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One Weird Trick for Fixing Elections
This article originally appeared in .
On Sept. 30, conservative outlet Just the News allegations that an agency within the Department of Homeland Security helped create a shadowy public-private partnership called the Election Integrity Partnership (EIP) to censor and suppress right-of-center voices and media in the run-up to the 2020 election with the help of Big Tech.
The headline was alarming: 鈥淥utsourced censorship: Feds used private entity to target millions of social posts in 2020.鈥 The targets of censorship, according to the article, were some of the biggest names on the right鈥擟harlie Kirk, Sean Hannity, Gateway Pundit, Fox News, and the New York Post鈥攚hose social media posts on platforms like TikTok, Twitter, and Facebook were labeled, soft blocked, or removed. On his show, Hannity reacted to the news by alleging that the EIP created an 鈥.鈥 The story also charged that the government and the partnership colluded to evade First Amendment protections, and noted that each EIP partner was handsomely rewarded with millions in federal dollars after the 2020 election. Finally, the story warned, the partnership wasn鈥檛 finished鈥攊t has continued its work during the run-up to the 2022 midterm elections.
The EIP responded a week later. In a , the partnership pushed back on the story and the resulting media coverage, essentially claiming that it was all heat and no light. According to the EIP, it was simply flagging election-related disinformation online, and passing it on to social media companies in order to protect the legitimacy and integrity of the 2020 vote. If conservative accounts were disproportionately targeted, according to the partnership, it was because 鈥渢he vast majority of false rumors and disinformation about the 2020 election spread primarily through far-right influencers catering to Trump-voting audiences, reflecting the asymmetrical nature of the phenomenon.鈥 The partnership also said that the social media platforms alone were responsible for determining what actions to take after the EIP shared its findings. Finally, the partnership wasn鈥檛 operating secretively, the statement said. It , , and held daily webinars in the run-up to the election, and afterward wrote - and a massive .
It is difficult to assess the full details of what exactly went on, especially regarding the EIP鈥檚 underlying motives. But we do know this: You don鈥檛 have to be a conspiracy theorist to be concerned about the First Amendment implications of the EIP鈥檚 work, even as described by the EIP itself鈥攅specially with tomorrow鈥檚 elections on the line.
There is a serious argument that a partnership like the EIP violates at least the spirit, if not the letter, of the First Amendment. The idea behind the partnership, according to the EIP鈥檚 , came from four students at the Stanford Internet Observatory (SIO) who were interning at the Department of Homeland Security鈥檚 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). They observed that there was no agency in the federal government tasked with identifying, monitoring, and correcting election-related disinformation online. As the report itself acknowledged, a U.S. government response to domestic 鈥渆lection disinformation鈥 was problematic, because it 鈥渨ould likely be excluded from law enforcement action under the First Amendment.鈥 The EIP wasn鈥檛 wrong.
Government itself has only strictly limited power to restrict false information鈥攆or example, when it satisfies the specific, narrow standards for fraud, defamation, or perjury. These constitutional guardrails are wise precisely because such vague concepts as 鈥渄isinformation鈥 give officials too much enforcement discretion, which they predictably use to target critical, dissenting, and minority voices. Denying government the power to implement such an inherently manipulable concept as 鈥渄isinformation鈥 honors the cardinal First Amendment principle of 鈥,鈥 which ensures that the general power to discern what鈥檚 true and false belongs to the American people.
In an apparent attempt to avoid this constitutional problem, the EIP was created 鈥渋n consultation with CISA鈥 on July 26, 2020鈥100 days out from the Nov. 3 national election. The groups within the EIP seemed almost designed to make conservative heads explode. Two housed at liberal universities? Check. A New York-based social media ? Check. A connected to a Washington, D.C.-based establishment think tank? Check.
The EIP then set up a ticketing system whereby private stakeholders, like the NAACP or the Democratic National Committee, could submit 鈥渢ickets,鈥 or reports, flagging possible examples of disinformation. While most tickets came from private stakeholders and EIP analysts, at least one government agency submitted tickets. According to the partnership, CISA did not submit any tickets, but 5% of tickets came from the State Department鈥檚 .
When the EIP decided a ticket qualified as disinformation and sent it to the social media platforms, the companies took notice. According to the EIP after-action report, the social media giants responded at least 75% of the time to the tickets in which they were tagged. Thirty-five percent of the URLs the partnership shared with Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, TikTok, and YouTube 鈥渨ere either labeled, removed, or soft blocked,鈥 the EIP. The tech platforms disproportionately targeted large accounts supporting then-President Donald Trump, which, according to the partnership, were claiming the election was or would be stolen. These 鈥渞epeat spreaders鈥 included the actor James Woods, Gateway Pundit, Donald Trump Jr., Donald Trump, Charlie Kirk, Mark Levin, and Breitbart News, among others.
