring some speakers over others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature鈥檚 speaker preference reflects a content preference.鈥 Id. at 170 (citation omitted). Here, the Act is content-based in multiple ways: it explicitly targets TikTok as a speech platform and as a speaker; discriminates against the millions of speakers who use TikTok; is justified in substantial part by disapproval of TikTok鈥檚 content and fear of a foreign government鈥檚 influence on it; and exempts websites and apps that do not host user-generated content or that are primarily dedicated to product, business, or travel reviews.
鈥淚t is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.鈥 Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass鈥檔, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (citation omitted). The government bears the burden to show the Act鈥檚 restriction of speech 鈥渇urthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.鈥 Reed, 576 U.S. at 171. 鈥淚f a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government鈥檚 purpose, the legislature must use that alternative,鈥 and the First Amendment forbids a 鈥渂lanket ban if the [objective] can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative.鈥 United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813鈥14 (2000) (citation omitted). Congress has not met its heavy burden in these regards.
While the government has expressed concerns about national security, which can be a compelling interest, it still must provide evidence of a specific and serious threat and prove the Act is necessary to address it. See id. at 819, 827 (content-based speech regulation violated First Amendment given 鈥渓ittle hard evidence of how widespread or how serious the problem鈥 it targeted was, and due to the government鈥檚 failure to use 鈥渓east restrictive means鈥 to address it). Even when the interest asserted involves our nation鈥檚 security, 鈥渢he First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result.鈥 N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 725鈥26 (Brennan, J., concurring).
This Court has 鈥渘ever accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden.鈥 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov鈥檛 PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000). With respect to national security, the Court has observed: 鈥淭he danger to political dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to protect 鈥榙omestic security.鈥 Given the difficulty of defining the domestic security interest, the danger of abuse in acting to protect that interest becomes apparent.鈥 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972); see also N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 719 (Black, J., concurring) (鈥淭he word 鈥榮ecurity鈥 is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment.鈥).
B. Congress did not meet the heavy burden the First Amendment demands.
A primary purpose of the Act is to banish disfavored viewpoints from the marketplace of ideas 鈥 a constitutionally infirm basis for regulating speech. Yet even if Congress had acted for a legitimate purpose under the First Amendment, the D.C. Circuit was far too lenient in accepting the government鈥檚 rationale for the Act and its assertions that this law would materially combat the suggested harms. Rather than holding the government to its obligation to provide evidence, the court was satisfied by generalized claims regarding Chinese hackers, PRC efforts to purchase large data sets in other contexts, and predictions that TikTok entities 鈥渨ould try to comply if the PRC asked for specific actions to be taken to manipulate content for censorship, propaganda, or other malign purposes.鈥 TikTok Inc. at *41鈥45.
The Act鈥檚 purpose of preventing Americans from encountering disfavored ideas on TikTok is not even a legitimate governmental interest, let alone a compelling one. 鈥淎t the heart of the First Amendment鈥檚 Free Speech Clause is the recognition that viewpoint discrimination is uniquely harmful to a free and democratic society.鈥 NRA of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 187 (2024). The government 鈥渕ust abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.鈥 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
Moreover, the First Amendment protects not only the right to express ideas but also the right to receive them, including alleged 鈥減ropaganda鈥 from abroad. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 306鈥07 (1965). Chief Judge Srinivasan鈥檚 concurring opinion incorrectly characterized Lamont as a 鈥渘arrow鈥 decision dependent on 鈥渁n affirmative obligation to out oneself to the government in order to receive communications from a foreign country that are otherwise permitted to be here.鈥 TikTok Inc. at *109 (Srinivasan, C.J., concurring). Lamont struck down a requirement that anyone wishing to obtain foreign 鈥渃ommunist political propaganda鈥 through the mail must affirmatively notify the Postal Service. However, the Court based its holding on the broader principles that the First Amendment prohibits the government from seeking 鈥渢o control the flow of ideas to the public,鈥 including from foreign sources, and that it protects 鈥溾榰ninhibited, robust, and wide-open鈥 debate.鈥 Lamont, 381 U.S. at 306鈥07 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
This Court鈥檚 decision in Lamont was narrow, but only in the sense that it means the First Amendment does not prevent the government from efforts to 鈥渃lassify the mail,鈥 鈥渇ix the charges for its carriage,鈥 鈥渋nspect material from abroad for contraband,鈥 or pursue similar speech-neutral actions. Id. at 306鈥07. Nothing in Lamont suggests the government could pass laws even more restrictive than an affirmative-request requirement on Americans鈥 access to information from abroad. If the government cannot impose Lamont鈥檚 notice requirement because it would likely cause recipients 鈥渢o feel some inhibition in sending for literature鈥 designated as propaganda, id. at 307, it cannot 鈥 for relevant example 鈥 completely ban receipt of the information. That does more than risk chilling access to information 鈥 it freezes out access.
