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Lawsuit challenging new Title IX regulations dismissed
After the Department of Education issued Title IX regulations protecting students鈥 free speech and due process rights in sexual misconduct cases on May 6, four lawsuits were filed challenging the legality of these new regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act. Earlier this week, Know Your IX et al. v. DeVos was dismissed without prejudice, meaning the plaintiffs may try to make their case again by amending their complaint. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue, so Tuesday鈥檚 ruling is not a legal determination about whether the new regulations are lawful. Still, this dismissal is an important step away from depriving students of the important safeguards for their free speech and due process rights contained in the new regulations, which took effect in August following months of public notice and comment.
Earlier this week, Know Your IX et al. v. DeVos was dismissed without prejudice, meaning the plaintiffs may try to make their case again by amending their complaint.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) brought the Maryland case on behalf of plaintiffs Know Your IX, the Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Girls for Gender Equity, and Stop Sexual Assault in Schools, all of which are nonprofit organizations that purport to work toward equal access to education. They claimed in their May 14 lawsuit against ED, Secretary of Education Elisabeth DeVos, and former Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Kenneth L. Marcus that the new Title IX regulations 鈥渃reat[ed] an arbitrary and wholly unexplained disparity between its treatment of sex discrimination鈥 and discrimination based on other protected classes, and that they are arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
FIRE doesn鈥檛 have an institutional stance on all the provisions these plaintiffs challenged, but we certainly have a stance on the plaintiffs鈥 claim that ED 鈥渞edefined鈥 sexual harassment. To the contrary, it simply reaffirmed the standard set by the Supreme Court over 20 years ago.
The court didn鈥檛 get that far, though. Before a court rules on the merits of the case, plaintiffs must establish standing 鈥 essentially, that they have suffered a legal harm and now is the right time to make the legal argument they are making. As the court reviews,
To establish Article III standing and invoke federal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show (1) an 鈥渋njury in fact,鈥 (2) a sufficient 鈥渃ausal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,鈥 and (3) a 鈥渓ikelihood鈥 that the injury 鈥渨ill be redressed by a favorable decision.鈥
Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc.
Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc. argued that it has associational standing because one of its member attorneys who represents students, faculty, and staff in Title IX proceedings alleges she will have a harder time resolving cases in her clients鈥 favor. Judge Richard D. Bennett wrote that this result is speculative, and in any case, 鈥淐OPAA鈥檚 argument seems to hinge[ ] on an attorney鈥檚 desire to assist her clients in a regulatory environment that she prefers鈥 (internal quotations omitted). He further explained: 鈥淎ttorneys do not suffer a recognizable injury in fact under Article III whenever the law causes changes to their docket . . . .鈥 Even if COPAA had alleged economic injury, he wrote, it would have to show that this injury 鈥渇alls within the 鈥榸one of interests鈥 sought to be protected by the statutory provisions whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint.鈥 In short, Title IX was enacted to protect students, not their attorneys. Accordingly, the court concluded that COPAA does not have standing to sue.
Girls for Gender Equity
Girls for Gender Equity argued that it has organizational standing because it would have to spend more of its resources advocating against the new regulations and educating its members and others about changes in the law, thus suffering an injury. The court rejected this argument, writing that 鈥淸t]he Fourth Circuit held that voluntary 鈥榖udgetary choices鈥 are not cognizable injuries under Article III.鈥 Furthermore:
If this Court were to allow a party whose organizational mission is to engage in policy advocacy to claim injury on the basis of a need to engage in that exact activity, any advocacy group could find standing to challenge laws when there are changes in policy.
Sound familiar? I wrote almost the exact same thing two years ago in the context of SurvJustice, Equal Rights Advocates, and the Victim Rights Law Center鈥檚 lawsuit challenging the rescission of the April 4, 2011 鈥淒ear Colleague鈥 letter. In that case, a federal court in California bewilderingly seemed to accept the argument that the plaintiff organizations were injured by ED鈥檚 rescission of the DCL because it caused 鈥渇rustration of [the plaintiffs鈥橾 organizational mission[s]鈥 and 鈥渄iversion of . . . resources to combat鈥 that frustration.
In this case, the court ruled that Girls for Gender Equity does not have standing to sue.
Stop Sexual Assault in Schools
Stop Sexual Assault in Schools made a similar argument to Girls for Gender Equity, which was rejected on the same grounds. Additionally, Judge Bennett wrote that SSAIS鈥檚 injury could not be redressed by the court because if it does rule in SSAIS鈥檚 favor, the organization will still have to do what it complains of having to do now: 鈥渦pdate its informational and training materials and 鈥榚ngage in the resource-draining task of recreating itself as an expert in state and local policies.鈥欌 SSAIS, therefore, does not have standing to sue.
Know Your IX
Finally, lead plaintiff Know Your IX argued that 鈥淸t]he Rule鈥檚 provisions directly frustrate Know Your Title IX鈥檚 mission,鈥 and that it will face an increase in 鈥渃alls and training requests鈥 that will require the expenditure of more resources.
The court reiterated that an organization鈥檚 decisions about resource allocation is not an issue for the courts to redress. Here, it looks back at SurvJustice et al. v. DeVos, noting that at least in that case the plaintiffs offered some evidence that changes in the organizations鈥 case loads were not merely speculative. Judge Bennett wrote, though, that even if Know Your IX had done so, it would still need to show 鈥渁n involuntary reallocation of resources.鈥 Know Your IX 鈥渉as not demonstrated that the Rule forced the organization to take action as a matter of law,鈥 only a 鈥渦nilateral and uncompelled response to the shifting needs of its members.鈥 Accordingly, it does not have standing to sue.
Where things stand now
This development means that there is now one fewer potential avenue for a ruling against these important safeguards for student rights.
FIRE, Independent Women鈥檚 Law Center, and Speech First had filed a motion to intervene in this suit. We will review our options moving forward as plaintiffs decide whether to appeal or amend their complaint.
Our motion to intervene was granted in Pennsylvania et al. v. DeVos and denied in New York v. Department of Education and Victim Rights Law Center et al. v. DeVos. Moreover, motions for preliminary injunctions have been denied in Pennsylvania et al. v. DeVos and New York v. Department of Education. More coverage of and documents from all four cases challenging the new Title IX regulations can be found on our page dedicated to this litigation.
While a decision on the merits stating that the new Title IX regulations are lawful would be welcome, this development means that there is now one fewer potential avenue for a ruling against these important safeguards for student rights.
You can view the order to dismiss below:
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