The government鈥檚 role in forming EIP and implementing its ticketing system, as well as social media companies鈥 high level of responsiveness to EIP鈥檚 tickets, suggest that the government may be sharing its power with ostensibly private actors to such an extent that the latter are effectively functioning as government agents. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has sensibly recognized that when certain actions are undertaken by private sector actors that are 鈥溾 with the government, such actions are subject to the same constitutional limits that apply to the government. Likewise, the court has held that when government private actors to engage in censorship, that too violates the First Amendment. The involvement of the DHS and State Department in the project does make one wonder how much pressure the social media companies felt to address the tickets that EIP sent to them.
As of now, it seems the federal government is at least approaching that constitutional entanglement line. Recent from The Intercept places the EIP within a larger, troubling context. Lee Fang and Ken Klippenstein detail how the DHS, originally created in the aftermath of 9/11 to focus on terrorist threats emanating from abroad, has been expanding and altering its mission to address what it considers domestic threats, including a broad concept of information that it deems potentially dangerous; moreover, in seeking to suppress such information, DHS has often collaborated with powerful tech companies without sufficient oversight from Congress. The agency鈥檚 ill-fated proposal for a Disinformation Governance Board in April was only the most well-known and widely ridiculed instance of bureaucratic proliferation and mission creep that has accelerated under both the Trump and Biden administrations.
In their zeal to play gatekeeper, a group of elite institutions, partnering with government agencies, is picking and choosing what Americans see online. Whatever you want to call that, it isn鈥檛 democracy.
First Amendment and broader culture-of-free-speech concerns aren鈥檛 the only problem presented by the EIP, however. Consider the issue of bias. In December 2021, seven members of the EIP published in the Journal of Quantitative Description. The article focused on the social media accounts cited above, which the authors argue acted as superspreaders of election disinformation, helping sow doubt about the integrity and legitimacy of the 2020 election. The authors admit that the monitoring process for identifying and flagging pieces of disinformation likely 鈥渞eflect biases of individual analysts.鈥 These analysts, as Stanford Internet Observatory鈥檚 Ren茅e DiResta , were 鈥渢rained student researchers鈥 .
That鈥檚 a salutary admission, but one sentence later the authors wave it away. 鈥淭hough the organizers did not record the political orientations of the Tier 1 analysts,鈥 the EIP authors write, 鈥渙ur experience working with them suggests that diverse political orientations were present and that the overall group skewed towards the center left.鈥 For many who are skeptical about the EIP already, this might only induce resigned laughter, since they likely perceive Stanford students as being far to the left of the average American. Imagine if the federal government helped form a similar partnership that employed students from Liberty University to flag disinformation online. The reaction would be largely the same, only coming from the opposite side.
According to the partnership, its is to defend American democracy, particularly the integrity and legitimacy of our electoral system. These are laudable, worthwhile goals, but the way the EIP went about pursuing them demonstrates a paternalistic lack of faith in the intelligence of ordinary Americans. In their zeal to play gatekeeper, a group of elite institutions, partnering with government agencies, is picking and choosing what Americans see online. Whatever you want to call that, it isn鈥檛 democracy.
As the Supreme Court said, an Orwellian 鈥溾 is antithetical not only to individual liberty, but also to the entire idea of self-government. Accordingly, the court has stressed, our system to discover truth 鈥渙ut of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.鈥 It鈥檚 difficult for that process to play out unencumbered when the government itself has a policy of telling proxies whose tongues to cut out.
Transparency, arguably absolute transparency, is necessary to counter the free speech dangers that the EIP poses by policing inherently slippery concepts like鈥渕isinformation鈥 and 鈥渄isinformation.鈥 The partnership does seem to understand the value of showing its cards. In its statement, the EIP stated that it 鈥渉as always operated openly and transparently鈥 and that any 鈥渋nsinuation that information about our operations or findings were secret up to this point is disproven by the two years of free, public content we have created.鈥
Radical transparency is the least voters should expect of such a partnership at least partially funded by taxpayer money and involving elements of the national security bureaucracy.
It would be more accurate to say that the EIP operated while hidden in plain sight. An obscure partnership between little-known research centers and ABC government agencies may be technically transparent, but that matters little if the vast majority of the population has no idea the arrangement exists. A large portion of the blame goes to the popular and resource-rich media outlets that weren鈥檛 interested in covering such developments for readers and viewers until a comparatively small conservative website did it for them.
Since the EIP was formed to exchange information between its partners in real time, it presumably could create a web tool to allow interested citizens and organizations to also watch it work in real time and provide some sort of due process for accounts flagged for disinformation. And if the partnership鈥檚 existence continues beyond the midterms, especially in the runup to the 2024 election, it should prioritize recruiting analysts who represent the ideological and political diversity of the American electorate and provide that data to the public.
With the potential for abuse so grave, blog posts, Twitter threads, and downloadable after-action reports won鈥檛 cut it. Radical transparency is the least voters should expect of such a partnership at least partially funded by taxpayer money and involving elements of the national security bureaucracy. Such a commitment would go a long way toward demonstrating to the public that the EIP has nothing to hide鈥攁nd is glad to have the American people watch it like a hawk.
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