This Court鈥檚 subsequent decision in Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987), confirms that Lamont controls any government attempt to 鈥減rohibit, edit, or restrain the distribution of advocacy materials in an ostensible effort to protect the public from conversion, confusion, or deceit.鈥 Id. at 480. And by preventing Americans from accessing information on TikTok, including 鈥 but not limited to 鈥 content allegedly affected by a foreign adversary, that is essentially what the Act does here.
Despite acknowledging the 鈥淕overnment justifies the Act in substantial part by reference to a foreign adversary鈥檚 ability to manipulate content seen by Americans,鈥 TikTok Inc. at *30, the Circuit majority paradoxically determined the government is not motivated by concerns about the ideas or messages Americans encounter on TikTok. But the court directly contradicted this perplexing conclusion when it characterized the government鈥檚 concerns about 鈥渢he risk that the PRC might shape the content that American users receive, interfere with our political discourse, and promote content based upon its alignment with the PRC鈥檚 interests.鈥 Id. at *36鈥37. The government even posits a risk of the PRC promoting its views on a specific topic: 鈥淭aiwan鈥檚 relationship to the PRC.鈥 Id. The government鈥檚 expressed concern about the potential of TikTok content to 鈥渦ndermine trust in our democracy and exacerbate social divisions鈥 removes any doubt the Act is intended to shape public sentiment. Public Redacted Br. for Resp鈥檛 35 (TikTok Inc. v. Garland, D.C. Cir. 24-1113, Document No. 2066896).
Numerous legislators who supported the Act similarly expressed concerns about 鈥減ropaganda鈥 and specific viewpoints being promoted on TikTok.[8] If such hypothesized content manipulation occurs, the legislative concern 鈥渃enters on the potential reactions to covert content-creation decisions made by the PRC.鈥 TikTok Inc. at *13 (emphasis added). That is, the government is plainly targeting PRC鈥檚 alleged influence over TikTok鈥檚 content over concern over about what messages and ideas Americans encounter on the platform, taking the Act into forbidden constitutional territory.
Even if the government鈥檚 鈥渃ontent manipulation鈥 rationale is not treated as per se unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, it still falls far short of the demands of strict scrutiny. The argument is speculative twice over. First, the government 鈥渁cknowledges that it lacks specific intelligence that shows the PRC has in the past or is now coercing TikTok into manipulating content in the United States.鈥 TikTok Inc. at *60. The D.C. Circuit thus relied on what it calls 鈥渋nformed judgment鈥 and reasonable prediction while acknowledging 鈥渢he absence of 鈥榗oncrete evidence鈥 on the likelihood of PRC-directed censorship,鈥 yet it somehow concluded this is 鈥渕ore than mere speculation.鈥 Id. at *61. How so? The government鈥檚 mere reliance on national security as a reason for 鈥渄eference鈥 is insufficient to paper over this deficiency. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 725鈥26 (Brennan, J., concurring) (government cannot restrict speech based on 鈥渟urmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result鈥). See FEC v. Cruz, 596 U.S. 289, 307 (2022) (the government may not restrict speech just because it might prevent some subsequent 鈥渁nticipated harm鈥).
Second, neither the government nor the court explained how the PRC鈥檚 manipulation of TikTok content would pose a 鈥済rave threat to national security.鈥 TikTok Inc. at *71. What exactly is the threat? Will the PRC鈥檚 influence over a single social media platform in the U.S. 鈥 a democracy where citizens have free access to an overwhelming diversity of viewpoints and information sources 鈥 magically turn millions of Americans into Manchurian candidates? And how does this threat compare to the potential threat from PRC agents using other, unrestricted platforms to spread propaganda?
Despite the lack of evidence that the PRC is controlling TikTok鈥檚 content and an inability to explain how such control would seriously threaten national security, the court meekly deferred to the government鈥檚 judgment and unjustifiably dismissed an obvious, less-restrictive alternative: counterspeech. See Kohls v. Bonta, No. 2:24-cv-02527 JAM-CKD, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179933, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2024) (鈥淓specially as to political speech, counter speech is the tried and true buffer and elixir, not speech restriction.鈥) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The government can battle ideas it opposes by contributing to the marketplace of ideas, but it cannot rig the marketplace. That is First Amendment 101.
The government鈥檚 separate claim that the Act serves national security by countering the PRC鈥檚 efforts to collect data from Americans also amounts to little more than conjecture. The D.C. Circuit based its decision on a record devoid of evidence showing ByteDance has actually disclosed or will disclose TikTok user data to the PRC, what that data includes, what the PRC has done or would do with it, or how those actions will harm U.S. national security. Notably, last year, a federal district court preliminarily enjoined Montana鈥檚 TikTok ban on First Amendment grounds, citing the lack of supporting evidence for the state鈥檚 argument that China 鈥渃an gain access to Montanan[s鈥橾 data without their consent.鈥 Alario v. Knudsen, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1082 (D. Mont. 2023).
Use of a prior restraint in these circumstances 鈥 the most intrusive of speech restrictions, and a content-based one at that 鈥 is particularly suspect where numerous less restrictive options were available to the government. For example, Congress could have enacted generally applicable legislation addressing the specific data practices that concern many of the Act鈥檚 supporters. Moreover, TikTok reached a national security agreement through negotiations with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 鈥渋ncluding agreeing to a 鈥榮hut-down option鈥 that would give the government the authority to suspend TikTok in the United States if [TikTok and ByteDance] violate certain obligations under the agreement.鈥 Pet鈥檙s TikTok and ByteDance Ltd.鈥檚 Pet. Review 5. The court recognized that the agreement and TikTok鈥檚 voluntary mitigation efforts 鈥減rovide some protection鈥 but again uncritically deferred to the government鈥檚 unsupported assertion that these available less-restrictive means are inadequate. TikTok Inc. at *51.
The Act鈥檚 underinclusiveness further demonstrates sloppy tailoring. 鈥淯nderinclusiveness raises serious doubts about whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint.鈥 Brown, 564 U.S. at 802. If the Act鈥檚 purpose is to prevent platforms that collect user data from disclosing it to foreign adversaries, it is not at all clear why the Act applies only to platforms that permit users to 鈥済enerate or distribute content,鈥 Pub. L. 118-50, Div. H, 搂 2(g)(2)(A)(iii), or why it exempts platforms 鈥渨hose primary purpose is to allow users to post product reviews, business reviews, or travel information and reviews.鈥 Id. 搂 2(g)(2)(B). The asserted interests in data privacy would seem to apply generally to any website or application that collects user data and is 鈥渃ontrolled by a foreign adversary,鈥 regardless of whether its users generate content or whether its content centers on reviews rather than, say, political speech.
The government鈥檚 failure to substantiate how the Act would materially address the speculative harms is even more glaring. Although it justified passage based on generalized claims about foreign cyber-espionage activity, TikTok Inc. at *41鈥45, it does not affect 鈥渢he PRC鈥檚 ability to communicate through any medium other than TikTok.鈥 Id. at *108 (Srinivasan, C.J., concurring). Nor does it have any effect on international cyber-espionage, hacking, or the ability to acquire data on Americans from other sources. The D.C. Circuit at least acknowledged 鈥渢he Act does not fully solve the data collection threat posed by the PRC,鈥 but suggested rather weakly that this 鈥渄oes not mean it was not a step in the right direction.鈥 Id. at *53鈥54. But strict scrutiny demands more. Particularly when the future of an entire medium of communication is at stake, the government is obliged to do more than suppose it might be taking a positive step. E.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662鈥64 (1994); Brown, 564 U.S. at 799.
III. The Act鈥檚 Sweeping Censorship Betrays First Amendment Values.
Notwithstanding the 鈥渃entral tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas,鈥 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745鈥46 (1978), the D.C. Circuit upheld the Act even after applying strict scrutiny 鈥 鈥渢he most demanding test known to constitutional law,鈥 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997). To reach this result, the court not only invoked the 鈥渞isk of the PRC manipulating content on the platform鈥 鈥 despite the government鈥檚 admission it had no evidence the PRC had ever done so, TikTok Inc. at *60 鈥 it went so far as to portray the Act鈥檚 sweeping censorship as necessary to protect free expression. In the court鈥檚 telling, the mere possibility the PRC might one day 鈥渕anipulate鈥 speech on the platform is 鈥渁t odds with free speech fundamentals鈥 and provides ample justification for the ban. Id.
But any conception of 鈥渇ree speech fundamentals鈥 that forgives mass censorship in the name of conjectural concerns about foreign threats is not only worthless, but dangerous. The Founders recognized the risk inherent in the D.C. Circuit鈥檚 reasoning. 鈥淧erhaps it is a universal truth,鈥 warned James Madison, the First Amendment鈥檚 lead author, 鈥渢hat the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions agst. danger real or pretended from abroad.鈥[9] But because those 鈥渨ho won our independence by revolution were not cowards,鈥 the First Amendment they ratified rejects 鈥渟ilence coerced by law 鈥 the argument of force in its worst form.鈥 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375鈥76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The Founders would likewise reject the D.C. Circuit鈥檚 misunderstanding of 鈥渇ree speech fundamentals鈥 because, like the Act itself, it sacrifices liberty for silence.
The court鈥檚 analysis flips the First Amendment on its head, proclaiming the Act, which eliminates millions of Americans鈥 access to a platform for communication for the purpose of shielding them from disfavored ideas, 鈥渁ctually vindicates the values that undergird the First Amendment.鈥 TikTok Inc. at *56. Ironically, the court cited Moody for the proposition that the First Amendment prohibits 鈥渢he government from tilting public debate in a preferred direction.鈥 Id. at 55鈥56. Yet that is exactly what the government is doing here 鈥 regulating a private speech platform 鈥渋n order to achieve its own conception of speech nirvana.鈥 Moody, 603 U.S. at 742. The Act doesn鈥檛 vindicate First Amendment values so much as betray them.
The D.C. Circuit鈥檚 concern about 鈥渃ontent manipulation鈥 confuses the First Amendment protections at stake. The court justified its decision to uphold the Act out of concern that, acting via TikTok, the Chinese government may one day do what the U.S. government cannot: 鈥渕anipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.鈥 TikTok Inc. at *44 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)). But the First Amendment not only prevents our government from dictating what we may say and hear, but also the speech private platforms may permit, even if those platforms are aligned with a hostile government. The Act trades a speculative risk of foreign 鈥渕anipulation鈥 for definite government intrusion into the private speech marketplace, violating constitutional principles in the name of protecting them.
TikTok is a private platform, and, like other private platforms, it maintains 鈥淐ommunity Guidelines鈥 that restrict speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment.[10] The platform鈥檚 algorithm selects certain content to highlight or reject. These are protected editorial choices. Moody, 603 U.S. at 716 (choices to 鈥渋nclude and exclude, organize and prioritize鈥 user content create 鈥渄istinctive compilations of expression,鈥 and this process 鈥渞eceive[s] the First Amendment鈥檚 protection.鈥). That the government believes TikTok may align its choices with the PRC鈥檚 interests cannot constitutionally serve as grounds to eliminate it as a communications channel any more than the First Amendment allows banning import of a book because a foreign government might have authored (or altered) some chapters of it.
The D.C. Circuit鈥檚 flawed reasoning carries far-reaching consequences, opening the door to broad regulation of other communications platforms engaged by foreign governments. Domestic social media platforms frequently receive 鈥 and acquiesce to 鈥 requests or demands from foreign governments to remove content,[11] and they routinely serve as staging grounds for 鈥渋nfluence operations鈥 by designated foreign adversaries.[12] The government fails to explain how its concerns about the PRC鈥檚 hypothetical manipulation of TikTok content are any more pressing than what is known to be happening on other social media platforms. Under the D.C. Circuit鈥檚 reasoning, could the government ban X or Facebook on national security grounds for complying with foreign government demands to censor content, or for not doing enough to combat foreign influence campaigns?
The D.C. Circuit鈥檚 confusion undermines the expressive rights of private platforms and their users in deference to a broad, ill-defined governmental interest in protecting 鈥淔irst Amendment values.鈥 But 鈥渢he government cannot get its way just by asserting an interest in improving, or better balancing, the marketplace of ideas.鈥 Moody, 603 U.S. at 732. This Court has consistently rejected as 鈥渟ingularly unpersuasive鈥 the destroy-the-village-to-save-it argument that extensive government regulation is necessary to protect free speech online. Reno, 521 U.S. at 885. Faced here with the outright ban of an expressive platform used by 170 million Americans, it should do so again.
The remedy for the government鈥檚 fear that TikTok will tilt public debate in an unfavorable direction is 鈥渕ore speech,鈥 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring), not regulation that seeks 鈥渢o orchestrate public discussion through content-based mandates.鈥 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 728. 鈥淎s a matter of constitutional tradition,鈥 the First Amendment commits us to this path because 鈥渆ncouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.鈥 Reno, 521 U.S. at 885.
To the extent TikTok is promoting or may one day promote PRC 鈥減ropaganda,鈥 the government, civil society organizations, and ordinary Americans are fully equipped to expose and challenge it through raising their own voices. That is true regardless of whether the propagandizing is 鈥渃overt鈥濃攇overnment officials have obviously had no difficulty raising public awareness about alleged PRC influence on TikTok鈥檚 content. The government 鈥渉as not shown, and cannot show, why counterspeech would not suffice to achieve its interest.鈥 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 726.
Yet the D.C. Circuit dismissed counterspeech as a 鈥渘a茂ve鈥 response to whatever 鈥渃overt manipulation of content鈥 the PRC may hypothetically pursue. TikTok Inc. at *54. That dismissal cannot be reconciled with this Court鈥檚 recognition that 鈥渢he proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express 鈥榯he thought that we hate.鈥欌 Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 246 (2017) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Nor does it square with the instructive approach of Taiwan, a country the D.C. Circuit specifically identified as a potential subject of the PRC鈥檚 hypothetical content manipulation. Taiwan has banned TikTok from government devices, as has our federal government.[13] But Taiwan鈥攗niquely aware of the PRC鈥檚 machinations 鈥 has not imposed a broad ban of the kind now before the Court. Instead, it has chosen to embrace its 鈥渄eeply ingrained culture of free political speech,鈥 relying on debate, dialogue, transparency, and 鈥渁 deep network of independent fact-checking organizations鈥 to counter disinformation of the type feared by our Congress.[14]
Taiwan knows we cannot defeat totalitarianism by adopting its methods. Conversely, the Act now before this Court would make the United States the first free and open democracy to adopt a broad blanket ban of TikTok across its territory. And it would do so despite research indicating fears of foreign interference are generally overwrought;[15] that the PRC in particular has been consistently unsuccessful in its efforts to influence other countries via online disinformation;[16] and that addressing 鈥渄isinformation鈥 successfully requires long-term efforts that rely on messaging and a focus extending beyond individual platforms.[17] Contrary to the D.C. Circuit鈥檚 contention, counterspeech is not 鈥渘a茂ve鈥; it is freedom鈥檚 best answer.
Allowing the TikTok ban to stand would mark an unprecedented departure from our longstanding commitment to free speech exceptionalism, which sets the United States apart not only from authoritarian states but also other democracies that mandate significant government regulation of online speech, such as the European Union and Germany. It would undermine the principles enshrined in the First Amendment and signal a troubling shift, aligning the United States with regimes that stifle their citizens鈥 freedom to share and access information and ideas. And this erosion of our constitutional tradition would weaken the nation鈥檚 moral authority to advocate for speech and press freedoms abroad while chipping away at what the Founders knew as the 鈥渂ulwarks of liberty鈥 here at home.[18]
Authoritarian nations like North Korea and Iran ban platforms out of fear of what their citizens may read or publish.[19] The United States has not 鈥 until now. 鈥淎uthority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority.鈥 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). The United States is exceptional because our constitutional history and tradition recognizes 鈥淸t]hat the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength.鈥 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). This Court should uphold that tradition by striking down this unprecedented ban.
CONCLUSION
Never before has Congress taken the extraordinary step of effectively banning a platform for communication, let alone one used by half the country. The First Amendment requires an explanation of why such a dramatic restriction of the right to speak and receive information is necessary, and compelling evidence to support it. The government failed to provide either here. What little Congress did place on the public record includes statements from lawmakers raising diffuse concerns about national security and, more disturbingly, their desire to control the American public鈥檚 information diet in a way that strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. This Court should reverse the decision below and hold that the Act is constitutionally invalid.
December 27, 2024
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Robert Corn-Revere
Robert Corn-Revere
Counsel of Record
FIRE
700 Pennsylvania Ave. SE, Suite 340
Washington, D.C. 20003
(215) 717-3473
bob.corn-revere@thefire.org
William Creeley
Aaron TerrFIRE
510 Walnut Street
Suite 900
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Amici Curiae
NOTES
[1] Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici affirm that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and that no person other than amici or its counsel contributed money intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief.
[2] FIRE(@thefireorg), TikTok,
[3] IJ (@instituteforjustice), TikTok,
[4] Reason Magazine (@reasonmagazine), TikTok,
[5] The D.C. Circuit pointedly declined to consider material the government submitted under seal. TikTok Inc. at *86 (鈥淣otwithstanding the significant effect the Act may have on the viability of the TikTok platform, we conclude the Act is valid based upon the public record.鈥).
[6] H.R. Rep. No. 118-417 at 2 (2024).
[7] Jane Coaston, What the TikTok Bill Is Really About, According to a Leading Republican, N.Y. Times (Apr. 1, 2024), ; see also Pet鈥檙s Firebaugh et al.鈥檚 Pet. Review 20鈥23.
[8] The HECC report鈥檚 and Rep. Gallagher鈥檚 comments about 鈥減ropaganda鈥 noted above are just the tip of the iceberg. See H.R. Rep. No. 118-417, supra note 6, at 2; Coaston, supra note 7. When the Act was introduced, Rep. Mikie Sherrill claimed the Chinese Communist Party uses TikTok to 鈥減romote propaganda.鈥 Bill to Protect Americans From Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications, Including TikTok, Select Comm. on the CCP (Mar. 5, 2024), . Rep. John Moolenaar said, 鈥渨e cannot allow the CCP to indoctrinate our children.鈥 Id. Rep. Ashley Hinson claimed China uses TikTok to 鈥減ush harmful propaganda, including content showing migrants how to illegally cross our Southern Border, supporting Hamas terrorists, and whitewashing 9/11.鈥 Id. And Rep. Elise Stefanik accused TikTok of 鈥減roliferating videos on how to cross our border illegally鈥 and 鈥渟upporting Osama Bin Laden鈥檚 Letter to America.鈥 Id. That is only a sampling of lawmakers鈥 remarks betraying the Act鈥檚 clear viewpoint-discriminatory purpose.
[9] Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, National Archives (May 13, 1798),
[10] These rules shape TikTok鈥檚 distinct expressive culture. To game the platform鈥檚 algorithm and evade content moderation, TikTok users have created new slang marked by substituting certain words for others 鈥 for example, 鈥渦nalive鈥 instead of 鈥渄ead.鈥 See Melina Delkic, Leg Booty? Panoramic? Seggs? How TikTok Is Changing Language, N.Y. Times (Nov. 19, 2022),
[11] See, e.g., Jack Nicas & Paul Mozur, The Battle Over Who Controls the Internet, N.Y. Times (Oct. 15, 2024),
[12] See, e.g., Shannon Bond, Meta warns that China is stepping up its online social media influence operations, NPR (Nov. 30, 2023),
[13] Kelvin Chan, These are the countries where TikTok is already banned, Assoc. Press (Apr. 26, 2024),
[14] Meaghan Tobin & Amy Chang Chien, Taiwan, on China鈥檚 Doorstep, Is Dealing With TikTok Its Own Way, N.Y Times (May 16, 2024),
[15] See, e.g., Christopher A. Bail et al., Assessing the Russian Internet Research Agency鈥檚 Impact on the Political Attitudes and Behaviors of American Twitter Users in Late 2017, 117 Proc. Nat鈥檒 Acad. Sci. 243, 243鈥50 (2020) (finding 鈥渘o evidence that interacting with [Twitter accounts operated by the Russian Internet Research Agency] substantially impacted 6 political attitudes and behaviors鈥 and concluding the 鈥渞esults suggest Americans may not be easily susceptible to online influence campaigns鈥).
[16] See, e.g., David Gilbert, Why China Is So Bad at Disinformation, WIRED (Apr. 29, 2024), ; Joshua Kurlantzick, China鈥檚 Influence Efforts Are Expanding 鈥 But They Also Often Are Failing, The Interpreter (Feb. 23, 2023), .
[17] See Jon Bateman & Dean Jackson, Countering Disinformation Effectively: An Evidence-Based Policy Guide, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Jan. 31, 2024),
[18] The Papers of James Madison Ch. 14, Doc. 50 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1st ser., 1962鈥77), . The notion of freedom of expression as a 鈥渂ulwark of liberty鈥 dates to Cato鈥檚 Letter No. 15. Thomas Gordon, Cato鈥檚 Letters, or Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, and Other Important Subjects 96 (London 1737), available at /research-learn/catos-letter-no-15.
[19] Eloise Barry, These Are the Countries Where Twitter, Facebook and TikTok Are Banned, TIME (Jan. 18, 2022),